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Abstract
Many practitioners and academics have argued that the risk of investing in
international markets has increased in the last ten years; and that the greater the
real or perceived risk of an investment, the less likely it is that a particular
investment will be made.
The effectiveness with which these risks are managed in the oil and natural gas
industry are important for several reasons. First, oil and natural gas are
essential for sustaining current economic activity and promoting economic
growth. Second, the balance between supply and demand determines the price of
oil and natural gas and their impact on the economies of all nations. Therefore
the price and availability of oil and natural gas are also matters of national
security. Third, the search for a secure supply of oil and natural gas affects the
political, military and economic relations between countries.
This study addresses four questions. What institutions and strategies are
available for managing political and investment risk in the international oil and
gas industry? How and when did they develop? In what circumstances is each
used? How effective have they been?
The institutions available for managing risk include oil and gas exploration
contracts, domestic courts, national constitutions, bilateral investment treaties,
multilateral investment treaties, governmental and non-governmental regulatory
agencies and international energy forums. The organizations that manage
uncertainty and risk include international oil companies, oil service companies,
national oil companies, and public and private providers of financial capital and
insurance. Their strategies include corporate finance, joint ventures, project
finance, alliances and energy diplomacy.
This study supports the view that existing institutions change and new institutions
are created when organizations perceive that a change in the status quo will
enhance the profitability of existing projects and make new projects economically
feasible. However, the process by which these institutions are created and evolve
is easier to describe in theory than it is to explain in practice, because
institutional development takes place in small steps; and frequently involves
several organizations, some trying to change the existing institutional
environment and others trying to preserve it.
Finally, the institutions supporting the international oil and gas industry can be
arranged in a hierarchy based on their relative importance. Contracts, informal
relationships and transparency are the most important institutional mechanisms
used by international oil and natural gas companies to manage risk. The second
line of defense includes domestic law, bilateral treaties, and international courts
and tribunals. A third line of defense includes multilateral treaties and
international forums.
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Chapter 1- Introduction
1.1 Statement of the Problem
Many practitioners and academics have argued that the risk of investing in international markets
has increased in the last ten years. The evidence cited for this conclusion include: (1) the Arab
Spring and its aftermath and more recently the military conflicts in Syria and Iraq, which
demonstrate the risks associated with even seemingly stable regimes (2) forced contract
renegotiations and expropriations in the mining, oil and natural gas sector in several resourcerich countries (Venezuela, Argentina and Russia) and (3) recurring financial crises and the need
for more regulation of financial organizations (for example, Basel II and III, Solvency II). More
generally, after a period of relatively low investment claim losses, there is a renewed awareness
that investment risk, driven by political events, is still difficult to predict.1
This is particularly true in the international oil and natural gas industry in which there is often a
shift in bargaining power over the life of a project between the nation supplying the natural
resource, the transit countries through which the export pipeline passes, and the multinational
companies providing the financial capital and technical expertise needed to develop and export
the resource. Until exploration is completed and the field development facilities and pipeline
infrastructure are built, superior bargaining power lies with the multinational companies,
because the host government often does not have the financial, technical, and marketing
resources needed to find and produce the oil and natural gas. However, after the investment in
the facilities and export infrastructure have been made by the foreign investors, the bargaining
power shifts to the host government and the transit countries, because they have the power to
interrupt operations, pass legislation that impairs the value of the investment or in the worst
case, expropriate the project assets.2
In addition, oil and gas projects often extend over several decades. During that time, the host
government and its economic policy and political ideology may change. Consequently, what
the host government and transit countries previously considered attractive financial terms, may
1

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Investment and Political Risk, World Bank Group (Washington,
DC 20433, 2012), p. 42
2
David Wood, Petroleum Economics, Risk and Opportunity Analysis, Chapter 10 in Betty J. Simkins and Russell E.
Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and the Future of Energy
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013), p. 243
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no longer meet their expectations. Raymond Vernon described this phenomenon as an
“obsolescing bargain”.3 The new regime may demand larger financial returns than originally
agreed, from what have become, mature, low risk projects. The demands usually take the form
of forced contract renegotiation, increased fiscal take or expropriation.4
The inclination of host governments to demand more favorable terms, are not just observed in
developing countries. For example: (1) the state of Alaska has increased the financial burden
levied on oil investors several times since the commissioning of the TAPS (Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System) in 1977. More recently, the ACES (Alaska’s Clear and Equitable Share) fiscal
system implemented in 2007, significantly increased the fiscal take from the oil companies.5 (2)
The government of the United Kingdom increased the corporate tax on North Sea oil producers
(termed supplemental corporation tax) three times between 2002 and 2011, placing an increased
fiscal burden on oil companies operating mature oilfields with declining production. (3) In the
OECD countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), asset
expropriation is rare and tax increases are usually not made on a retroactive basis, but in the
developing world, outright expropriation and the forced acceptance of onerous financial terms by
investors were still common between 2000 and 2010, for example, in Algeria, Ecuador,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Argentina and Venezuela.6
1.2 Importance of the Problem
The effective management of these risks is important for several reasons. First, oil and natural
gas are essential for sustaining current economic activity and promoting economic growth.
Second, the balance between supply and demand determines the price of oil and natural gas; and
their impact on the economies of all nations. Therefore the price and availability of oil and
natural gas are also matters of national security. Third, the search for a secure supply of oil and
3

Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US Enterprises, (New York: Basic Books., 1971)
David Wood, Petroleum Economics, Risk and Opportunity Analysis, Chapter 10 in Betty J. Simkins and Russell E.
Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and the Future of Energy
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013) p. 242
5
Dan E. Dickinson and David Wood, “Alaska Tax Reform: Intent Met with Oil” (Part 1 of 2), Oil & Gas Journal, May
25, 2009, 20-24.; Dan E. Dickinson and David Wood, “Alaska Tax Reform: Gas Raises Questions” (Part 2 of 2, Oil &
Gas Journal, June 1, 2009, 20-26.
6
David A. Wood, “Long Term Fiscal Contractual Stability Proves Elusive, Part 1”, Petroleum Review, February 2005,
38-42.; David A. Wood, “Long Term Fiscal Contractual Stability Proves Elusive, Part 2.” Petroleum Review, April
2005, 44-48.
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natural gas affects the political, military and economic relations between countries.
Consequently, every developed and developing country has placed energy policy at or near the
top of its national priorities.
Supply and Demand
World consumption of petroleum liquids (crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), has
increased from 63.1 MBPD (million barrels per day) in 1980 to 90.5 MBPD in 2013.7 The
consumption of petroleum liquids is expected to increase from 90.5 MBPD in 2013 to 115.0
MBPD in 2040 (Table A.1). The production of petroleum liquids is expected to increase from
90.1 MBPD 8 (Table A.2) in 2013 to 96.6 MBPD by 2020 and 115.0 MBPD in 2040. These
forecasts are based on the assumption that the price of crude oil rises to $106 per barrel in 2020
and $163 per barrel in 2040.9
Increasing oil production from 90.5 MBPD in 2013 to 115.0 MBPD in 2040 would be
challenging even if the world’s existing and future reserves were under the control of oil
importing nations, however sixteen of the twenty largest oil companies are national oil
companies (NOCs); and Saudi Arabian Oil Company, Saudi Arabia’s national oil company,
controls ten times the reserves that ExxonMobil does.10 NOCs own between 73% and 90% of
the world’s oil reserves and accounted for 61% of oil production in 2012. NOCs also own 68%
of the world’s natural gas reserves and account for 52% of natural gas production.11 The U.S.
Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) reference case projects that OPEC production will
increase slightly in absolute terms, but decline in relative terms from 61% of world production in
2012, to somewhere between 39% and 43% of total global liquids production by 2040.12 In
addition, an estimated 60% of the world’s undiscovered reserves are likely to be in countries, in
7

U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/global_oil.cfm, EIA,
September 9, 2014
8
Ibid
9
U. S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2013 with Projections to 2040 (Washington, DC:
EIA, 2013), p. 31
10
The Economist, “Really Big Oil, National Oil Companies”, August 10, 2006 referenced in Andrew Inkpen and
Michael Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry – Management, Strategy & Finance (Tulsa, OK: PennWell
Corporation, 2010), p. 52
11
David G. Victor, David R. Hults and Mark C. Thurber, Oil and Governance – State-Owned Enterprises and the
World Energy Supply (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 3
12
U. S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2013 with Projections to 2040 (Washington, DC:
EIA, 2013) p. 31
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which the domestic NOC has essentially exclusive access to onshore and offshore oil prospects in
its home country.13 NOCs are therefore of great importance to their country’s economy; to the
energy security of importing countries; and the balance between supply and demand. Figure A.1
presents the historical record of oil prices from 1861 through 2013, before and after adjusting for
inflation.
Global capital expenditures and exploration expense (CAPEX) in the exploration and production
sector of the oil and gas industry are expected to increase from $682 billion in 2013 to $723
billion in 2014.14 The increase in CAPEX has been driven by increasing exploration and
production activity in deep and ultra-deep offshore areas and the continuing strong demand for
oil and natural gas.15 However, the price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) has declined from
approximately $106 per barrel in June 2014 to $56 per barrel at the end of 2014. Consequently,
CAPEX in 2015 is expected to decline to $571 billion. This level of expenditures assumes that
the average price of WTI in 2015 rebounds to $70 per barrel.16 On January 5, 2015 the spot
price of WTI was $50.05 per barrel.
The amount of financial and physical capital involved in oil and natural gas exploration make
them particularly vulnerable to the obsolescing bargain. Consequently, as the risk of contract
renegotiation and expropriation increases, investments in oil and natural gas that would
otherwise be made will not be made; reducing the supply and increasing the price of oil and
natural gas. This risk can be reduced or reallocated by the development of appropriate
institutions. Understanding how these institutions can and do reduce risk is important to
developed and developing countries for several reasons.

13

Silvana Tordo, Brandon S. Tracy and Noora Arfaa, National Oil Companies and Value Creation, World Bank,
Working Paper 218, (Washington, DC: 2011), p. xi
14
Barclays, Global 2014 Capital Spending Outlook, December 9, 2013,
http://www.pennenergy.com/content/dam/Pennenergy/onlinearticles/2013/December/Global%202014%20EP%20Spending%20Outlook.pdf
15
PR Newswire Services, “Global Oil and Gas CAPEX to Increase to $1,201 Billion in 2013,”
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-oil-and-gas-capex-to-increase-to-1201-billion-in-2013187890961.html
16
Oil & Gas Journal, “Sharp drop expected in global E&P spending in 2015, study says”, Oil & Gas Journal, January
8, 2015, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2015/01/sharp-drop-expected-in-global-e-p-spending-in-2015-studysays.html?cmpid=EnlDailyJanuary82015
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First, most of the “easy oil” has been found and is being depleted through production by the
NOCs. Second, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company is operating close to maximum production
capacity, 11.5 MBPD, and will eventually be unable to act as a “swing” producer, that is, a
producer that can increase production when oil supplies are “tight” to ensure a balance between
supply and demand, and the stability of the price of oil.
Third, the periodic resurgence of resource nationalism in democratic oil exporting countries like
Mexico and Venezuela; and the policies of more authoritarian regimes like Russia to retain or
regain control of their oil and natural gas resources is a continuing threat to direct foreign
investment and reduces the opportunities for IOCs (international oil companies) to explore for oil
and natural gas.
Fourth, IOCs possess technology that could be used successfully in countries that rely almost
exclusively on their national oil companies (NOCs) for exploration and production technology.
Because the NOCs and their governments have been reluctant to allow the international oil
companies (IOCs) to explore in their countries, the IOCs have been forced to engage in
exploration in more difficult environments, for example, ultra-deep water and the Arctic Circle
where exploration and production cost and technological risk are much higher.
Fifth, many national oil companies, for example, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) in Mexico,
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) in Venezuela and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)
in Iran have not reinvested enough of their oil and gas revenue in the discovery of new oil and
natural gas reserves to replace the reserves that are being depleted. Sixth, the inability of most
NOCs to focus exclusively on commercial objectives and the absence of a true bottom line have
frequently led to the mismanagement of financial resources.
Seventh, the lack of transparency in the operation and financial performance of many national oil
companies makes private sector lenders reluctant to lend to these NOCs, consequently not all
sources of capital are available to national oil companies. Eighth, international law provides
limited enforcement mechanisms as a deterrent to the expropriation of assets owned by IOCs in
developing countries, or to the unilateral abrogation of agreements between host countries and
international oil companies.
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1.3 Purpose of the Study
The challenges created by these issues can be met to varying degrees by the development of
appropriate institutions. Understanding how these institutions have developed and how effective
they have been in managing political and investment risk is important to the economic efficiency
of the oil and natural gas industry and to the world economy. In addition, understanding the
development of and the role played by institutions in the oil and natural gas industry can expand
our knowledge of institutional development, economic history and political development in
general.
1.4 Defining Risk
Risk is frequently understood to mean the possibility of failure or loss, but it is better understood
as a dispersion or range of the possible outcomes. Risk is therefore a measure of the degree of
uncertainty or variability of outcome and does not necessarily reflect a high probability of failure
or loss.17 This definition is applicable to political risk as well as commercial and financial risk.
In the upstream sector of the petroleum industry (exploration and production) risk can be divided
into two major categories, below ground risk and above ground risk. Below ground risk includes
resource uncertainty, technical uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. Resource uncertainty
refers to the presence or absence of oil and natural gas in a specific drilling prospect, it is either
there or it is not (a discrete uncertainty); and the amount of oil and natural gas, if a discovery is
made (a continuous uncertainty). Technical uncertainty refers to the potential, but unknown
engineering problems that may be encountered in producing the oil or gas. Environmental
uncertainty refers to the potential for accidental damage to land or marine life. Above ground
risk includes adverse changes in economic conditions (intentional or unintentional), the inability
to enforce the terms of a contract, changed fiscal terms imposed by the host government
(division of revenue), resource nationalism, discriminatory regulatory behavior and the
placement of geopolitical considerations (national security, energy security, and political
alliances) above legal and financial commitments. Table A.3, in Appendix I presents a more
complete list of risks and uncertainties in the oil and natural gas industry.

17

David Wood, Petroleum Economics, Risk and Opportunity Analysis, Chapter 10 in Betty J. Simkins and Russell E.
Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and the Future of Energy
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013) p. 239
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1.5 Foreign Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment
Lipson (1985) noted that “until recently…portfolio investments [debt] and direct investment
[equity] had long shared roughly similar treatment [levels of protection]. They could be
characterized jointly in a single regime governing all foreign capital”.18 He traced the
divergence to the late 1960s, when expropriations proliferated, but debt renunciation (and default
more generally) did not. He concluded that “The fundamental difference is the better
institutionalization of international finance [emphasis in the original]. …. The answer lies in two
basic differences between the network of international lending and equity investments [foreign
direct investment]”.19 First , multinational corporations have largely independent interests in
expropriation disputes, but financial organizations have joint interests because of the network of
interbank liabilities. Second, because the interests of direct investors are separable, their home
governments have less incentive to become involved in one another’s expropriation disputes.20
This is an important consideration for two reasons. First, the question arises whether two
regimes still exist almost 30 year later. Second, if two different regimes do exist, then a choice
must be made between studying the “debt” regime, the “equity” regime or both. In this study,
the emphasis is on the foreign direct investment regime (equity) in the international oil and
natural gas exploration industry. This includes an analysis of the recent record of expropriation,
major deals and alliances between IOCs, NOCs and host country governments; recent disputes
between IOCs, NOCs and host governments; recent adjudications of disputes; and the recent
record of compliance with such arbitration rulings and court decisions.
1.6 Plan of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 outlines the central research question and subsidiary research questions to be answered
in this study. Chapter 3 reviews previous research on the development and role of institutions
and organizations in theory and practice. Chapter 4 describes the research design used in the
study. Chapter 5 describes the research methods. Chapter 6 describes the research findings.
Chapter 7 presents six case studies which are compared to the observations and conclusions in

18

Charles Lipson, Standing Guard – Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Los
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1985), p. 170
19
Ibid
20
Ibid, p. 174-175.
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Chapter 6. These cases are consistent with the conclusions reached in Chapter 6. Chapter 8
presents a summary, conclusions and proposals for future research.
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Chapter 2 - Research Questions
2.1 Central Research Question
The evaluation of political and investment risk have always been a part of exploring for oil and
natural gas, however, the role played by institutions in managing this risk, has frequently been
subsumed in this political and investment analysis. Second, although books have been written on
how petroleum law 21 and international investment treaties 22 can be used in theory to manage
risk, less attention has been given to (1) how and when these institutions developed, (2) the
extent to which international oil companies, national oil companies, oilfield service companies
and host governments have used these institutions and (3) how effective they have been in
managing risk. This study examines these questions.
2.2 Subsidiary Questions
Question #1
What evidence, if any, exists that the frequency of expropriation of foreign direct investment has
increased in the oil and natural gas industry; and under what circumstances is it more or less
likely to occur?
Question #2
Not all disputes between host countries and IOCs are related to expropriation. In fact, most
disputes are the result of a disagreement regarding the terms and conditions of a contract or some
unanticipated event. This raises three questions. (1) How frequent are investment disputes, (2)
How are these disputes usually resolved and (3) What circumstances are more or less likely to
lead to disputes?
Question #3
What contract provisions are most often included in a contract to limit the number of disputes
and resolve those that occur?

21

Ernest E. Smith, John S. Dzienkowski, Owen L. Anderson, John S. Lowe, Bruce M. Kramer and Jacqueline L.
Weaver, International Petroleum Transactions, Third Edition, (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 2010)
22
Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, (Kluwer
Law International, 2009); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation
(USA: Oxford University Press, April 8, 2010)
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Question #4
What are the primary clauses in a bilateral investment treaty and how effective have they been in
resolving disputes?
Question #5
Are countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment treaties less likely to be
involved in investment disputes in an international court or tribunal? Are countries with more
reliable legal systems as measured by government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,
and control of corruption less likely to be involved in disputes in an international court or
tribunal?
Question #6
Does a relationship exist between the amount of oil a country consumes and the number of
bilateral treaties it has signed? Does a relationship exist between the FDI outflows from a
country, the FDI inflows to a country and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has
signed? Are the rulings of most courts and tribunals fair and are they complied with?
Question #7
What sources of capital are available to finance oil and gas exploration and development? What
financing structures are available? What business structures are available? Do alliances offer
any advantages in managing risk and how politically feasible are they?
Question #8
What financial instruments are available for managing risk after a project is in operation?
Question #9
What is financial reporting quality and transparency? Can financial reporting quality be
measured and if so how? Does financial reporting quality matter from a theoretical perspective?
Does financial reporting quality matter from a practical perspective? Does the quality of
financial reporting affect the amount of foreign direct investment in a country?

17

Question #10
How important are multilateral treaties in the oil and gas industry? How important are
international energy forums? Who is responsible for the quality of financial reporting in the
international environment? How have signature bonuses affected NOCs, IOCs and host
governments? What is energy diplomacy and does it matter in the competition for oil and natural
gas? How do countries balance foreign direct investment and national security? These questions
are addressed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 3 - Previous Research
3.1 Institutions and Organizations in Theory
In its classical economic formulation, markets are assumed to be efficient in the absence of
regulation. In its neoclassical formulation, markets are thought to work most of the time, but
may require minimal regulation to maintain an orderly market. The basic assumptions of
classical and neoclassical economics are: (1) people have rational preferences among outcomes
that can be identified and assigned a value, (2) individuals maximize their utility and firms
maximize their profits, (3) people act independently on the basis of full and relevant
information,23 and (4) the classical and neoclassical economic models assume that capital is
optimally allocated through the action of markets and prices.
Another approach to economics in general and political economy in particular is the “new
institutional economics”. New institutional economics (NIE) has its origin in two articles by
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937) and The Problem of Social Cost (1960).
Institutional economists work within a modified neoclassical framework, which includes
consideration of efficiency, that is, transaction and distribution costs.24
The NIE approach differs from neoclassical economics in several ways. First, it rejects the
assumption that people act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.
Institutional economists argue that decisions are made on the basis of less than complete and
accurate information, because the acquisition of information involves costs in time and money
and both are constraints. Second, engaging in transactions involves the incurrence of transaction
costs and transaction risk, which influence the decision making process and therefore the
decision. Third, the two preceding points make a formal system of rules desirable because
formal rules lower information and transaction costs, and reduce the risk associated with a
particular transaction. The issues addressed by institutional economics include: organizational
arrangements, property rights,25 transaction costs,26 credible commitments, modes of governance,
persuasive abilities, social norms, ideological values, decisive perceptions, gained control,
23
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enforcement mechanisms, asset specificity, human assets, social capital, asymmetric information,
strategic behavior, bounded rationality, opportunism, adverse selection, moral hazard,
contractual safeguards, surrounding uncertainty, monitoring costs, incentives to collude,
hierarchical structures, and bargaining strength.
The two principal classes of participants in the institutional economic framework are institutions
and organizations. There are no universally accepted definitions for the terms “institution” and
“organization”, but most scholars working within the NIE framework follow Douglass North's
definitions. Institutions are the "rules of the game", consisting of both the formal legal rules and
the informal social norms that govern individual behavior and structure social interactions.
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political economic and social
interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Throughout history,
institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange.
… They evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future; history in
consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the historical performance of
economies can only be understood as a part of a sequential story.27

Organizations are those groups of people and the governance arrangements they create to
coordinate their group action against other groups also performing as organizations, for example,
business firms, universities, clubs, medical associations, and unions.28 These definitions will be
used throughout this study.
Coase, North, Williamson and others argue that the role of institutions has been underestimated
and that institutions are not a neutral or unchanging background against which rational
individuals and organizations make decisions. Rather institutions “together with the standard
constraints of economics … define the choice set and therefore determine transaction and
production costs and hence the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity”.29
Institutions not only define the “choice set”, but also influence organizations, consequently
changing both the organizations and the institutions over time. “Incremental change comes from
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the perceptions of the entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that they could do
better by altering the existing institutional framework at some margin”.30
Institutions (contracts, domestic laws, treaties, international law, formal rules and informal
customs) and the entities that implement them (regulatory agencies, financial exchanges, nongovernmental agencies and inter-governmental agencies) are involved in virtually every stage of
the oil and gas exploration, development and production process. This involvement extends
beyond the neoclassical assumptions regarding rules and regulations needed to maintain an
orderly market and includes laws regarding capital formation, ownership structure, foreign direct
investment, capital allocation, domestic and international product pricing, taxation, capital
repatriation and social service expenditures.
Although it might be possible to discuss institutions in this study without discussing the types of
organizations, the influence of institutions on specific organization and the influence of these
organizations on specific institutions will be clearer if organizations are explicitly discussed.
The decision to include organizations in the analysis is also driven by North’s observation that
“institutions do not emerge spontaneously to create and nurture the market, but rather reflect the
interests of those players [organizations] in a position to put them in place”.31 Therefore, how
energy exporting and energy importing countries define their short term and long term interests
and how they relate those interests to other aspects of their energy, international security and
climate agenda will determine the direction that institutional development takes.32
3.2 Institutions in Practice
The institutions employed in practice include: (1) national constitutions, domestic law,
international law, bilateral and multilateral investment agreements (e.g. North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), and the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes), courts and tribunals, (2) contract provisions, partnership
structures, financing structures and political risk insurance; and (3) institutions promoting
30
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transparency, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the
Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE). A detailed discussion of the development and operation
of the institutions used by the oil and natural gas industry is presented in Chapter 6.
3.3 Organizations in Practice
The organizations in the international oil and gas industry can be divided into three broad
categories: (1) national governments (2) national oil companies and (3) international oil
companies. The next three sections examine the politics, policies, and objectives of each of these
types of organizations.
3.3.1 National Governments
National governments are the representatives of the people and therefore, at least in theory, act to
enhance the welfare of the people in that country. In countries exporting oil and natural gas, this
principally consists of the development of energy policy related to the discovery, production and
sale of oil and natural gas. Energy policy includes approving the organizations that will be
granted drilling rights in the country, the rate of production allowed, and the division of revenue
between the national government and the IOCs or foreign NOCs operating in the country. The
investment policy of national governments can change over time and this represents in the
broadest sense the risk to foreign direct investment. This section examines the politics, policies
and objectives of some of the larger oil exporting countries and their governments.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia possesses almost one-fifth of the world's proved oil reserves and is the largest
exporter of petroleum liquids in the world. In 2013, Saudi Arabia produced an average of 11.592
MBPD (million barrels per day) and exported an estimated 8.731 MBPD of petroleum liquids.
Far East Asia received approximately 54 percent of Saudi Arabia's crude oil exports and the
majority of its refined petroleum products and natural gas liquids (NGL) exports. In 2013, Saudi
Arabia exported an average of 1.326 MBPD of petroleum liquids to the United States, which
accounted for 21.4% of total U.S. petroleum imports. Saudi Arabia's economy remains heavily
dependent on petroleum exports. Petroleum exports accounted for almost 90 percent of Saudi
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Arabia’s total export revenues in 2011, according to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries’ (OPEC) Annual Statistical Bulletin 2012. 33
The state oil company, Saudi Arabian Oil Company, has exclusive rights to explore for and
produce oil and natural gas in the country. Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources and the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals have oversight of the Saudi
Arabian Oil Company and the oil and natural gas industry. The Supreme Council, which is
composed of members of the royal family, industry leaders and government ministers, is
responsible for petroleum and natural gas policy, including contract review and long term
strategic planning. Saudi Arabian Oil Company’s financial performance is ranked in the upper
middle classification, one level below Statoil and Petrobras, which are considered the two best
managed NOCs and one level above Petroleos de Venezuela S.A (PDVSA) and Petroleos
Mexicanos (Pemex).34
Viewed from the outside, internal politics do not appear to be an obstacle to the formation and
implementation of a consistent energy policy in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia’s
policies and production level have been consistent with its public statements, that is, to provide
enough oil to maintain the world price of oil at a level that will not lead to a global recession.
However, the spot price of crude oil (West Texas Intermediate) has declined from $106 per barrel
in June 2014 to $56 per barrel at the end of December 2014. Given the significant reduction in
the price of crude oil, Saudi Arabia might have been expected to reduce its production to bring
the global supply of oil into balance with demand. However, Saudi Arabia has continued to
produce oil at its prior level. There are several possible reasons why Saudi Arabia has continued
to produce at its previous level. First, Saudi Arabia may not want to reduce its market share of
crude oil exports relative to other countries, particularly those countries in OPEC. Second, Saudi
Arabia’s marginal cost of oil production is significantly lower than other countries within and
outside of OPEC. They can therefore operate at a profit even at substantially lower oil prices.
Third, they may want to discourage the production of unconventional oil and gas (shale oil and
shale gas) in the United States and Canada. Fourth, they may want to put economic and fiscal
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pressure on the Shia dominated governments of Iran and Iraq who have from time to time sought
hegemony in the Middle East.
Russia
In 2013, Russia produced an average of 10.498 MBPD of petroleum liquids and exported an
estimated 7.201 MBPD, making it the third-largest producer of oil (after the United States and
Saudi Arabia). Russia was the second-largest producer of natural gas in 2012 (after the United
States). In 2012, the state owned company Rosneft produced 2.448 MBPD, 23.7% of Russia’s
oil production of 10.315 MBPD and LUKoil, a private company, produced 1.670 MBPD, 16.2%
of Russia’s oil production.
The state-owned company, Gazprom dominates Russia's upstream gas industry, producing
approximately 74% of Russia's total natural gas output. Gazprom also controls most of Russia's
natural gas reserves. More than 65% of proved reserves are directly controlled by the company
and additional reserves are controlled by Gazprom through joint ventures with other
companies.35
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia privatized its oil industry by selling
state-owned companies to private investors. Beginning in the late 1990s, a small number of
private sector companies drove growth in the oil sector and several international oil companies
attempted to enter the market, with varying degrees of success. Although foreign companies can
invest in Russia, the investment is generally made in partnership with a Russian company,
usually Rosneft if the investment is in the oil sector and Gazprom, if the investment is in the
natural gas sector. 36
Several ministries are involved in the oil and gas sector. The Ministry of Natural Resources
issues field licenses, monitors compliance with license agreements, and levies fines for violations
of environmental regulations. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for tax policy in the energy
sector, and the Ministry of Economic Development is responsible for regulations of tariffs and
energy sector reforms. The Ministry of Energy oversees energy policy formulation and
enforcement. Within these ministries, regulatory agencies involved in the sector include the
35
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Federal Energy Commission (oil transportation tariffs), the Commission for State Policy on the
Oil Market (formulates policy for regulating oil and oil product markets), and the Commission
on Protective Measures in Foreign Trade and Customs and Tariff Policy (sets crude oil export
tariffs).37
Since 1999, the Russian oil and gas industry has undergone renationalization. Russia’s tax and
environmental regulatory agencies have been instrumental in helping to affect this
renationalization. This is discussed in more detail in the case study of TNK-BP in Chapter 7.
Russia’s energy policy is directed at two objectives, (1) the use of oil and gas export revenue to
develop the domestic economy and (2) the use of oil and gas exports to create and maintain
political alliances with countries bordering Russia. A combination of economic sanctions
imposed on the Russian economy by the United States and its coalition partners in response to
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its incitement of and assistance to Russian separatists in
Eastern Ukraine; the decline in the spot price of crude oil (West Texas Intermediate) from $106
per barrel in June 2014 to $56 per barrel at the end of December 2014 and the country’s heavy
reliance on oil and gas exports for foreign exchange reserves have led to a run on the ruble and
are likely to lead to a recession in Russia in 2015.
Venezuela
In 2013, Venezuela produced an average of 2.489 MBPD and exported an estimated 1.712
MBPD of petroleum liquids. Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) is the largest employer in
Venezuela and accounts for a significant portion of the country's GDP, government revenue, and
export earnings.
During the 1990s, Venezuela took steps to liberalize its petroleum sector. In 1999, Venezuela
passed the Gas Hydrocarbons Law, which was intended to diversify the economy by promoting
natural gas development and expanding the role of natural gas in Venezuela's energy sector. This
legislation allowed private operators to own 100 percent of natural gas projects, in contrast to the
ownership rules in the oil sector which required that Venezuela own a majority interest in all new
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oil projects. The Gas Hydrocarbons Law also reduced royalty and income tax rates on natural
gas projects relative to the rates applied to oil projects.38
However, after the election of President Hugo Chavez in 1999, the Venezuelan government
continuously increased its involvement in the oil industry.39 In 2002, almost half of PDVSA's
employees went on strike in protest against the policies of President Chavez and his
administration, essentially bringing the company's operations to a halt. After the strike, PDVSA
fired 18,000 employees and restructured the organization to strengthen the government’s control
over the company and increase the loyalty of middle and upper management. In 2006, President
Chavez initiated the nationalization of oil exploration and production in Venezuela, by
mandating the renegotiation of ownership of all projects and giving PDVSA a minimum of 60%
ownership in all oil and gas projects (old and new).40
In 2007, President Chavez announced a public referendum on several proposed constitutional
amendments, one of which would have entitled the state to a controlling ownership position in all
new natural gas projects, similar to a constitutional law governing the oil sector. However,
Venezuelan voters defeated the referendum in December 2007.41 Chavez successor, Nicolas
Maduro, was elected President of Venezuela on April 15, 2013 and has continued the policies of
his predecessor.
Mexico
In 2004, Mexico produced an average of 3.848 MBPD of petroleum liquids and exported an
estimated 1.792 MBPD of petroleum liquids. In 2013, Mexico produced an average of 2.908
MBPD of petroleum liquids and exported an estimated .803 MBPD of petroleum liquids.
In early December 2013, after years of state ownership and declining production, Mexico’s
President Enrique Pena Nieto proposed significant energy reforms. On December 12, 2013 the
Mexican Senate passed a new law with 95 votes in favor and 28 votes against, allowing domestic
and foreign companies to explore and develop oil fields, for the first time since 1938. This
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legislation was subsequently referred to the lower Mexican Chamber of Deputies where it was
approved by a vote of 345 in favor and 134 against. President Pena Nieto signed the energy law
on December 20, 2013.42
Advocates of the new law argued the status quo was unacceptable, because Mexico was facing
depleted reserves and declining output.43 The law is intended to restore the efficiency of the oil
and natural gas industry in Mexico, which is suffering from corruption, inefficiency and an
inability to successfully implement new technologies. The reforms also propose improving the
transparency and effectiveness of national finance.44
The reforms would allow exploration and production contracts that include: licenses, productionsharing agreements, profit-sharing agreements, and service contracts. Prior to this legislation,
only service contracts, in which foreign companies were paid for services rendered, were
allowed. Under the new legislation, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), will remain a state- owned
company, but will be given more budgetary and administrative autonomy and will have to bid
competitively with other oil and gas companies on new projects.
On June 19, 2014, the conservative National Action Party (PAN) said that it would only support
the energy reforms if President Pena Nieto agreed to electoral reforms that could have the effect
of weakening his party’s (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI), hold on power.45 In addition,
Mexico's left-wing parties had previously announced that they intended to promote a 2015
referendum to repeal the new energy laws that have already been passed.46 However, on August
6, 2014, the Mexican Senate voted 78 to 26 in favor of a package of legislation that implements
these changes to the Mexican oil industry and President Pena Nieto signed the laws on August
11, 2014.
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On October 1, 2014 Mexico's state oil company Pemex and Exxon Mobil Corp signed a noncommercial agreement to jointly explore potential upstream and downstream business
opportunities.47 On the same day, a new private sector Mexican oil company, named Sierra Oil
& Gas, was announced. Sierra Oil & Gas has secured equity investment commitments of $525
million from U.S. private equity firms Riverstone Holdings LLC and EnCap Investments. 48
Developments in Mexico illustrate several of the features of the oil and natural gas industry
described earlier: (1) the depletion of “easy oil reserves” (2) the need to employ more advanced
technology in oil producing regions where the “easy oil” has been depleted; (3) the uncertainty
created by a continuing struggle between populist nationalism and resource sovereignty on the
one hand and economic efficiency and investor protection on the other.
China
In 2013, China produced 4.459 MBPD of petroleum liquids, making it the fourth largest
producer in the world; and consumed 10.277 MBPD, making it the second largest petroleum
liquids consumer in the world, after the United States. The government's energy policies are
dominated by the country's growing demand for oil and its reliance on oil imports. The National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a department of China's State Council, is the
primary policymaking, planning, and regulatory authority in the Chinese energy sector, but four
other ministries oversee various aspects of the country's oil policy.
In July 2008, the government created the National Energy Administration (NEA) to act as the
principal energy regulator. The NEA and the NDRC are responsible for approving new energy
projects in China, setting domestic wholesale energy prices, and implementing the central
government's energy policies. In January 2010, the government formed a National Energy
Commission for the purpose of consolidating and conforming energy policies among the various
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agencies under the State Council.49 China's national oil companies (NOCs) also have significant
influence in the formation of energy policy in China.
Between 1994 and 1998, the Chinese government reorganized most state-owned oil and natural
gas assets into two vertically integrated firms that own both upstream and downstream assets, the
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petroleum and Chemical
Corporation (Sinopec). These two firms operate a range of local subsidiaries, and together
control China's upstream and downstream oil markets. CNPC is the largest upstream oil
company in China and together with its publicly-listed subsidiary, PetroChina, accounts for an
estimated 53% and 75% of China's total crude oil and natural gas production, respectively.
Sinopec’s operations are focused on refining and distribution, which account for 76% of
Sinopec’s revenues. Other state-owned oil firms have emerged over the past several years. For
example, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is responsible for offshore oil
exploration and production.50
Onshore oil production in China is mostly limited to China's NOCs, but international oil
companies (IOCs) have been granted greater access to offshore oil prospects and technically
challenging gas fields, mainly through production-sharing contracts (PSCs) and joint ventures
(JVs) with international oil companies. Chinese investment laws require that China's NOCs
must hold the majority interest in each production sharing agreement and retain the right to
become the operator after development costs have been recovered by the partners in the
production sharing agreement.51
The Communist Party of China (CPC) is the sole governing party in China, but it coexists with
eight other legal parties that constitute the United Front. It is therefore more appropriate to
discuss China’s internal politics and policy in the context of competing bureaucracies rather than
political parties. This competition includes disputes regarding internal pricing and subsidies,
greater state sponsorship of one energy source over another, conflict over the priority to be given
to environmental protection and national economic development and the extent to which state
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owned companies (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC) are allowed to negotiate their own deals with
IOCs and host states.
Nigeria
In 2013, Nigeria produced 2.373 MBPD of petroleum liquids, making it the 13th largest
producer in the world and exported 2.254 million barrels per day. The Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was created in 1977 to provide oversight of the oil and natural
gas industry and promote oil and natural gas development. In 1988, the NNPC was divided into
12 subsidiary companies to more effectively regulate the sub-sectors of the industry. The
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), a department within the Ministry of Petroleum
Resources, is also an important regulator of the Nigerian oil and gas industry.
Most of Nigeria's major oil and natural gas projects are funded through joint ventures (JVs)
between international oil companies (IOCs) and NNPC, in which NNPC is the majority
shareholder. Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) are usually employed on deep water
projects and generally include more attractive terms for the IOC than those projects onshore or in
shallow water, to provide an incentive to the IOCs to invest in deep water projects. 52
The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which was initially proposed in 2008, is expected to change
the structure and fiscal terms governing the oil and natural gas sectors in Nigeria, if it becomes
law. The bill is intended to ensure that the management and allocation of petroleum resources in
Nigeria are conducted in accordance with the principles of good governance, transparency and
sustainable development. The most recent version of the PIB was submitted to the Nigerian
National Assembly on July 18, 2012, but has not yet been passed.53 If the PIB is passed in its
current form, it will impose changes to new and existing contracts that could make some projects
commercially unviable, particularly deep water projects. Some of the most contentious
provisions of the PIB are the potential renegotiation of existing contracts with IOCs, changes in
tax and royalty structures, deregulation of the downstream sector, restructuring of NNPC, a
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concentration of oversight authority in the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and a mandatory
contribution by IOCs of 10% of monthly net profits to the Petroleum Host Communities Fund.54
Because of the regulatory uncertainty created by the delay in passing the PIB, there has not been
a licensing round for oil exploration in Nigeria since 2007. This regulatory uncertainty extends
to the natural gas industry as well. The result is that less investment has been made in new
projects than might otherwise have been made. Developments in Nigeria illustrate several of the
features of the oil and natural gas industry described earlier: (1) the depletion of “easy oil
reserves”, (2) the need to employ more advanced technology, and (3) the uncertainty created by a
continuing debate over changes in national energy laws.
Iraq
Iraq’s oil production has increased from 2.399 MBPD in 2009 to 3.058 MBPD in 2013.
Approximately 75% of Iraq's crude oil production comes from the oil fields in southern Iraq and
the rest comes from the northern oil fields near Kirkuk. The majority of Iraqi oil production
comes from just three very large oil fields: (1) Kirkuk, (2) the North Rumaila field in southern
Iraq, and the South Rumaila field also in southern Iraq.
The Iraqi Ministry of Oil oversees oil and natural gas exploration and production in all areas of
Iraq, except the Kurdish territory, through its operating entities the North Oil Company (NOC)
and the Midland Oil Company (MDOC) in the north and central regions of Iraq; and the South
Oil Company (SOC) and the Missan Oil Company (MOC) in the southern region of Iraq. Oil
production in the northern region is controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Production in this region varies because of disputes between the KRG and the central Iraqi
government in Baghdad. Independent assessments by FACTS Global Energy and the Middle
East Economic Survey suggest that crude oil production capacity under the control of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) may have reached 400,000 BPD (barrels per day) at the
end of 2013.55
In addition, political disputes between the Sunni, Shia and Kurdish sects within Iraq and the
absence of a law governing the development of Iraq's oil and natural gas, have slowed the pace at
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which Iraq’s oil production has increased. The proposed Hydrocarbon Law, which would govern
Iraq’s contracts with and regulation of oil and gas companies, has been under review in the
Council of Ministers since October 26, 2008, but has not received final passage.56 The violence
created by I.S.I.S. (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) or I.S.I.L. (The Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant) in Iraq’s Northern and Western provinces have brought some Iraqi oil fields under
the control of I.S.I.S making the passage of this bill even less likely.
Furthermore, the ruling party’s (Dawa Party) insistence on centralizing policy making in the Shia
dominated government in Baghdad under the leadership of former Prime Minister, Nouri alMaliki exacerbated these conflicts. The election of Haider al-Abadi, who is thought to be a more
inclusive leader, may help bring Sunnis, Shias and Kurds closer together, making cooperation on
oil production and oil policy easier, but I.S.I.L.’s control of oil fields and refineries in Northern
and Western Iraq could reduce oil production in the long term. The next section examines the
motivation, behavior and policy of national oil companies.
3.3.2 National Oil Companies
National oil companies control a substantial part of world oil production and world oil reserves.
Consequently, they play a critical role in the balance between supply and demand. Understanding the
policies and behavior of national oil companies is therefore important for understanding the operation
of the international oil and gas industry.
Victor identified four main approaches to understanding NOCs in the literature: (1) Theoretical and
historical efforts to explain why NOCs exist (2) Assessments of economic efficiency that have
demonstrated considerable variation in the financial performance of NOCs (3) NOC’s political
behavior, a topic of particular interest to political scientists, who have tried to explain the abnormal
politics in resource-rich countries and (4) Reform, a continuing topic in resource-rich countries,
especially those in which NOCs have performed poorly or engaged in perverse political behavior (or
both).57 This section focuses on 1 and 3.
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Why NOCs Exist
A World Bank study prepared by Tordo et al. examined why NOC’s exist.58 From that study
Victor identified four principal reasons why governments have created and maintained NOCs
rather than rely on private sector companies and simply impose taxes on them.59
(1) Weakness of Public Institutions. Governments must perform many functions, including the
regulation of a complex oil and natural gas industry. The institutions needed to regulate the
industry are often weak or non-existent in developing countries. Governments may create an
NOC to facilitate the collection of information and the regulation of the industry by giving
themselves direct access to the country’s oil and gas operations.60 61 A central NOC can track
and allocate rents and provide fiscal oversight of the industry. For example, in Angola one of
the main functions of its NOC, Sonangol, is to regulate the sector and oversee the behavior of the
large number of IOCs active in the country.62
(2) Inadequacy of the Domestic Private Sector. Maximizing the value of oil and gas resources
requires coordination among many firms and often few if any of these firms exist in a country with
previously unknown hydrocarbon resources. Governments often create an NOC to help encourage the
orderly development of the oil and gas industry.63 In addition, many NOCs are given the
responsibility for developing domestic industry suppliers (e.g. drill pipe, drilling fluids, seismic
exploration and waste water treatment) and customers (utilities, industrial and automotive). In Saudi
Arabia, for example, the Saudi national oil company led the development of the nation’s
petrochemical industry.64 65
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(3) Desire for Internal Control over the Revenue Created by Oil and Gas Production. Control
over the cash inflow from production and sale of oil is of major importance to a host
government, whether it intends to use the revenue for public purposes or is intent on diverting it
for private gain.66 67 (This is a separate issue from the more general concern about industry
regulation.) In countries that are primarily dependent on oil and gas exports for government
revenue and in which rentier politics predominate, the key to controlling the rents is to control
the NOC. This explanation is usually reformulated in public statements as a matter of national
pride and the people’s desire for the state to exercise sovereignty over the country’s oil
resources.68
(4) The Desire to Project Economic and Political Power Abroad. An NOC can be used to exert
political influence abroad as well as at home, for example Russia has used the threat of
termination of gas delivery to Western Europe and countries that were previously a part of the
Soviet Union to retain influence in these countries.69 These four explanations are related to each
other and more than one is usually operating in a country at any given time.
Political Behavior of NOCs
The creation of an NOC is itself a political act; and given their size and importance to the
national economy, they inevitably become involved in national politics. The studies of political
behavior of NOCs can be divided into two categories. One category emphasizes the principalagent relationship between the host government and the NOC, in which the principal (the state
and its people) try to encourage an agent (the NOC) to align its behavior with the principal’s
interests.70
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A second group of studies demonstrate how NOCs become political actors to advance their own
agenda and increase their power. For example, Mommer 71 demonstrated how NOCs that began
as rent collectors for the state (e.g. PDVSA) acquired a larger range of functions over time,
including oil production and refining operations abroad.72 A large number of case studies have
shown how NOCs have become states within a state; insulating themselves from external review
and so increasing their freedom to pursue their own self-interest. Russia’s Gazprom is one of the
more obvious examples.73 Some of the literature on Saudi Aramco points to similar
conclusions.74 The next section examines the politics, policies and objectives of international oil
companies.
3.3.3 International Oil Companies
Between 1970 and 1980, a substantial portion of the world’s oil reserves were nationalized by the
governments of the oil producing countries. For example, in 1976 the nationalization of the
Kuwait Oil Company was completed and was 100% owned by the government of Kuwait.75 In
1979, during the Islamic Revolution the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was nationalized
and was 100% owned by the government of Iran.76 In 1974, Saudi-Aramco was 60 % owned by
the Saudi government, but by 1980 it was 100% owned by the Saudi government.77 The
immediate effect of these nationalizations was to substantially reduce the oil and gas reserves
under the control of the IOCs. The secondary effect was the consolidation of oil and gas
companies in the private sector. For example, Exxon and Mobil merged in 1999 and Conoco and
Phillips Petroleum merged in 2002.
The expropriation of the IOCs’ oil and gas reserves called into question the future of the IOC’s.
In addition, the IOCs’ rationale for merging and their long term future depended on their ability
to successfully develop very large oil and natural gas projects in difficult environments, often
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involving complex geology and significant technical risk.78 Consequently, much of the research
on international oil companies between 1985 and 2005 focused on their future role in the
industry.
However, the IOCs have succeeded in making this transition and are still among the largest oil
and natural gas companies in the world.79 In 2012, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron
Corp, BP Plc and ConocoPhillips, had combined net income of $121.2 billion (30.1% of all oil
and gas companies reporting profits in that year. (These figures do not include the countries of
the Middle East and Africa which do not report net income). These five companies produced
7.47 MBPD of oil or 8.4% of the 89.8 million barrels per day produced worldwide in 2012.
They also produced 31.7 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas or 7.8% of 404.0 billion cubic
feet produced per day worldwide in 2012. (These numbers include the countries of the Middle
East and Africa).80 In 2012, the next 20 largest U.S. oil companies reported $20.2 billion in net
income on 2.9 MBPD of oil production.81 The IOCs therefore still control substantial capital
inflows that can be invested in future exploration and production projects.
In 2008, these five firms accounted for $125.1 billion (23.4%) of total capital expenditures and
exploration expense (CAPEX) of the $534.7 billion spent on oil and gas exploration worldwide.
(These figures do not include the NOCs of the Middle East and Africa which do not report
capital expenditures and exploration expense). In 2012, these five firms accounted for 23.6% of
the $579.5 billion spent on CAPEX for oil and natural gas exploration worldwide.82 83 84 85 (This
$579.5 billion does not include the capital expenditures and exploration expense made by the
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NOCs in the countries of the Middle East and Africa and is therefore lower than the $617.2
billion estimated by Barclays Bank for 2012. Barclays estimated the CAPEX made by the NOCs
of the Middle East and Africa at $26.3 billion and $23.8 billion, respectively in 2012. Adding
these two figures to $579.5 billion gives $$629.6 billion ($579.5 + $26.3 + $23.8 = $629.6),
which is close to the $617.2 billion Barclays estimated for global CAPEX, in 2012.) 86
However, these five firms accounted for only 29.8 billion barrels and 33.0 billion barrels of
proved liquid reserves (oil and LPG) in 2008 and 2012, respectively, or 2.0% of liquid reserves
worldwide (conventional and unconventional) of 1,687.3 billion barrels. 87 88 89
Changing Role of the IOCs
Between 1995 and 2005, the role of the IOCs evolved from technically integrated and selfsufficient exploration and development companies, to general contractors, coordinating the
operations of a large number of suppliers and subcontractors who perform specific tasks
(producing and analyzing seismic data, provide drilling rigs and crews, and providing a wide
range of oil field services). The IOCs provide the project management and organizational skills
these large projects require. The largest IOCs also function as bankers by providing or arranging
the financing needed to explore and develop large fields in difficult environments.90 For this
reason, IOCs have substantial bargaining leverage at the beginning of negotiations with a host
country.91
The Politics of International Oil Companies
IOCs are not primarily political actors but rather economic actors. They tend to be involved in
political issues only to the extent that the actions of government affect the economics of their
operations and their future profitability. However, the price and the availability of oil and natural
gas industry are of intense interest to constituents and governments in developed and developing
countries. Oil and natural gas is therefore the object of considerable government legislation.
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Bradley characterizes the political behavior of private sector oil companies as either defensive or
offensive. Defensive behavior refers to oil companies trying to influence legislation initiated by
others that it believes will increase its costs or reduce its revenues. Offensive behavior refers to
oil companies initiating legislation that they believe will reduce their costs and increase their
revenues. This latter example is the kind of political behavior that North had in mind when he
said “Incremental change [in institutions] comes from the perceptions of the entrepreneurs in
political and economic organizations, that they could do better by altering the existing
institutional framework at some margin”.92
Gourevitch proposed a more nuanced explanations for policy formation and institutional
development. These explanations are the production profile, intermediate associations, state
structure, economic ideology and the international system. All five explanations have been
dominant at some point in the political history of the oil and gas industry.93
Whether the oil and gas industry’s political behavior is driven by offensive or defensive
considerations, or by one of the explanations given by Gourevitch, the fact remains that the oil
and gas industry has a considerable presence in capitols around the world. For example, in 2013,
the oil and gas industry, including refining, transportation and distribution, spent $145 million on
behalf of 190 clients and employed 765 lobbyists in Washington, DC.94
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Chapter 4 Research Design
4.1 Overall Design
The research design for this study has several components. The first is an analysis of the record
of expropriations in the oil and gas industry (Question #1). The second is an examination of
those disputes that were brought before an international court or tribunal (Question #2). The
third and fourth review the provisions most often included in contracts (Question #3); and
bilateral treaties (Question#4) to minimize risk and uncertainty. The fifth and sixth analyze the
relationship between bilateral treaties, the frequency of disputes, and the reliability of legal
systems (Question #5); and the relationship between the amount of oil a country consumes,
foreign direct investment outflows and inflows and the number of bilateral treaties a country has
signed (Questions #6). The seventh examines the sources of capital; and the risk characteristics
of various financing structures, business structures, and alliances (Question #7). The eighth
reviews the financial instruments available for managing risk after a project has commenced
operation. The ninth examines the origins and relevance of financial and operational
transparency (Question #9). The tenth evaluates the scope and relevance of multilateral
investment treaties, international energy forums and energy diplomacy (Question #10). The
research design also includes interviews with government and non-government officials and six
case studies which test the conclusions drawn in Chapter 6.
4.2 Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis used in Question #1 is the individual instances of a country expropriating oil
and gas assets. The unit of analysis used in Question #2 is the individual disputes brought before
an international court or tribunal. The unit of analysis used in Questions #3 and #4 are the
specific provisions included in contracts and bilateral treaties. The unit of analysis used in
Questions #5 and #6 are individual countries. The unit of analysis used in Question #7 is the
types of transactions and transaction structures. The unit of analysis used in Question #8 is the
specific financial instruments available for managing risk. The unit of analysis used in Question
#9 is the specific governmental and non-governmental institutions responsible for financial and
operational transparency. The unit of analysis used in Question #10 is specific multilateral
treaties, international energy forums and individual acts of energy diplomacy. The unit of
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analysis in the case studies is the individual events that comprise six major developments in the
oil and natural gas industry.
4.3 Time Period Covered by Events
Question #1 includes expropriations between 1990 and 2014. Question #2 includes the cases
brought before the ICSID or some other tribunal between 1996 and 2014. Question #3 includes
provisions that have been used for several decades; and Question #4 draws on examples from
1948 to 1999. Question #5 uses the number of bilateral treaties signed by each country as of July
2014; the frequency of disputes between 1996 and 2014; and the ranking of country legal
systems by the World Bank in 2012. Question #6 uses the number of bilateral treaties in each
country as of July 2014, the amount of oil it consumed in 2012, and foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows and outflows in 2012. Question #7 references examples related to sources of
financing from 1944 through 2012; financing structures between 1960 and 2010; business
structures between 1966 and 2014; and alliances between 2010 and 2014. Question #8 uses
examples from 1969 to the present. Question #9 references events and sources between 2004
and 2012. Question #9 references events related to multilateral treaties between 2002 and 2013;
international energy forums between 1991 and 2013; financial reporting between 2000 and 2013;
signature bonuses between 2002 and 2011; and energy diplomacy between 2010 and 2011. The
events included in case #1 cover the period from 2011 to 2014; case #2 from 2009 to 2014; case
#3 from 1992 to 2005; case #4 from 2010 to 2014; case #5 from 1998 to 2014; and case #6 from
2003 to 2013.
4.4 Kinds of Evidence Already Available
The review of expropriations in the oil and natural gas industry includes 12 expropriations
between 2003 and 2012 (Question #1). The review of disputes includes 68 cases brought before
the ICSID or other international tribunals (Question #2). The review of contracts includes nine
specific examples of common contract provisions and five general examples (Question #3). The
review of bilateral treaties includes five specific examples of common bilateral treaty provisions
and three general examples (Question #4). The review of bilateral treaties, the frequency of
disputes and the reliability of legal systems includes the 24 largest oil importing and exporting
countries (Question #5). The analysis of bilateral treaties vs. oil consumption includes 66
countries; bilateral treaties vs. foreign direct investment outflows (191 countries); bilateral
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treaties vs. foreign direct investment inflows (213 countries); and the impartiality of decisions
(16 cases) (Question #6). The review of sources of capital, financing structures, business
structures and alliances includes six sources of capital, seven financing structures, three business
structures, and two types of alliances (Question #7). The review of the financial instruments for
managing risk is divided into two broad categories, commercial risk and non-commercial risk
(Question #8). The review of methods for measuring financial reporting quality describes two
approaches. The evaluation of the theoretical and practical importance of financial reporting
quality is based primarily on the existing literature. The relationship between the quality of
financial reporting and foreign direct investment was evaluated using a sample of 38 countries.
The reserve estimates made by producing countries and reported by various publications are
compared to estimates made by independent analysts. The practical implications of reserve
estimates were based on prior experience and general economic theory (Question #9). The
evaluation of the scope and relevance of multilateral investment treaties and international energy
forums was based on the number of these institutions and their ability to influence policy and
practice in the oil and natural gas industry. The effectiveness of energy diplomacy was
evaluated using media reports and the analysis of industry specialists (Question #10).
The interviews were conducted by telephone with government and non-government officials in
Washington, DC. Efforts to obtain interviews with executives working in private-sector oil
companies, oil service companies and national oil companies were unsuccessful. The six case
studies in Chapter 7 were developed from more than 100 media reports of the individual actions
comprising six major projects in the oil and gas industry.
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Chapter 5 – Research Methods
The general method used in this study is to compare theory to practice. This requires a
simultaneous explanation of why particular institutions exist and how they operate. To do this,
this study employs several research methods, including qualitative analysis (literature search,
historical events, interviews and case studies) and quantitative methods (industry statistics and
statistical methods).
5.1 The Process and Adequacy of the Evidence
5.1.1 History of Expropriations in the Oil and Gas Industry (Question #1)
The history of expropriations was developed by searching for online accounts of these events.
Examining the history of expropriations between 1990 and 2014 provided sufficient historical
perspective on expropriation to evaluate how frequently they occur and under what conditions
they are more or less likely to occur.
5.1.2 Disputes and Dispute Resolution (Question #2)
The list of disputes brought before a court or tribunal between 1996 and 2014 were obtained
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website. This
database includes 597 cases brought before an international court or tribunal over 20 years.
5.1.3 Common Contract Provisions (Question #3)
The provisions most often included in oil and gas contracts were compiled from law books,
journal articles and specific contracts. These sources provided summaries and examples of these
provisions, the purpose they serve and the specific language used; and are representative of the
provisions included in most contracts.
5.1.4 Bilateral Treaty Provisions (Question #4)
The provisions found in most bilateral treaties were developed by reference to law books and the
text of specific bilateral agreements. These examples were taken from 1948 to 1999. They
illustrate the evolution of these agreements and are representative of the types of clauses in most
bilateral treaties.
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5.1.5 Frequency of Disputes and Legal Systems (Question #5)
The number of bilateral treaties signed by each country as of July 2014 and the number of
disputes to which each country was a party, between 1996 and 2014, were obtained from the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website. The ranking of the
legal systems of each country in 2012 was obtained from the World Bank website. This data is
sufficient to test whether a relationship exists between the number of disputes and two specific
types of institutions (bilateral treaties and national legal systems).
5.1.6 Oil Consumption and Foreign Direct Investment (Question #6)
The number of bilateral treaties signed by each country as of July 2014 and the foreign direct
investment (FDI) outflows and inflows in 2012, were obtained from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website. The oil consumed in 2012, in each
country, was obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. These
data only compare these variables at one point in time, 2014 in the case of bilateral treaties and
2012 in the case of oil consumption and FDI inflows and outflows however, they are adequate to
make a preliminary judgment whether these variables are related to one another.
5.1.7 Capital Sources, Financing and Business Structures and Alliance (Question #7)
A general description of the sources of financing, financing structures, business structures, and
alliances were developed from recent books and journal articles. Specific examples of each were
developed by conducting an online search of recent transactions. These general descriptions and
specific examples are representative of the available sources of financing and choice of
commercial structures.
5.1.8 Financial Instruments for Managing Risk (Question #8)
A general description of the financial instruments available for managing risk was developed
from books and journal articles. The size and scope of the market for political risk insurance was
obtained from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the Berne Union websites.
5.1.9 Transparency, Financial Reporting and Reserve Estimation (Question #9)
The methods devised for measuring the quality of financial reporting were obtained from the
accounting literature. The evaluation of the theoretical importance of the quality of financial
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reporting was derived from the theoretical literature by North, Coase, Williamson and others.
The evaluation of the practical importance of the quality of financial reporting was derived from
recent journal articles and general economic theory. The analysis of the relationship between
the quality of financial reporting and direct foreign investment was developed using the existing
literature and the statistics compiled by UNCTAD. This study compares the quality of financial
reporting and foreign direct investment in only one year, but includes 38 countries.
A description of the methods used in the United States for estimating reserves was obtained from
the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
websites and several journal articles. An evaluation of actual estimates of oil and gas reserves,
were developed by comparing several sources including the Oil & Gas Journal (O&GJ), the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the BP Statistical Review of World Energy.
The method prescribed by the SPE and the SEC for estimating the quantity and value of reserves
is applied by all U.S. oil and gas companies and is widely accepted in other countries as well.
These institutions are therefore adequate to demonstrate the process by which these rules are
developed and the manner in which they are applied. The actual estimates made by the O&GJ,
EIA and BP are all derived from numbers published by individual countries. These estimates are
in some cases higher than would be justified if the SPE procedures and SEC rules were applied.
5.1.10 Multilateral Treaties, International Forums and Energy Diplomacy (Question #9)
The scope and relevance of multilateral investment treaties and international energy forums was
evaluated based on their number and their ability to affect energy policy and industry practice in
the international oil and gas industry. The effectiveness of these institutions and the
effectiveness of energy diplomacy were evaluated using media reports and the analysis of
industry specialists.
5.1.11 Interviews
Thirty one (31) letters were mailed to specific oil and gas executives on August 18, 2014. These
letters included eight to private sector oil companies, nine to national oil companies, five to oil
service companies, seven to U.S. government departments and agencies and two to international
agencies. Five responses agreeing to an interview were received. The remaining 26 potential
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interviewees either declined the interview or did not respond at all. The five interviews were
conducted between September 22 and September 30, 2014.
Two interviews were conducted with officials at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), one with
an official at the Overseas Private Investment Coporation (OPIC), one with an official at the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and one with an official at the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The interview questions were
designed to better understand how decisions are made in private and public sector organizations
and institutions, an aspect of decision making that is often not available in published media
reports or press releases.
5.1.12 Case Studies
The case studies were compiled from an extensive search of online sources (media reports,
journal articles, and NGO reports). The events included in case #1 cover the period from 2011 to
2014; case #2 from 2009 to 2014; case #3 from 1992 to 2005; case #4 from 2010 to 2014; case
#5 from 1998 to 2014; and case #6 from 2003 to 2013. Every account of an event was verified
by reference to another source reporting on the same event.
5.2 Analytical Techniques for Evaluating the Evidence
5.2.1 History of Expropriations in the Oil and Gas Industry (Question #1)
The analysis of the evidence related to expropriations is based on a comparison of the number of
expropriations per year and their relationship to the change in the price of oil.
5.2.2 Disputes and Dispute Resolution (Question #2)
The analysis of the evidence related to disputes and dispute resolution begins with a comparison
of the number of disputes in the oil and gas sector and the number of disputes in other industry
sectors. Next, it compares (1) the frequency of disputes and the changes in the price of oil; (2)
the number of disputes and the number of major transactions in the industry each year; (3) the
number of disputes and institutional effectiveness; and (4) the number of disputes and the choice
of rules and venues.
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5.2.3 Common Contract Provisions (Question #3)
This section begins with a description of the general contract provisions included in all contracts
and then describes more specialized clauses related to economic stabilization, the use of
domestic and foreign courts, and arbitration rules. This section also provides specific examples
from recent contracts.
5.2.4 Bilateral Treaty Provisions (Question #4)
This section begins with a description of choice of law clauses; then describes clauses intended
to promote, admit and protect the investment of foreign investors; and clauses prescribing
various standards of treatment (national, most favored nation, international, and minimum). This
section concludes with a description of the procedures to be followed by the expropriating
government; an analysis of the legal instruments most often referenced in these proceedings and
the time needed to resolve disputes in an international court or tribunal.
5.2.5 Frequency of Disputes and Legal Systems (Question #5)
This section uses scatter plots, measures of R2 and qualitative interpretations to (1) compare the
number of bilateral treaties and the number of disputes; and (2) the quality of the national legal
system and the number of disputes.
5.2.6 Oil Consumption, Production, and Foreign Direct Investment (Question #6)
This section uses scatter plots and qualitative interpretation to compare (1) the amount of oil a
country consumes versus the number of bilateral treaties it has signed, and (2) the FDI outflows
from a country versus the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed, (3) the FDI
inflows to a country versus the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed, and (4)
analyzes the effectiveness and the efficiency of international courts and tribunals using simple
frequency and count models.
5.2.7 Capital Sources, Financing and Business Structures and Alliances (Question #7)
This section describes the sources of financing and uses a combination of qualitative and
quantitative information to evaluate the relative importance of various sources of capital.
Second, it explains the financing structures used in the oil and gas industry. Third, it illustrates
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the business structures used in the oil and gas industry, using generic examples. Fourth, it
examines the feasibility of alliances between NOCs and IOCs and between two NOCs.
5.2.8 Financial Instruments for Managing Risk (Question #8)
This section is primarily descriptive, but includes some quantitative analysis of the size of the
market for political risk insurance.
5.2.9 Transparency, Financial Reporting and Reserve Reporting (Question #9)
This section begins with a definition of transparency and reporting quality. It then examines
several methods for measuring reporting quality. Third, it briefly reviews the theoretical
importance of transparency by restating the observations and analysis of the institutional
economists. Fourth, it examines the practical importance of the quality of financial reporting by
summarizing some of the literature published on this subject. Fifth, it uses scatter diagrams and
a qualitative assessment of the results to evaluate whether the quality of financial reporting
influences direct foreign investment. Sixth, it compares the methods used to estimate oil and
natural gas reserves and identifies some of the technical and political problems in evaluating
these estimates. Finally, it evaluates the practical importance of these estimates.
5.2.10 Multilateral Treaties, International Forums and Energy Diplomacy (Question #10)
This section describes the current state of multilateral treaties, particularly as they relate to direct
foreign investment. Next it provides a brief history of the development of international energy
forums. Third, it summarizes the convergence observed in the practice of financial reporting.
Fourth, it explains the practice of signature bonuses and cites two specific examples. Fifth, it
defines energy diplomacy; explains its intended purpose, and presents several arguments for and
against energy diplomacy.
5.2.11 Interviews
The length of the interviews was between 30 minutes and one hour. Only one interview was
conducted with each respondent. The questions were designed specifically for each respondent,
consequently there was relatively little overlap between questions and answers and therefore
only occasional opportunity for consensus. The interviews provided useful background
information and insight into the operation of the political risk insurance market and the
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international lending process in developing countries. However, the international oil companies,
national oil companies and oilfield service companies that were contacted all declined to be
interviewed, precluding the insight that might have been possible if even a few of these private
sector companies had agreed to be interviewed. The explanations and observation made by the
respondents are compared to the conclusions drawn from the quantitative and qualitative analysis
in Chapter 6.
5.2.12 Case Studies
The events in each case study are presented in chronological order. At the end of each case those
events are compared to the theory presented in Chapter 3 and the findings in Chapter 6.
5.3 Objectivity, Reliability, Completeness and Validity
5.3.1 History of Expropriations in the Oil and Gas Industry (Question #1)
The history of expropriation in the oil and gas industry was developed through a search of online
media accounts of these events. Two or more sources were used to ensure objectivity and
reliability. The search was continued until the events that had already been identified dominated
the search results. The validity of the accounts of these events was ensured by using respected
sources of journalism.
5.3.2 Disputes and Dispute Resolution (Question #2)
The objectivity and reliability of this data was ensured by relying on the UNCTAD database as a
primary source for disputes brought before various international courts and tribunals and
comparing this database with reports in the news media. No reports of cases were found in the
media that were not also reported in the UNCTAD database. The validity of the data is
supported by the extensive documentation and annotation of these cases in the database and the
reputation of UNCTAD itself. However, the UNCTAD database includes the following
disclaimer “The data included in this database are based on extensive research and interviews,
but represent only those claims which were disclosed by the parties or arbitral institutions”.95
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5.3.3 Common Contract Provisions (Question #3)
The objectivity and reliability of these contract provisions were insured by consulting several
scholarly sources. The provisions derived from these sources are complete in the sense that they
are representative of the most common provisions in oil and gas contracts. The validity of these
provisions is supported by the inclusion of the text from several recent oil and gas contracts.
5.3.4 Bilateral Investment Treaty Provisions (Question #4)
The objectivity and reliability of these bilateral provisions were insured by consulting several
scholarly sources. This list of bilateral treaty provisions is not meant to be comprehensive but is
representative of the most important and most common provision in bilateral investment treaties.
The validity of these provisions is supported by the inclusion of the text from several recent
bilateral investment agreements.
5.3.5 Frequency of Disputes and Legal Systems (Question #5)
The number of bilateral treaties signed by each country was obtained from the UNCTAD
database and should therefore be reliable. However, UNCTAD relies on self-reporting by
member countries regarding the treaties they have signed and those that are in force. The
accuracy and completeness of the data therefore depends on the timeliness and accuracy with
which member states provide updates to UNCTAD.
5.3.6 Oil Consumption and Foreign Direct Investment Outflows and Inflows (Question #6)
The oil consumed in 2012 in each country was obtained from the United States Energy
Administration (EIA) website. The EIA relies on the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Oil
& Gas Journal (O&GJ) and U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for this data.
The foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from each country and inflows to each country in
2012, was obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
which depends on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for this information.
The accuracy of this information is dependent on self-reporting by the member countries.
5.3.7 Capital Sources, Financing and Business Structures and Alliances (Question #7)
Descriptions of capital sources, financing structures, business structures and alliances were
developed from a review of articles published in trade journals, conference papers and industry
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reports. There is broad agreement in the literature on the meaning of these terms, the choices
within each category, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. The completeness of the
search was ensured by continuing the search until options that had already been identified
dominated the search results. The validity of the options was supported by identifying actual
examples of their use.
5.3.8 Financial Instruments for Managing Risk (Question #8)
Descriptions of the financial instruments available for managing risk were developed from a
review of books and articles published in academic and trade journals. The completeness of the
search was ensured by continuing the search until options that had already been identified
dominated the search results. The validity of the options was supported by identifying actual
examples of their use.
5.3.9 Transparency, Financial Reporting and Reserve Reporting (Question #9)
The objectivity and the reliability of the methods used to measure reporting quality and its
influence on investment decisions was based on an evaluation of the methods used by each
author and the statistical and substantive significance of their results. This literature review is
not complete, but is representative of the literature in this field. The estimates of world oil and
gas reserves have been criticized by some analysts as too optimistic. The limitations on the
objectivity and reliability of these estimates are discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, the practical
importance of these estimates was evaluated using a combination of theory and practice.
5.3.10 Multilateral Treaties, International Forums, NGOs and Energy Diplomacy (Question #10)
The purpose of specific multilateral treaties, international energy forums and NGO’s is a matter
of record, but evaluations of how effective these institutions have been has varied. The
effectiveness of these institutions is evaluated taking into account the political reality that each
faces. Energy diplomacy includes a wide range of strategies. This study includes a
representative list of the methods that have been employed in the practice of energy diplomacy.
5.3.11 Interviews
The interviews did not present as significant a challenge to objectivity and reliability as
expected. This is in part because many of the questions the interviewees were asked were
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procedural and could be answered by statements of fact rather than opinion or conjecture.
Second, the number of questions aimed at assessing motivation, were much smaller and the
answers were conditioned to some extent by the premise or fact situations described by the
interviewer. The inability to obtain interviews from private-sector oil companies, national oil
companies and oil field services companies limits the perspective on certain issues. Those
interviews that ran for an hour can be said to be complete, but the interviews that ran for 30
minutes were not complete, but addressed the most important issues. The correctness of the
interviewer’s understanding of the interviewees’ responses was verified by the interviewer
summarizing the interviewee’s responses at various points during the interview.
5.3.12 Case Studies
The objectivity and reliability of the events included in the timeline of each case were ensured by
using two or more sources to verify each event in the sequence. These cases are complete in the
sense that they report all of the major developments in each case and provide sufficient
continuity in the narrative for the reader to understand how each event is related to the one that
preceded it and the one that followed it.
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Chapter 6 – Research Findings
6.0 Central Research Question
The central research question in this study has four parts. What institutions and strategies are
available for managing political and investment risk in the international oil and gas industry?
How and when did they develop? How are they used by organizations in the oil and gas
industry? How effective have they been?
The institutions that facilitate the management of risk include oil and gas exploration
contracts, domestic courts, national constitutions, bilateral investment treaties,
multilateral investment treaties, governmental and non-governmental regulatory agencies
and international energy forums. The strategies for managing risk include corporate
finance, joint ventures, project finance, alliances and energy diplomacy. The
organizations that manage risk include international oil companies, oil service companies,
national oil companies, and public and private providers of financial capital and political
risk insurance.
The evidence in this study is consistent with North’s conclusion that “incremental change
[in institutions] comes from the perceptions of the entrepreneurs in political and
economic organizations that they [the entrepreneurs] could do better by altering the
existing institutional framework at some margin” 96 and that “institutions do not emerge
spontaneously to create and nurture the market, but rather reflect the interests of those
players in a position to put them in place”.97 However, the process by which these
institutions are created and evolve is easier to describe in theory than it is to explain in
practice, because institutional development takes place in steps; and involves several
organizations, some trying to change the institutional environment and others trying to
preserve the existing institutional structure.
The institutions in the international oil and gas industry can be arranged in a hierarchy
based on their relative importance. The most important institutional mechanisms used by
international oil and natural gas companies are contracts, informal relationships and
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transparency. The second most important institutions include domestic law, bilateral
treaties, and international courts and tribunals. A third line of defense includes
multilateral treaties and international forums. Only a small number of these institutions
are the direct result of developments in the oil and gas industry, most have developed in
response to the needs of foreign investors in general and have then been adapted for use
in the oil and gas industry. The next section presents the finding related to the ten
subsidiary research questions formulated in Chapter 2.
6.1 Frequency and Causes of Expropriation (Question #1)
Some analysts have argued that the risk of investing in international markets has increased in the
last ten years. The evidence usually cited for this conclusion includes: (1) the Arab Spring and
its aftermath; and the wars in Syria and Iraq; (2) resource nationalism and expropriations in the
mining, oil and natural gas sector, particularly in Russia and Latin America; and (3) recurring
financial crises. However, these three types of events create different types of risk. Military
conflicts like those in Syria and Iraq present a risk to the continued operation and potential
destruction of energy infrastructure in these countries (i.e. producing wells, pipelines, refineries
and export terminals) but not necessarily a risk of expropriation. Resource nationalism creates
the risk of contract renegotiation and expropriation, but not necessarily the disruption of
operations. (3) Excessive financial leverage and insufficient transparency create the risk of
financial crises in the capital markets (commercial banks, investment banks and “non-bank” or
“shadow banks”). Question #1 addresses the risk of forced contract renegotiation or
expropriation as result of resource nationalism.
Q1
What evidence exists, if any, that the frequency of expropriation of foreign direct investment has
increased in the oil and gas industry; and under what circumstances is it more or less likely to
occur?
H1
The frequency with which oil and natural gas assets have been expropriated has varied over the
last 54 years; and is related to the rate of change in oil prices.
Table 1 below demonstrates that the expropriation of oil and gas assets was already underway in
the 1960s (20), but increased substantially between 1971 and 1979 (69). Expropriations nearly
ceased between 1980 and 2003 and increased again between 2004 and 2011. The average global
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price of crude oil decreased from $1.90 per barrel in 1960 to $1.80 per barrel in 1970; increased
from $2.24 per barrel in 1971 to $31.61 per barrel in 1979; then decreased from $36.83 per barrel
in 1980 to $28.83 per barrel in 2003; and increased from $38.27 per barrel in 2004 to $111.26
per barrel in 2011. (See Table A.4, in Appendix I for a year-by-year presentation of the number
of expropriations and the change in the price of crude oil.)
Table 1 - Comparison of the Number of Expropriations and the Price of Oil
(Dollars per Barrel and Percent Change)

Year

Number of
Expropriations

1960 - 1970

20

1971 - 1979

69

1980 - 2003

3

2004 - 2011
2012
2013
2014

12

1
0
0

Annual
Average
United
States
Crude Oil
Price
$2.91 –
$3.39
$3.60 $25.10
$37.42 $27.69
$37.66 $87.04
$86.46
$91.17
$93.44

Change
in the
Price of
United
States
Crude
Oil in
Dollars

Change
in the
Price of
United
States
Crude
Oil in
Percent

$.48

16.5%

$21.50

597.2%

($9.73)

-26.0%

$49.38

131.1%

($0.58)

-0.67%

$1.90 $1.80
$2.24 $31.61
$36.83 $28.83
$38.27 $111.26
$111.67

5.17%

$108.66

2.43%

$104.73

$4.71
$2.27

Annual
Average
Global
Crude
Oil Price

Change
in the
Global
Price of
Crude
Oil in
Dollars

Change in
the
Global
Price of
Crude Oil
in
Percent

($0.10)

-5.3%

$29.37

1311.16%

($7.80)

-21.7%

$72.99

190.7%

$0.41

0.37%

($3.01)

-2.77%

($3.93)

-3.75%

Sources:
1. Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin and Konstantin Sonin, “Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory
and Evidence from Panel Data, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 27 (2) (2011) p. 301
http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp
2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show

Table 1 supports the hypothesis that the number of expropriations increases when the rate of
change in the price of oil increases; and decreases when the rate of change in the price of oil
decreases. However, in the period from 1960 to 1970, there were 20 expropriations even though
the average world oil price declined. One possible explanation for this anomaly is that the
governments of the oil producing countries had begun to exert more control over the posted price
of oil, but may have been reluctant to raise prices more rapidly because they were uncertain
about the consequences of higher oil prices on the world economy and the demand for oil. (The
posted price refers to the price at which a company or country is willing to buy or sell a
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particular commodity. In markets where an official exchange does not operate, traders will often
refer to the posted price(s) of the major companies or countries trading that commodity. The
posted price is therefore similar to a company’s bid and ask price.) Therefore they chose to
expropriate the oil and gas fields, which was a more definitive expression of national sovereignty
and at the same time less risky. The section below presents a brief history of expropriation and
privatization in the oil and natural gas industry.
First Attempt at Nationalization - 1950 to 1964
In May 1951, after months of unsuccessful negotiations, Iranian Premier Mossadegh and his
National Front government nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AOIC). The British
government responded by blocking Iran’s bank accounts in London and the Royal Air Force
compelled at least one Panamanian ship to surrender its Iranian oil at Aden.98 In addition, the
seven major oil companies, acting as an oligopoly remained united in their opposition to
nationalization.99 The boycott of Iran’s oil was effective because Iran did not have the
technicians needed to operate the nationalized facilities; the refineries needed to refine the crude
oil; the tankers to transport it, and the distribution system to sell it. Consequently, in 1952 and
1953, Iran sold only 3% of the oil it had sold in the years prior to the attempted
nationalization.100 The nationalization of Iran’s oil and gas industry was ultimately unsuccessful
during this period.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded in 1960, but it did not
emerge as a force in establishing oil prices until ten years later, during the Tripoli-Tehran crises
of 1970 - 1971 (discussed below). However, taking control of the determination of the posted
prices in 1960, added an important new structural element to the international oil industry and
the power of the oil exporting countries in particular.101
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The Beginning of the End - 1965 to 1971
In 1968, after a successful military coup in Libya, Colonel Qaddafi’s Revolutionary Command
Council shut down the British and American military bases in Libya. In January 1970, the
Revolutionary Command Council demanded a $.43 per barrel increase in the posted price of oil
at a time when the posted price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) was $3.35 per barrel. After,
nine months of negotiation an agreement was reached between the Libyan government and the
international oil companies. The Libyan government would instead receive a 20% increase in
royalties and taxes.102
In November 1970, The Shah of Iran, surpassed the fifty-fifty profit-sharing terms first
established by Venezuela in 1943, by demanding and receiving a tax rate of 55% of the profits
from the consortium companies in Iran.103 In 1971, Saddam Hussein nationalized the oil
industry in Iraq, increasing its ownership to 100%.104 The period from 1965 to 1971, therefore
was a transitional period during which the posted price of crude oil remained essentially
unchanged, but the political power of the oil producing countries increased and the power of the
IOCs decreased.
The First Oil Crisis – 1972 to 1974
At a meeting in Vienna in mid-September 1973, the OPEC countries demanded a new deal with
the oil companies. The Tehran and Tripoli agreements were terminated just two years after they
were signed (see above). On October 5, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against
Israel.105 On October 17, 1973, the Arab Oil Ministers agreed to an embargo, cutting production
5% from the September level, and agreed to continue cutting production by 5% each month until
their objective was met, that is, the United States’ withdrawal of its support for Israel.106
Ultimately, the Saudis cut production by 25%. OPEC producers had publicly declared solidarity,
but some OPEC governments and the Soviet Union increased production. Consequently, the
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overall reduction in world oil production was just 7%,107 but that was enough to increase the
average world oil price from $2.48 per barrel in 1972 to $11.53 per barrel in 1975; and to
increase the average U.S. price from $3.60 per barrel in 1972 to $12.21 per barrel in 1975.
The Second Oil Crisis and Nationalization - 1975 to 1979
In 1974, Saudi-Aramco was owned 60 % by the Saudi government, but by 1980 it was owned
100% by the Saudi government.108 In 1976, the nationalization of the Kuwait Oil Company was
completed and was owned 100% by the government of Kuwait.109 In 1979, during the Islamic
Revolution, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was nationalized and was owned 100%
by the government of Iran.110 The average world oil price increased from $11.53 per barrel in
1975 to $36.83 per barrel in 1980 and the average U.S. price increased from $12.21 per barrel in
1975 to $37.42 per barrel in 1980.
The Era of Privatization - 1994 to 2003
The period from1994 to 2003 was dominated by partial or complete privatization of national oil
companies. For example, between 1989 and 1997, Repsol (a Spanish oil company) was
privatized by selling 100% of the company’s stock to the public. In 1990 and 1991, no
privatizations were reported, but in 1992, Total (a French oil company) began the process of
privatization. The company sold a 30% share to the public in 1992 and sold the remaining 70%
to the public in 1998. In 1993, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC, the largest
national oil company in India) sold a 16% interest to the public. In 1994, OAO Gazprom (a
Russian natural gas company) sold a 62% interest to the public; and Lukoil (a Russian oil
company) became 100% privatized. In that same year, a settlement was reached between the
government of Peru and a German investor group regarding Peru’s expropriation of the
undeveloped Aguaytia gas field and the producing Maquia oil field in central Peru.
In 1995, Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IndianOil) sold 11% of its shares to the public. Public
ownership of IndianOil was subsequently increased to 21%. In 1995, Enersis S.A. (a subsidiary
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of ENI, an Italian oil company) sold a 15% interest in the company to the public; and in 2001
public ownership was increased to 70%. In 1995, Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. sold a 49% interest in
the company to the public. In the period from 1996 through 1999, there were no significant
privatizations, but in 2000, two significant partial privatizations occurred. China Petrochemical
Corporation (SINOPEC) began the sale of a 24% interest in the company to the public; and
PetroChina Company Limited (PetroChina) began the sale of a 14% interest in the company to
the public. In 2001 the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) sold a 29%
interest in the company to the public and Statoil (a Norwegian national oil company) sold a 38%
interest to the public.111 In 2002, no significant privatizations occurred. (For a list of
privatizations during this period see Table A.6 in Appendix II.) Therefore, between 1994 and
2003 the oil industry was dominated by privatizations rather than expropriations, even though the
average global price of crude oil increased from $15.82 in 1994 to $28.83 in 2003.
Resurgence of Expropriations - 2004 to 2011 112
Beginning in 2004, the frequency of expropriation began to increase again. In 2003, the Russian
government presented OAO Yukos, a private sector Russian oil company, with an invoice for
$27 billion in back taxes allegedly owed by the company. Yukos was unable to pay the taxes
and was subsequently declared bankrupt in a Russian court. Yukos management valued the
company at $20 billion. In 2004, its assets were sold to other Russian oil companies and its
president was convicted on fraud charges and imprisoned.
In 2006, there were instances of contract renegotiation, contract termination and expropriation.
(1) The state of Alaska’s agreement with the three oil companies operating on Alaska’s North
Slope was modified to include an additional 20% tax on their profits in Alaska. (2) Occidental
Petroleum filed a claim against Ecuador in response to Ecuador’s decision to terminate
Occidental’s exploration and development contract (3) Bolivia announced that Brazil’s state-run
company, Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), Royal Dutch Shell PLC, and other private firms
would have to transfer ownership of their Bolivian retail gasoline networks to state-owned
Yacimientos Petroliferas Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) within one month.
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In 2007, there were two reports of contract renegotiation and one report of expropriation. (1)
Venezuela increased the royalty and tax rates on the oil companies operating in Venezuela.
Venezuela’s “take” increased from $33.4 billion in 2007 to $38.5 billion in 2008. (2) The
Russian government insisted that Gazprom be allowed to purchase a 50% plus one share interest
in the Sakhalin – 2 Gas Field in Russia for $7.45 billion. Shell was forced to give up majority
control in one of its most profitable assets after having invested over $6 billion to develop the
project. (3) Venezuela expropriated ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips’ assets in Venezuela.
ConocoPhillips valued it assets in Venezuela at $4.5 billion and indicated that it would take a
charge against net income for the full amount. The IOCs that were willing to accept Venezuela’s
terms lost controlling interest in their operations in Venezuela.
In 2010, there was one expropriation and one threat of expropriation. (1) Venezuela nationalized
eleven oil rigs owned by Helmerich & Payne (HP). HP filed suit in Washington, D.C. Federal
District Court seeking $32 million in back payments for unpaid services and several hundred
million dollars for the value of its 11 drilling rigs. (2) Ecuador threatened to nationalize the oil
assets of any international oil companies that refused to replace their production sharing
agreements with fixed-fee contracts.
In 2011, Madagascar Oil of Houston halted operations in Madagascar because it believed its
operations might be expropriated. In 2012, YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, a subsidiary
of Repsol, valued at $18 billion, of which Repsol owned a 57.4% interest, was expropriated by
the government of Argentina.
The preceding analysis suggests that the frequency with which oil and natural gas assets have
been expropriated is a function of the change in the price of crude oil relative to the long term
price trend and not the price of oil at a particular point in time. (For a more mathematically
rigorous treatment of this question see the study by Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin summarized in
Appendix II).
Absolute and Relative Significance of Expropriation
For the firms whose assets are expropriated, the impact can be substantial and therefore must
always be a consideration for oil and gas companies. One measure of the relative impact of
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expropriations on the industry is to compare the value of the properties expropriated in recent
years to the total amount of capital spending and exploration expenditures (CAPEX) in the same
years. As already noted, in 2010, there was one expropriation and one threat of expropriation.
Venezuela nationalized eleven oil rigs owned by Helmerich & Payne (HP). Helmerich & Payne
filed suit in Washington, D.C. Federal District Court for $32 million in back payments for unpaid
services and several hundred million dollars for the value of its 11 drilling rigs. Assuming that
the 11 rigs were worth $400 million, the total value of the lawsuit is approximately $432 million.
This is a relatively small number compared to the $457.6 billion in CAPEX made by the oil and
gas industry in 2010. In 2011, Madagascar Oil of Houston halted operations in Madagascar
because it believed its operations might be expropriated. In 2011, CAPEX made by the oil and
gas industry was $556.1 billion.
In 2012, YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, a subsidiary of Repsol, valued at $18 billion,
of which Repsol owned a 57.4% interest, was expropriated by the government of Argentina. In
2012, the CAPEX made by the oil and gas industry was $617.2 billion. The value of the
expropriation $10.3 billion ($18 billion x .574) was relatively small compared to the value of
CAPEX in 2012.
6.2 Origins and Resolution of Contract Disputes (Question #2)
Most disputes are not the result of expropriation, but rather the result of a disagreement over the
interpretation of specific terms and conditions in a contract; developments that were not foreseen
when the contract was prepared; or changes in the host government’s policies. This section
examines three questions:
Q2
(1) How frequent are investment disputes?
(2) How are disputes, usually resolved?
(3) What circumstances are more or less likely to lead to disputes?
H2
(1) It is not clear how many disputes arise between IOCs and host governments because,
(2) Most disputes are resolved by the parties on their own without outside assistance.
(3) Disputes are more likely to arise when the quality of governance and the rule of law are low.
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Comparison of the Number of Disputes within and outside the Oil and Gas Industry
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) lists 597 cases that have
been brought before various international courts or tribunals including the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) established in 1966, United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) established in 1964, International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) established 1919, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration
(SCC) established 1917, International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Additional Facilities (ICSID/AF) established 1978, Cairo Centre Rules (CRCICA) established
1979 and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA, established 1899). Of these 597 cases, 68
are related to the oil and gas industry or approximately 11%.113
Comparison of Disputes and Crude Oil Prices
There were no expropriations between 1996 and 2002 and 13 expropriations between 2003 and
2012. Between 1996 and 2002, 10 cases were brought before an international court or tribunal;
and between 2003 and 2012, 58 cases were brought before an international court or tribunal. The
frequency of these cases therefore, exhibit the same pattern observed regarding expropriations,
that is, forced renegotiations by host countries and the number of disputes brought before an
international court or tribunal increased when crude oil prices were rising rapidly relative to the
long term trend in crude oil prices.
Comparison of Transactions and Disputes
In 2012 and 2013, the total number of new deals (royalty/tax agreements, production sharing
agreements, service contracts, joint ventures, acquisitions and divestitures) in the oil and natural
gas industry, was 1,800 and 1,400, respectively.114 However, no cases were brought before an
international court or tribunal in 2013, 3 cases were brought before an international court or
tribunal in 2012, 4 in 2011, 5 in 2010, 2 in 2009 and 8 in 2008. This suggests that most IOCs
and host countries comply with the terms and conditions of the contracts they sign and resolve
most disputes on their own.

113

UNCTAD, http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show
E & Y, Global Oil and Gas Transactions Review 2013,
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013/$FILE/EYGlobal_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013.pdf
114

61

Comparison of Disputes and Institutional Effectiveness
Table 2 below summarizes the 68 cases reported by UNCTAD and compares them to the ratings
for the quality of governance given to the host country defendants by the World Governance
Project.115 This rating system includes six measures of governance: Voice and Accountability,
Political Stability/Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of
Law, and Control of Corruption. This rating system uses a scale from 0 to 100, in which 0 is the
worst possible governance rating and 100 is the best possible rating. These six measures are
described below.
Voice and Accountability “captures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a
free media”. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism “measures the likelihood of
political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism”. Government
Effectiveness “reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such
policies”. Regulatory Quality “reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector
development”. Rule of Law “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.
Control of Corruption “reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state
by elites and private interests”.116
Voice and Accountability and Political Stability/Absence of Violence are not included in the
analysis below because these two measures are related to individual citizens’ rights and personal
safety whereas the other four measures are directly related to the credibility of the government’s
commitment to policies affecting investors, regulatory fairness and consistency, administration
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of impartial justice affecting investment disputes and control of corruption influencing
investment and investor rights.
Table 2 - Oil and Gas Disputes Reported by UNCTAD and Governance/Rule of Law
(N = 68)
Defendant Country

Number
of Cases

Albania

1

Number of
Bilateral
Treaties
43

Algeria

1

47

Argentina

15

Azerbaijan

Government
Effectiveness

Regulatory
Quality

Rule of
Law

Control of
Corruption

45

56

35

27

34

9

26

36

58

45

19

29

39

1

35

24

34

25

13

Bangladesh

2

30

22

20

19

21

Bolivia

3

19

43

22

16

27

Bulgaria

1

68

60

69

51

52

Canada

2

34

95

96

95

95

Ecuador

9

18

37

15

12

28

Egypt

2

101

25

33

40

34

Georgia

4

31

70

73

55

64

Grenada

1

2

62

62

59

69

Average

Romania

1

82

44

69

56

51

Russian Federation

5

72

41

39

24

16

Slovak Republic

1

54

74

80

64

60

41
26
33
24
21
27
58
95
23
33
66
63
59
33
24
16
55
30
70

South American Govt

1

NMF

NMF

NMF

NMF

NMF

NMF

14
56
26
90
7

Jordan

1

52

54

57

63

61

Kazakhstan

6

42

40

38

31

21

Kyrgyzstan

1

29

29

40

12

13

Nigeria

1

21

16

25

10

11

Tajikistan

1

32

18

18

11

10

Trinidad & Tobago

1

12

65

57

50

50

Ukraine

1

67

32

29

26

16

United States

1

46

90

88

91

89

13

5

1

7

Venezuela

5

28

Total

68

1023

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show

Table 2 shows that the countries in which the largest number of disputes arose have relatively
low ratings on these measures (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Russian
Federation and Venezuela). However, there are countries with low ratings, but a small number
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of disputes. This could be partly the result of a smaller number of projects in these countries
(Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Ukraine).
Comparison of Rules/Venues
Of the 68 cases in the oil and gas sector, 47 were brought before the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 9 before the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 7 before the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
Arbitration (SCC) and the remaining 5 before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce; ICSID Additional Facilities Rules; and the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.
Possible reasons for bringing a dispute before an international court or tribunal include: (1) the
failure of the contract to provide for the specific contingency that has arisen; (2) repudiation of a
contract by the host state; (3) a lack of confidence in the fairness of the domestic courts in the
host country; or (4) the inclusion of a provision in the contract that specifies that an international
court or tribunal is to be used if a dispute cannot be resolved by the parties on their own. The
relationship between contracts, domestic courts and bilateral investment treaties, will be
discussed in more detail in the section on legal systems and investment and again in the case
studies. The next section reviews the most common provisions in oil and gas exploration and
production contracts.
6.3 - Contract Provisions in Oil and Gas Contracts (Question #3)
It is almost inevitable that at some point in the life of a contract, the parties will disagree about
something. This is made more likely because oil and gas contracts may be in operation for 10 to
20 years. The disagreement may be about whether one of the parties has done what they said
they would do; in the way they promised to do it; and within the timeframe they agreed to do it.
In addition, it is common for oil and gas contracts to include provisions specifying that some
issues are to be negotiated at a later date. This section summarizes the contract provisions that
are most often included in oil and gas contracts to minimize disputes and resolve conflicts.
Q3
What contract provisions are most often included in an oil and gas contract to limit the number
of disputes and resolve those that occur?
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H3
Most contracts include references to “good faith”, “use reasonable efforts”, and “a timely
manner”. Specific provisions in contracts include provisions for: dispute resolution,
stabilization or equilibrium, choice of law, domestic or foreign courts, arbitration and
arbitration rules.
Good Faith
“Good faith” is a term that is often used in connection with issues regarding whether the parties
to a contract have done what they said they would do, in the way they promised to do it and
within the timeframe they agreed to do it. For example:117
Excerpt from a Libyan Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSA)
13.5.2. "…..shall proceed in good faith to negotiate a gas sales agreement incorporating the
principles set forth in Article 13.4"”.
(This provision is relevant when natural gas is produced from a project that was undertaken with the
expectation that it would produce oil.)

Excerpt from Azerbaijan Agreement
15.2. (cd) - " SOCAR [State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic]and Contractor shall diligently
negotiate each, such Supplemental Agreement (and the relevant Sales Agreement) in good faith”.

Accounting Procedures
In an appendix to the contract there is usually a section titled Accounting Procedures which is
referred to in the main contract.
Excerpt from an Appendix on Accounting Procedures
"….if any of such methods[of accounting] prove to be unfair or inequitable to the Contractor then the
Parties will meet and in good faith endeavor to agree on such changes as are necessary to correct
any unfairness or inequity”.

Excerpt from Iraq’s Technical Service Agreement
2.3 - " Discovered but undeveloped reservoirs, as defined in Annex D, may be developed and
produced under this Contract but shall be subject to a separately agreed remuneration fee which the
Parties undertake, in good faith, to agree"”.
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Two other phrases frequently used in oil and gas contracts are the obligation to "use reasonable
efforts" or to do something or deliver something “in a timely manner". Although domestic law
may provide some guidance on what "reasonable efforts" or "deliver in a timely manner" require
of the parties, there will occasionally be disputes whether what has been done constitutes
"reasonable efforts" or "timely manner". To reduce the ambiguity of such provisions the contract
may include a reference to "generally accepted international standards or practices".118 However,
there can be disputes over the interpretation of terms like "generally accepted international
standards or practices” or “good petroleum practice”. (See section on environmental provisions
below for a definition and example of these terms.)
Most disputes arise when one party's interpretation of a provision results in the other party
having to spend more money or receive less money than it believes it should under the terms of
the contract. An oil or gas contract always has a section that specifies the procedures the parties
will use to resolve disagreements. This is frequently referred to as the "Dispute Resolution"
section or the "Arbitration" section and is frequently arranged in a hierarchy.
Excerpt from the Iraqi Model Form Technical Services Contract in Article 37. 119
“The Parties shall endeavor to settle amicably any dispute (the "Dispute”) arising out of or in
connection with or in relation to this Contract or any provision or agreement related thereto”.
" Where no such settlement is reached within thirty (30) days of the date when one Party notifies the
”
other Party of the Dispute, then the matter may, as appropriate, be referred by the Parties to their
senior management for resolution”.
“Where no such settlement is reached within thirty (30) days of such referral to management, any
Party to the Dispute may refer the matter, as appropriate to an independent expert or, by giving sixty
(60) days-notice to the other Party, refer the matter to arbitration as stipulated hereunder".
“If any Dispute arises between the Parties with respect to technical matters, such Dispute may, at the
election of either Party, be referred to an independent expert (“Expert”) for determination".
“All Disputes arising out of or in connection with this Contract, other than those Disputes that have
been finally settled by reference to either senior management or an Expert, shall be finally settled
under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three arbitrators
appointed in accordance with said Rules."
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In most cases, the parties will first try to resolve disputes themselves, whether or not the contract
requires them to do so. Doing so is less expensive and less prejudicial to the relationship, than
bringing in outside experts or arbitrators. Only when resolution of the dispute on their own
appears impossible, will the parties resort to other dispute resolution mechanisms. The contract
may specify the appointment of an expert for technical issues for which there is objective market
or accounting data. Disputes that involve more subjective issues of contract interpretation will
most likely be referred to a mediator or arbitration tribunal.120
Stabilization Contract Provisions
Many things can change during the life of a project in which billions of dollars may be invested
and which may extend over 25 years or more. Government policy, a country’s economic
development priorities or legal environment can all change as a result of elections or revolutions.
Stabilization contract provisions have been used to secure guarantees against changes in the
economic policies or legal environment within which a contract was originally negotiated.
Specific changes that a company might seek protection against include: (1) changes in the fiscal
regime, for example, increases in existing taxes or royalties, or the imposition of new ones (2)
changes to laws that affect the conduct of petroleum operations, for example labor laws imposing
more stringent or additional requirements on worker safety.121
Excerpt from a Ghanaian Production Sharing Contract
26.2 - "......As of the Effective Date of this Agreement and throughout its Term, the State guarantees the
Contractor the stability of the terms and conditions of this Agreement as well as the fiscal and
contractual framework hereof, specifically including those terms and conditions and that framework
that are based upon or subject to the provisions of the laws and regulations of Ghana (and any
interpretations thereof) including without limitation the Petroleum Income Tax Law, the Petroleum
Law, the GNPC Law and those other laws, regulations and decrees that are applicable hereto. This
Agreement and the rights and obligations specified herein may not be modified, amended, altered or
supplemented except upon the execution and delivery of a written agreement executed by the Parties.
Any legislative or administrative act of the State or any of its agencies or subdivisions which purports
to vary any such right or obligation shall, to the extent sought to be applied to this Agreement,
constitute a breach of this Agreement by the State."

120
121

Ibid
Ibid

67

However, most national governments perceive such stabilization provisions to be an
infringement on their national sovereignty.122 Although stabilization clauses exist in older
petroleum contracts, they are becoming increasingly rare. These clauses are often referred to as
"freezing clauses" because they attempt to freeze the host country’s law in place, at least as it
applies to a particular contract.
A more recent alternative to a stabilization provision is the “equilibrium provision.” The purpose
of an equilibrium provision is similar to a stabilization provision, that is, it is intended to
preserve the overall economic position of the oil company without appearing to infringe the
national sovereignty of the host country. If one of the parties is adversely affected by a change in
the country’s law, both parties agree to pursue changes to the contract that will restore the
adversely affected party to the financial position they enjoyed before the law was changed. For
example, if the country modifies its tax law and as a consequence the taxes imposed on the
profits of the oil company are increased by 10%, the parties would seek to agree an amendment
to some other terms of the petroleum contract to compensate the oil company for the increased
tax it must pay.123 For example:
Excerpts from Typical Petroleum Contract
Example 1
“Without prejudice to other rights and obligations of the Parties under the Agreement, in the event
that any change in the provisions of any Law, decree or regulation in force in [name of country]
occurs subsequent to the signing of this Agreement which adversely affects the obligations, rights and
benefits hereunder, then the Parties shall agree on amendments to the Agreement to be submitted to
the competent authorities for approval, so as to restore such rights, obligations and forecasted
benefits.”

Example 2
“....if after the Effective Date, the financial interests of Contractor are adversely and substantially
affected by a change to the Law which was in force on the Effective Date, or by revocation,
modification or non-renewal of any approvals, consents or exemptions granted to Contractor
pursuant to this Contract (other than as a result of Gross Negligence or Willful Misconduct of
Contractor or Operator) the Parties shall, within ninety (90) days, agree on necessary adjustments to
the relevant provisions of this Contract in order to maintain Contractor's financial interests under this
Contract reasonably unchanged."
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Domestic and Foreign Courts
When direct negotiations, mediation and the employment of experts do not lead to a resolution of
the dispute, the next step is a domestic court proceeding or international arbitration. Unless a
contract includes provisions requiring the parties to use an arbitration process, the first step
would be to bring the dispute before a domestic court of the relevant country or countries.
However, the reality is that in many jurisdictions the court process may not be independent, or
may be slow and international investors generally (not just oil companies) prefer not to take that
risk. Although citizens in the host country may find the suggestion that their courts are not
impartial or fair insulting, most contracts include a provision specifying arbitration in a court or
tribunal outside the host country.
Arbitration and Arbitration Rules
Arbitration is a process for resolving disputes that could not be resolved by some other means.
For the parties involved, particularly oil companies, arbitration has two main advantages over a
domestic court proceeding. First, the arbitration is not carried out in the country with which the
oil company has the dispute, increasing the probability that the outcome will be fair and
impartial. Second, arbitration procedures and awards are, at least in theory, confidential and
could therefore be an advantage to an oil company because it allows the company to keep the
terms and conditions of its original agreements and subsequent settlements private, thereby
protecting its proprietary information and its competitive position. The host government may
also perceive the confidentiality of arbitration to be an advantage for competitive reasons or
when signing bonuses or other controversial payments are involved (see discussion of signing
bonuses in Section 6.10.4).
Although the arbitration takes place outside the host country, this is a separate issue from the
question of which country's law will be used in adjudicating the dispute. For example, if a
dispute arises under a petroleum contract in Ghana, then Ghanaian law applies to the contract,
and an arbitration process would decide the dispute applying Ghanaian law even if the arbitration
process takes place in the investor’s country or a third country.
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Typical features of an arbitration provision in a contract include:


A clause specifying that the arbitration is to be conducted in accordance with the rules of

a particular arbitration institution. There are a several recognized international arbitration
institutions each of which has a set of rules that will apply to the arbitration process. It was
observed previously, that the rules most often used are the rules of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), UNCITRAL rules, and International
Chamber of Commerce Rules (ICC).


A clause specifying where the arbitration is to take place. Often, a "neutral" venue is

chosen, that is, one that is not in the country with which the contract is made and not in the
country in which the oil company or its parent organization is domiciled. Choices of
independent venues might include, Paris, London or Stockholm, but as previously stated the
law to be applied is the relevant governing law of the contract, not the law of the venue.
Excerpt from Azerbaijan Joint Development and Production Sharing Contract
“….shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the principles of law common to the law
of the Azerbaijan Republic and English law, and to the extent that no common principles exist in
relation to any matter, then in accordance with the principles of the common law of Alberta,
Canada..."

Other provisions include:


A clause specifying the number of arbitrators that will determine the dispute. Frequently

there are three. This allows each party to select one arbitrator and then to jointly appoint a
third or for the third to be appointed pursuant to the relevant arbitration rules.


A clause specifying the language in which the arbitration is to be conducted, usually a

major international language that has some (historical) relationship to the country to which
the dispute relates such as English, French, Spanish or Portuguese.


A clause specifying who is responsible for paying the cost of the arbitration. Usually, the

expense of arbitration is shared equally among the Parties.124
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Environmental Provisions
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 was a reminder of the
environmental risk associated with the exploration and production of oil and natural gas.
Although accidents on this scale are rare, all oil and gas projects involve environmental risk.
For this reason, most oil and gas contracts contain clauses related to nine major environmental
issues: (1) environmental standards; (2) stabilization; (3) environmental impact assessment; (4)
access to protected areas; (5) access to water and other natural resources; (6) gas flaring; (7)
responding to emergencies and accidents; (8) decommissioning and remediation; (9) liability,
indemnity and insurance.125 Examples of (1), (3), (7) and (9) are presented below:
Environmental Standards
A Cambodian contract defines “good petroleum practice” as:
“Good Petroleum Industry Practices means the standards and practices, and exercise of that degree
of skill, prudence and foresight that would reasonably be expected of persons carrying out
international petroleum operations, and adherence to generally accepted standards of the
international petroleum industry, including sound environmental provisions”.126

Environmental Impact Assessment
Excerpt from the Agreement for the Azeri and Chirac Fields in Azerbaijan
26.4 - "... an environmental baseline study ....to be carried out by a recognized international
environmental consulting firm selected by Contractor, and acceptable to SOCAR [State Oil Company
of Azerbaijan Republic]. SOCAR shall nominate representatives to participate in preparation of the
study in collaboration with such firm and Contractor representatives."

Responding to Emergencies and Accidents
Excerpt from a PSC (Production Sharing Agreement) in Ghana
“If Contractor does not act promptly so as to control, clean up or repair any pollution or damage,
GNPC [Ghana National Petroleum Corporation] may, after giving Contractor reasonable notice in
the circumstances, take any actions which are necessary, in accordance with accepted petroleum
industry practice and the reasonable costs and expenses of such actions shall be borne by Contractor
and shall, subject to Article 17.5 be included as Petroleum Costs”.127
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Liability and Indemnity
An example of an indemnity clause appears at 19.1 in the LOGIC Standard Offshore Service
Contract:
“19.1 The CONTRACTOR shall be responsible for and shall save, indemnify, defend and hold
harmless the COMPANY GROUP from and against all claims, losses, damages, costs (including
legal costs) expenses and liabilities in respect of: (a) loss of or damage to property ….”128

In a contract between Slessor and Vecto Gray, clause B13 states that:
“…the parties mutually and irrevocably undertake to release, defend and indemnify each other for
damage to any property, and/or injury to/or death of the personnel of the others, arising out of or in
connection with the Work, howsoever caused”.

Clause 2 in a standard Deeds of Adherence, states that the signatories are obligated to:
“…. be solely responsible for and shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other Signatories
and the other members of their respective Groups against all Claims arising from, out of, or relating
to the Services in connection with:
(i) personal injury to or sickness……; and
(ii) loss of, recovery of, or damage to any Property ……; and
(iii) Consequential loss ……...129

This section presented the contract provisions most often included in oil and gas contracts for the
purpose of minimizing and resolving disputes and explained how these provisions are applied in
the resolution of disputes when the arbitration or court proceeding take place outside the host
country. It also demonstrated that there is a well-defined set of procedural rules for resolving
disputes when the contracting parties cannot resolve them on their own. The next section
reviews the most common provisions contained in bilateral investment treaties and evaluates
their effectiveness in resolving disputes in the international oil and gas industry.
6.4 – Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties (Question #4)
Contracts are the principal means of documenting the rights and obligations of the parties
participating in a specific project. Bilateral investment treaties are the means of
documenting more broadly the rights and obligations of host countries and foreign
128
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investors. This section examines the content and the effectiveness of bilateral investment
treaties.
Q4
(1) What are the primary provisions in a bilateral investment treaty and how often are they used
in dispute resolution?
(2) How effective have they been in resolving disputes?
H4
(1)Most oil and gas contracts reference a bilateral investment treaty as a mechanism for
resolving disputes, but a relatively small number of disputes actually require the application of a
bilateral investment treaty.
(2) Obtaining compensation in an international court or tribunal is often a slow process.
Bilateral Investment Treaties
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are agreements between governments in which both
governments agree to provide certain protections to investments by nationals of the other country
in their country. The most common and important clauses included in bilateral treaties are
presented below.
Choice of Law Clauses
It was previously observed, that oil and gas contracts usually include a clause specifying the use
of host country law in the resolution of disputes. Bilateral investment treaties also include a
provision specifying the use of the law of the host state in international court proceedings and
arbitration tribunals, but they also refer to other sources of law. Most bilateral treaties refer to
four sources of law: (1) the bilateral investment agreement itself (the treaty); (2) the municipal
(domestic law) of the host state; (3) the provisions of the contract relating to the investment
between the parties; and (4) general principles of international law. An example of this choice of
law clause is contained in the bilateral investment treaty between Argentina and the United
Kingdom (1990), which provides at Article 8(4):
“The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement,[bilateral treaty], the laws of the Contracting Party [host country government]involved in
the dispute, including its rules on conflict of laws, the terms of any specific agreement concluded in
relation to such an investment and the applicable principles of international law. The arbitration
decision shall be final and binding on both Parties”.
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Bilateral investment treaties usually include an arbitration clause identifying the arbitral body to
which disputes may be submitted. Often the parties name the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Treaty Titles and Preambles
Most bilateral investment treaties are formally called “agreements for the promotion and
protection of investment”. In some agreements, the title refers to reciprocal or mutual protection.
Treaty titles are usually followed by short preambles, which focus on the objective of promoting
and protecting investment, and providing favorable conditions for foreign investment.130 ChinaGermany (2003) is a recent example of a typical preamble:
“Intending to create favorable conditions for investment by investors of one Contracting Party in the
territory of the other Contracting Party,
Recognizing that the encouragement, promotion and protection of such investments will be
conducive to stimulating business initiative of the investors and will increase prosperity in both
States,
Desiring to intensify the economic co-operation of both States…..”

National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment
One of the main objectives of international trade and investment law is to limit state actions that
discriminate based on the nationality of the foreign individual, entity, good, service or type of
investment.131 In most bilateral investment agreements national and most favored nation
treatment are combined into one provision.
Article 4(2), Chile-Egypt (1999), is an example of this:
“Each Contracting Party shall accord investments of the investors of [the] other Contracting Party in
its territory a treatment which is not less favorable than that accorded to investments made by its own
investors or by investors of any third country, whichever is more favorable”.

International Standards of Treatment
Standards of treatment based on fairness and equity existed before the development of modern
international investment agreements (IIAs). Fair and Equitable treatment clauses (FETs) used in
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and other international investment agreements appeared in
early international economic agreements such as the Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization (1948) and the Economic Agreement of Bogota (1948), as well as in the United
130

Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009) p. 123
131
Ibid, p. 147

74

States Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties. The first use of the Fair and
Equitable treatment clause in an international investment agreement can be found in Article I of
the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad proposed by Hermann Abs and Lord Shawcross in
1959:132
“Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the nationals of
the other Parties. Such property shall be accorded the most constant protection and security within
the territories of the other Parties and the management, use and enjoyment thereof shall not in any
way be impaired by unreasonable or discriminatory measures”. 133

The Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, created in 1961),
subsequently produced its own draft convention on the protection of foreign property in 1967,
entitled the Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, which includes a fair and
equitable treatment clause along similar lines.134 However, this treaty has not yet come into
force.
In its notes and comments to Article 1, of the OECD Convention a clear reference was made to
the source of the standard: “the standard conforms to the ‘minimum standard’ which forms part
of customary international law”.135 Although the 1967 Draft OECD Convention failed to gain
sufficient support among OECD countries for adoption as a multilateral convention, its
substantive provisions have served as an important model for bilateral investment treaties.136 By
referring to the OECD model and using it systematically, bilateral investment treaties are
effectively referring to this standard as defined by the OECD Draft Convention of 1967.137
Because most treaties do not define the substantive content of the standard to be applied, but
only refer to an unqualified formulation of the standard, or to one qualified by references to
(customary) international law, the contemporary meaning of the “fair and equitable treatment”
132
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standard still depends on interpretations by individual arbitral tribunals, which are not subject to
any effective appellate review. This makes the standard vulnerable to inconsistent interpretation,
resulting in uncertainty regarding its meaning. 138
Minimum Standard of Treatment
Unlike the national and most favored nation (MFN) treatment standard discussed in the previous
section, in which the standard of treatment is contingent on the treatment of some other party or
parties, the substantive content of a minimum standard is not determined by reference to the
treatment of other investors or investments. Minimum standards of treatment therefore provide a
treaty defined baseline or, in the words of one international investment tribunal “a floor below
which treatment of foreign investors must not fall, even if a government were not acting in a
discriminatory manner”.139 In practice this is still problematic, because there is often
disagreement about what constitutes a “minimum standard” of treatment.
Laws Related to Expropriation
International expropriation law is intended to mediate and to the extent possible, reconcile two
general principles of international law: (1) that states exercise permanent sovereignty over their
territories and natural resources; and (2) that states must respect the acquired rights of foreigners.
The exercise of permanent sovereignty means that private property is not inviolable. Unless the
state has made specific commitments not to nationalize a specific investor’s assets, states have a
right to tax, regulate or expropriate an investor’s assets provided the state and the expropriation
meet four conditions. (1) The expropriation must be for a public purpose, (2) must be done in
accordance with due process, (3) requires that it be done in a non-discriminatory manner, and (4)
that it be accompanied by prompt and equitable compensation.140
The expropriation and compensation provision of Article IV.2.1 of the draft Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) provides:
“2.1. A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalize directly or indirectly an investment in
its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or take any measure or measures having
equivalent effect (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) except:
138
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a.) for a purpose which is in the public interest
b.) on a non-discriminatory basis,
c.) in accordance with due process of law, and
d.) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in accordance with
Articles 2.2 to 2.5 below:”

Three issues in international expropriation law have been particularly contentious. First, what
economic interests can be expropriated? Second, what government measures amount to
expropriation? Third, what is the standard of compensation payable upon expropriation?
International investment agreements (IIAs) address each of these issues, but are still open to
interpretation.141 Each is examined below.
The range of economic interests that international investment agreements protect depends on the
definition of ‘investment,’ which most IIAs define broadly. Under customary international law,
both tangible property (i.e. land, equipment and inventory) and intangible property (i.e. company
shares, dividends, bank accounts, contract rights, intellectual property and goodwill) can be
expropriated.
Bilateral investment treaties typically contain a provision prohibiting either country from
expropriating the investments of nationals of the other country without due process or just
compensation or in violation of international law. The majority of expropriation cases in
international law have involved a deprivation of a foreign investor’s acquired rights and a
corresponding acquisition, or appropriation, of those acquired rights by the state or a third party
designated by the state, for example, an NOC.142 This is usually referred to as direct
expropriation.
A deprivation (expropriation) may also occur as a result of a state’s interference in the use of the
property or the receipt of its benefits by the investor, even though legal title to the property has
not been affected. The assumption of control over property by a government does not
automatically constitute expropriation requiring compensation under international law, however,
a claim of expropriation is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner has been
deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not temporary.
This is usually referred to as indirect expropriation and is often described as “equivalent”,
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“tantamount”, “de facto”, “creeping”, “constructive”, “disguised”, “consequential”, “regulatory”
or “virtual expropriation”.143
What is ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’ for expropriation in customary
international law is usually the issue most hotly disputed by the claimant and the respondent.
The country expropriating the assets would prefer to pay an amount equivalent to the book value
of the investment, that is, the difference between the project’s total assets and its total liabilities
(total assets – total liabilities = book value) based on historical cost. The company being
expropriated, however, usually seeks compensation measured by the market value of the
investment prior to expropriation. The market value of the property is usually the higher of the
two values and the difference between them is frequently substantial. This is particularly true in
the oil and gas industry in which the value of successful wells exceeds their cost; and the market
value of reserves tends to increase, because oil and natural gas prices have tended to increase.
The decisions of most international courts and tribunals and scholarly writing support the
position that under customary international law the country expropriating the assets is required to
pay full compensation measured by the fair market value of the property that has been taken”.144
Even those bilateral investment treaties which expressly define equitable compensation as the
fair market value, the specific language used in the agreement can have a significant effect on the
amount of the compensation.
For example, in an arbitration case between the Airport Development Co. and the Republic of
Hungary, the bilateral investment treaty stated that “the amount of compensation must
correspond to the market value of the expropriated investments at the moment of the
expropriation” and that “the amount of this compensation may be estimated according to the
laws and regulations of the country where the expropriation is made”. A provision written in this
manner would be particularly unfavorable to a company whose asset values have been driven
down by acts of the host government prior to the announcement of the expropriation, for
example, raising tax or royalty rates, denying license renewals or right of transit.145
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Legal Instruments Referenced in a Dispute
Fifty-one of the 68 oil and gas cases discussed previously and brought before an international
court or tribunal had either been arbitrated or were being arbitrated pursuant to a bilateral
investment treaty between the host country and the home country of the investor, nine were
being arbitrated pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), three pursuant to the provisions of
the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), two pursuant to both a bilateral investment
treaty and the ECT. The legal document to which three were pursuant was unknown. Bilateral
treaties are the legal instrument most often referenced in the adjudication of contract disputes
brought before an international tribunal.
Length of Time in Arbitration
The ten cases related to oil and gas exploration and production brought before an international
court or tribunal between 1996 and 2002, have been resolved through an arbitration decision or
by the parties reaching an out of court settlement. Fifteen of the 58 cases brought before an
international court or tribunal between 2003 and 2012 were settled, but 40 were still pending.
The status of three cases was unknown. This again suggests that seeking compensation in an
international court or tribunal is often a slow process. The next section examines the relationship
between the number of disputes, the number of bilateral treaties, and the reliability of the legal
system in a country.
6.5 – Bilateral Investment Treaties, Legal Systems and Disputes (Question #5)
In section 6.2, it was observed that most disagreements between the parties to a contract are
resolved by the parties themselves, but in section 6.4 it was observed that when a disagreement
cannot be resolved by the parties, the legal instrument most often referenced in the legal
proceedings is the bilateral investment treaty between the country of the claimant and the country
of the respondent.
Are countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment treaties less likely to be
involved in disputes in an international court or tribunal? The rationale for this proposition is
that countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment agreements may have a
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greater respect for the agreements they sign and the rule of law in general. Another way to
evaluate this relationship is to directly compare the quality and reliability of a country’s legal
system and the number of claims that have been brought against it an international court or
tribunal. The rationale for this proposition is that a country with a fairer and more reliable legal
system is less likely to be involved in disputes before an international court or tribunal because
both parties to the contract are likely to have confidence in the domestic court system.
Q5
(1) Are countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment treaties less likely to be
involved in disputes in an international court or tribunal?
(2) Are countries with more reliable legal systems less likely to be involved in disputes in an
international court or tribunal?
H5
(1) Countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment treaties are less likely to
be involved in disputes in an international court or tribunal?
(2) Countries with more reliable legal systems are less likely to be involved in disputes in an
international court or tribunal?
Number of Bilateral Treaties and the Number of Disputes
In Figure 1 below, Argentina (far right) has signed 58 bilateral investment treaties and had 15
cases brought against it by companies in the oil and gas industry. The Russian Federation has
signed 72 bilateral investment treaties and had 5 cases brought against it; Ecuador has signed 18
bilateral investment treaties and had 9 cases brought against it; and Venezuela has signed 28
bilateral treaties and had 5 cases brought against it. In addition, there are 14 countries that were
involved in one case, yet the number of bilateral treaties they had signed ranged from 2 to 82.
Figure 1 indicates that the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed is not a reliable
predictor of how many cases will be brought against it in an international court or tribunal. (R2 is
.0003 and adjusted R2 is -.0452) Possible explanations for this include: (1) in a particular
country, one regime may sign a large number of bilateral investment treaties to attract direct
foreign investment and a subsequent regime may place more emphasis on wealth redistribution
and resource nationalism. So that the large number of treaties a country has signed becomes an
institutional artifact of the previous regime, but have no connection to the policy of the current
regime, for example, Venezuela (28 BITs), Argentina (58), Chile (51), Cuba (59), Iran (61) and
the Russian Federation (72); and (2) in some countries the decision to sign a large number of
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bilateral investment treaties may be based more on political considerations than economic
considerations, that is, signing treaties expands a country’s political network and in the case of
larger countries its “sphere of influence”, for example China (130 BITs), Egypt (101), France
(102), Germany (134), India (84), Italy (92), South Korea (90), Netherlands (93), Spain (82),
Switzerland (118), Turkey (88), United Kingdom (104).

Number of Cases

Figure 1 - Number of Bilateral Treaties vs
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Quality of Legal Systems and the Number of Disputes
Figure 2 below, compares the number of cases brought against a country in an international court
or tribunal and the composite rating (average) a country received on the quality and reliability of
its legal system based on government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the
control of corruption. Zero is the worst possible rating and 100 is the best possible rating.
Argentina has a composite rating of 33 and had 15 cases brought against it in an international
court or tribunal. Ecuador has a rating of 23 and had 9 cases brought against it. Kazakhstan has
a rating of 33 and had 6 cases brought against it. The Russian Federation has a rating of 30 and
had 5 cases brought against it. Conversely, Canada has a rating of 95 and has been involved in
two cases; and the United States has a rating of 90 and has been involved in one case. However,
there are a significant number of countries in this sample with relatively low composite ratings
and yet only one case brought against them (lower left quadrant). These include Nigeria,
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Algeria and Albania. Another way of looking at this is to note that
Canada has a composite rating of 95 and had two cases brought against it and Venezuela has a
composite rating of just 7, but had only four cases brought against it. Figure 2 indicates that the
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composite rating a country received on the quality of its governance and legal system is not a
reliable predictor of the number of cases brought against it. (R2 is .0512 and adjusted R2 is .008).

Figure 2 - Governance/Rule of Law vs Number of
Cases
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The next section evaluates whether there is a relationship between the number of bilateral
investment treaties a country has signed and oil consumption and foreign direct investment
outflows and inflows. It also evaluates the effectiveness of international courts and tribunals.
6.6 - Oil Consumption, Foreign Direct Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties (Question
#6)
Q6
(1) Does a relationship exist between the amount of oil a country consumes and the number of
bilateral treaties it has signed?
(2) Does a relationship exist between the foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from a
country and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed?
(3) Does a relationship exist between the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to a country
and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed?
(4) Are the rulings of most courts and tribunals fair and are they complied with.
H6
(1) There is no relationship between the amount of oil a country consumes and the number of
bilateral treaties it has signed.
(2) There is a relationship between the FDI outflows from a country and the number of bilateral
investment treaties it has signed.
(3) There is a relationship between the FDI inflows to a country and the number of bilateral
treaties it has signed
(4) The rulings of most courts and tribunal are fair and are complied with.
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Oil Consumption and Bilateral Investment Treaties
Figure 3 below, suggests that there is no observable relationship between the amount of oil a
country consumes and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed. However, a
statistical analysis of the data might show that a country’s oil consumption is statistically and
substantively significant, even though it may be only one of several variables determining the
number of bilateral treaties a country has signed.

Figure 3 - Number of Bilateral Investment
Treaties vs Oil Consumption
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This analysis could also be refined by comparing the amount of oil a country imports from the
countries that are its principal oil suppliers and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has
signed with those countries. However, if the oil imported is simply purchased, but not the result
of direct foreign investment made by investors from the oil importing country in the oil
exporting country, it is unlikely that there would be a strong relationship between the amount of
oil imported and the number of bilateral investment treaties the oil importing country has signed.
Foreign Direct Investment Outflows and Bilateral Investment Treaties
Figures 4 and 5 below compare the number of bilateral investment treaties a country has signed
and the dollar amount of the foreign direct investment made by that country. Figure 4 shows that
the United States is an “outlier” and would therefore distort a regression line fitted to the data.
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Figure 4 - Number of Bilateral Investment
Treaties vs FDI outflows
(n = 191 countries (including the United States)
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In Figure 5, the United States is excluded. When the United States is excluded, the existence of
a relationship between the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed and FDI outflows
appears more likely but the large number of countries clustered on the left side of the figure
suggests that other factors are also affecting the amount of FDI outflow from a country. For
example, many countries are too small to have significant outward foreign direct investment no
matter how many bilateral investment treaties they sign.
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Figure 5 - Number of Bilateral Investment
Treaties vs FDI Outflows
(n = 190 countries, excluding the United States)
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Foreign Direct Investment Inflows and Bilateral Investment Treaties
Figure 6 suggests the number of bilateral investment treaties a country signs is related to the
foreign direct investment inflows a country receives, but the other factors are also involved.
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This is consistent with the literature on this issue. For example, Hallward – Driemeier concluded
that bilateral investment treaties act more as complements than as substitutes for good
institutional quality and local property rights.146 However, Neumayer and Spess conclude that a
higher number of BIT’s increases the FDI inflows to a developing country.147
Fairness and Effectiveness of International Courts and Tribunals
Given the general proposition that institutions develop and are sustained because they reduce risk
and expand the range of economic possibilities, it is reasonable to think that international courts
and tribunals are at least marginally effective, otherwise there would be little reason for them to
exist. The question then is not whether they are effective, but how effective they are.
Table A.7 in Appendix III shows that of the 68 oil and gas cases in the UNCTAD database, 16
have been resolved by a court or tribunal, (8 in favor of the plaintiff and 8 in favor of the
defendant.) These sixteen cases are not sufficient to conclude that international courts and
tribunals are mostly impartial, but the fact that court or tribunal decided in favor of the plaintiff
as often as they decided in favor of the defendant is encouraging. Ten cases have been settled
out of court, thirty-eight cases are still pending and the disposition of four cases is unknown.
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Claims Amounts versus Award Amounts
In six of the eight cases decided in favor of the investors, the investors were awarded an amount
less than they requested; in one case the investors were awarded exactly what they requested;
and in one case the amount requested is not known, but the amount awarded is known. In six of
the eight cases that were decided in favor of the state, the investors were awarded less than they
requested; in one case only part of the award was made public and in one case the court ruled
that it did not have jurisdiction. Therefore, in 12 of the 16 cases, the claimant was awarded less
than the amount they requested. This is in part because claimants usually seek compensation
equal to the market value of the assets expropriated or the market value of the breach of contract,
not the book value, which is usually lower. The conflict between book value and market value is
discussed in more detail later.
Efficiency of International Courts and Tribunals
One measure of the efficiency of international courts and tribunals is the time elapsed from
initiation of the case to the date the court or tribunal rendered its decision. Of the 16 cases in
which a decision has been rendered, 2 cases were in arbitration for 6 years, 3 cases for 5 years, 3
cases for 4 years, 4 cases for 3 years, 3 cases for 2 years and 1 case for 1 year. The average time
for a decision from an international court or tribunal was 3.6 years. Of the ten cases that were
settled out of court, 1 was settled in 7 years, 1 was settled in 4 years, 3 were settled in 2 years,
and 5 were settled in 1 year or less. The average time to settlement was 2.2 years.
Of the thirty-eight cases that are still pending resolution, 2 have been pending for 2 years, 3 cases
have been pending for 3 years, 4 cases for 4 years, 2 cases for 5 years, 6 cases for 6 years, 4
cases for 7 years, 5 cases for 8 years, 5 cases for 9 years, 3 cases for 10 years, 4 cases for 11
years and the disposition of four cases is unknown. The average time in adjudication for those
cases still pending is 6.9 years. A senior official at the ICSID explained this variation by noting
that some cases are more complicated than others; some arbitrators are busier than others; and
some parties challenge every motion and others only challenge basic and critical motions.148
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Effectiveness of International Courts and Tribunals
After an ICSID tribunal renders it decision, the ICSID gives the claimant an official copy of the
tribunal’s findings and award in writing. The claimant then presents this copy to the defendant
and requests compliance with the award. The timeliness and degree of compliance with court or
tribunal’s awards is difficult to evaluate because the compliance process is less transparent than
the arbitration process and UNCTAD’s and the ICSID’s record of the procedural details of a case
ends with the announcement of the award. A search of the literature did not produce any data on
the timeliness and degree of compliance with court or tribunal awards. The only references
found in the news media to non-compliance were Venezuela’s rejection of the ICSID’s award in
favor of ExxonMobil; and Venezuela’s subsequent withdrawal from the ICSID (see Case #5) and
the Russia’s rejection of the award granted by the Permanent Court of Arbitration to the previous
shareholders in OAO Yukos. However, a senior official at the ICSID noted that there is an
industry consensus that approximately 90% of awards are complied with.149 The next section
describes and evaluates the sources of capital, financing structures, business structures and
alliances.
6.7 – Financing, Fiscal Regimes and Alliances (Question #7)
Sections 3.3 (Organizations in Practice), 3.3.1 (National Governments), 3.3.2 (National Oil
Companies) and 3.3.3 (International Oil Companies) discussed three types of organizations that
comprise the international oil and gas industry. This section examines the options available to
these organizations regarding sources of capital, financing structures, fiscal regimes and
alliances.
Q7
(1) What sources of capital are available to finance oil and gas exploration and development?
(2) What financing structures are available?
(3) What fiscal regimes are available?
(4) Do alliances offer any advantages in managing risk; and how politically feasible are they?
H7
(1) Commercial bank debt, bonds and common stock remain the dominant forms of financing in
the oil and natural gas industry. Master limited partnerships, venture capital and multilateral
financing play a smaller role.
(2) Joint ventures and project financing can redistribute risk, but they do not necessarily reduce
overall risk.
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(3) Fiscal regimes (tax/royalty agreements, production sharing agreements, and service
agreements) are an important method for allocating risk and reward.
(4) Alliances offer some advantages, but are constrained by political uncertainty and conflict
over the life such an alliance.
6.7.1 Sources of Financing
In 2013, capital expenditures and exploration expense (CAPEX) in the oil and gas industry were
$682 billion and is expected to reach $723 billion in 2014.150 Figure 7 below, presents an
estimate of the funds (financial capital), raised by oil and gas exploration companies and the
source of those funds between 2010 and 2013. Two observations are worth noting: (1) the
amount of funds raised in 2013 was approximately $850 billion and the amount of CAPEX (not
shown) was $682 billion in 2013. This implies that the industry raised capital in 2013 in
anticipation of even higher capital expenditures in 2014; (2) there is no explicit mention of
internally generated cash flow from operations in this chart. Net cash flow from operations
would therefore need to be added to these figures to estimate the total sources of financial
capital. Nevertheless, Figure 7 provides a first approximation of the relative importance of
various sources of financing.
Figure 7 151
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Equity Financing
Public Equity Investment
Companies can acquire capital and investors can make an equity investment in a company in two
ways, publicly or privately. Public companies’ shares are traded on a stock exchange and can be
purchased by anyone, at any time. The IOCs and many of the major NOCs are traded publicly,
either in New York, London, Tokyo, or Hong Kong. Many of the medium-sized companies and
even the “juniors” in the oil and gas industry are also publicly traded.
Common Stock
Common stock gives its holders ownership in an oil and gas company that is proportional to the
number of shares each common stockholder owns. Common stockholders also have a
proportional claim on the net income of the firm after the obligations to all of the firm’s suppliers
and creditors have been met. In this sense, the common stockholders bear the ultimate risk of
failure or success of the enterprise. In the United States, the net income of the company is taxed
at the company level and any dividends that are paid to the stockholders are taxed again at the
individual shareholder level.
Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs)
A Master Limited Partnership (MLP) is a limited partnership (or limited liability company)
which units are publicly traded on a stock exchange. If it meets certain qualifications under U.S.
tax law, the MLP is a pass-through entity and does not pay tax at the entity level; taxes are only
paid at the individual partner level. Although not required by law, MLPs generally distribute all
of their available net income. In addition, each limited partner may record his share of the
MLP’s depreciation on his tax return.152 The master limited partners bear the ultimate risk of
failure or success of the enterprise.
The first MLP was created by Apache Oil Company in 1981. The number of MLPs in the oil,
gas and real estate industries grew rapidly in the 1980s and the U.S. Congress and the IRS
became concerned that large numbers of corporations would become MLPs to avoid the
corporate income tax. To prevent the widespread adoption of the MLP form, in 1987 Congress
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passed legislation to define and limit publicly traded partnerships. Congress created Section
7704 of the Internal Revenue Service Code, limiting partnership tax treatment to publicly traded
partnerships (PTPs) earning more than 90 percent of their income from a limited number of
specific sources.153
The popularity of MLPs continued to increase as investors searched for higher yield and energy
companies sought to monetize the value of their assets and still maintain control. As of February
2013, there were approximately ninety-six energy MLPs, and market capitalization for all MLPs
was approximately $403 billion. Approximately 70% are midstream energy MLPs (pipelines
and oil storage), 7% are upstream energy MLPs (exploration and production) and the remaining
23% are in other industry sectors.154
Private Equity Investment
Private equity firms have existed since 1946, but they increased in size and number beginning in
the early 1980s. Investors can make an investment in a privately owned company only if the
existing owners agree to expand the ownership of the firm. The potential investors must reach an
agreement with the current owners regarding the amount of capital they will contribute and the
proportional ownership the new investors will have in the expanded firm. Private equity capital
can come from individual private investors, institutional investors, mutual funds and sovereign
wealth funds. Private equity investors frequently hold the investment until it has attained
significant value and then sell the company to another investor group or take it public in an
initial public offering (IPO).
Hundreds of small oil and gas firms rely on private equity capital to fund their operations. These
firms often have significant potential, but have limited access to other forms of capital because
they have little operating cash flow and few assets in the beginning, to present to a commercial
bank as collateral for a loan. And although, advances in technology have improved the odds of
finding oil and gas, success is still elusive; three-quarters of all exploration wells are “dry holes”,
either because there is no oil there or because geologists have been unable to accurately identify
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the location of the oil or natural gas.155 However, ninety percent of the petroleum produced in
North America is produced by independent producers, not IOCs. Many of them are private
companies that rely on private equity investment to finance their operations.156 Private equity
groups made significant investments in the oil and gas industry in 2012 (1,590 private-equity
backed deals valued at $152.3 billion).157
Venture Capital
Venture capital financing primarily supports the development of private sector company
“startups” that have significant growth potential. The global oil and gas industry includes
thousands of startup companies, but their access to venture capital has been limited. In the early
1980s, venture capital investments in the energy and industrial-energy field accounted for more
than 20% of all venture capital financing, however by 2000, this percentage had declined to 1%.
Between 2002 and 2008, interest in the energy sector among venture capital firms increased
slightly to 3% of all venture capital investment in 2007. However, most of this investment was
and still is, focused on clean technologies (biomass, algae, and CO2 capture), not oil and gas
exploration and development.158
The oil and gas industry does not attract venture capital for two reasons. First, most new oil and
gas technologies (e.g. hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, and three dimensional seismic
imaging) require large amounts of capital, often averaging more than $100 million and ten or
more years to reach commercialization and profitability.159 Second, oil and gas industry
technology is perceived as mature and therefore unlikely to produce significant technological
innovation.160
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Debt Financing
Debt financing is available in two forms, commercial bank loans and the issuance of bonds. The
most common form of oil and gas financing is senior debt obtained from a bank, or a syndicate
of banks, (see Figure 7 above) through a revolving credit facility or a term loan credit facility. (A
revolving credit facility is a line of credit for which the customer pays a commitment fee and is
then allowed to borrow money from the lender up to the agreed limit. It is usually used to fund
ongoing operations; and the amount of the borrowing changes each month depending on the
customer's current cash flow needs). If the loan is made to provide an oil and gas producer with
working capital or funds to develop existing oil and gas properties, a revolving credit facility is
used. However, if the loan is made for the purpose of purchasing oil and gas properties, a term
loan facility is typically used.
Banks usually secure the loans with a mortgage or deed of trust on the oil and gas properties that
are being acquired or developed using the proceeds of the loan. These mortgages or deeds of
trust permit the bank to foreclose on the oil and gas properties in the event of a default by the
borrower under the credit agreement. If it becomes necessary for the bank to foreclose on the
borrower, the bank can sell the oil and gas properties and recover part of the funds it loaned.161
Most small and medium-sized firms in the oil and gas industry rely on commercial banks for
short-term and medium-term loans to finance their operations, but the availability of long-term
commercial bank loans and access to the bond market has historically been limited if these firms
specialize exclusively in the exploration and production segment of the industry. In that case,
these firms must rely on public and private equity for capital. In contrast, the super-majors
(Chevron, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, BP and Royal Dutch Shell) and other IOCs have
continuous access to commercial bank loans and the bond market, because of their vertical
integration; more diverse lines of business; diversity of their exploration and production projects;
longer history of operation; and their overall size.
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Multilateral Financing
Commercial banks (loans) and investment banks (bonds) are the most common sources of debt
financing however, there are other sources of debt financing that are particularly important to
developing countries. Multilateral lending organizations include the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International
Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
(ESMAP), Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Carbon Finance Facility (CFF).
The World Bank has separated the agencies under its control (Table 3) that lend to public
enterprises (government and semi-government organizations) from those that lend to private
enterprises (for-profit enterprises). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) and the International Development Agency (IDA) provide loans to public enterprises,
and the International Financing Corporation (IFC) lends to private enterprises. There are also
regional banks that support investment in the energy industry. These include the Inter-American
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the African
Development Bank.

(THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)
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Table 3 - Multilateral Lending Organizations for the Oil and Natural Gas industry162
International Bank
Facilities

Founded

International Monetary Fund
(IMF)

1944

Provides financial assistance to national governments to help them
through serious periods of economic adjustment

International Bank for
Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD)

1944

Also referred to as the World Bank, it was founded to reconstruct postWar Europe, and now lends to
governments worldwide to support economic and social development

International Development
Association (IDA)
International Finance
Corporation (IFC)
Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

1960

Interest-free loans, credits to finance projects that reduce poverty

1956

Lends directly to private companies without governmental guarantees to
promote private enterprise
Provides investment guarantees (currency, war, expropriation, breach of
contract) to private companies investing in developing countries

Energy Sector Management
Assistance Program
(ESMAP)
Global Environment Facility
(GEF)
Carbon Finance Facility

1974

Provides advice and analysis but not funds for shaping energy sector
development and policy (a JV of the United Nations and World Bank)

1991

Provides grants for studies and projects involving national and regional
environmental benefits
Supports carbon reduction policies and programs in OECD
and non-OECD countries which are aligned, using the World Bank
Carbon Finance Unit (CFU) as structure and manager

1988

2004

Primary Lending and Funding Activities

Regional Development Bank Facilities
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
African Development Bank (AIDB)
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Nordic Finance Group
OPEC Fund for International Development
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)

Asian Development Bank (ADB)
European Union (EU)
European Investment Bank (EIB)
Islamic Development Bank
Arab Fund for Economic & Social
Development

Critics have argued that multilateral lending organizations are no longer necessary because of the
depth and liquidity of the international financial markets. They also argue that they are highly
politicized in their lending policies. Proponents of multilateral lending agencies argue that these
institutions provide affordable capital for high value projects in high risk countries, projects that
would not be financed at affordable interest rates by commercial banks.
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6.7.2 – Financing Structures
Centralized Finance System
The centralized finance system is the most common form of financing and ownership structure.
It relies on a combination of equity (stock) and debt (commercial bank loans and bonds). In this
approach, there is no separation of funds between general operations and the specific projects the
company undertakes. When done correctly, it combines a strong central credit rating with a
sophisticated intercompany financing system (and the occasional use of project financing) and
provides large oil companies with several competitive advantages. These advantages include:
low-cost debt and equity, efficient use of the company’s cash flow, global tax optimization, and
facilitates remittance of its foreign affiliate’s cash.
Figure 8 - Typical Centralized Finance System
U. S. Tax Consolidation
Parent company

External Fund Raising

Funds for Affiliates

U. S
Branch

Controlled
Foreign
Corporation
s

U. S. Affiliates

Foreign
Finance
Company

U. S. Finance
Corporation
Intercompany
Loans

Source: Adapted from Stephen Arbogast and Praveen Kumar, Financing Large Energy Projects, Chapter 13, in Betty
J. Simkins and Russell E. Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and
the Future of Energy (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013)

However, financing a project entirely using one company’s financial resources is not always
feasible or prudent, because an individual project may require more capital than one company
can afford to risk on a single project. In that case, another financing structure is needed to
allocate the risk. These structures include joint ventures and project finance.
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Joint Ventures
A joint venture (JV) is a financing arrangement in which two or more parties agree to pool their
financial resources for the purpose of accomplishing a specific objective. In a joint venture, both
of the participants are responsible for the costs incurred and the profits and losses associated with
it. The joint venture is a separate legal entity from the parent companies that are funding the
venture. A separate operating agreement is prepared which specifies which company or
companies are responsible for actual project development and operation. By jointly funding the
enterprise, two or more companies can share the risk associated with a specific project and
achieve greater diversification of risk by investing in a larger number of projects.
Project Finance
IOCs are attracted to large projects, located in difficult environments for two principal reasons.
First, large projects provide IOCs the opportunity to use their advanced technology and project
management skills as a source of competitive advantage. Second, most NOCs have exclusive
access to drilling prospects in their country, particularly onshore. Consequently, the IOCs are
forced to operate large projects in difficult environments.
Because of the large size and technical complexity of these projects, IOCs have often chosen to
finance these projects using project financing. In this type of financing structure, the project is
financed primarily with commercial bank debt, usually 60% or more. Project financing legally
separates the project and it’s funding from the rest of the corporation or corporations that are
sponsoring the project. In a project finance arrangement the lenders rely solely on the assets and
cash flow of the project for the repayment of principal and interest. This is significantly different
from the centralized corporate finance model, in which lenders rely on the cash flow and
financial strength of the entire corporate enterprise for repayment of principal and interest.
Many project finance arrangements in the petroleum industry are structured through a special
purpose entity (SPE), an off-balance-sheet partnership set up by the company to separate the
financial risk of the project from the rest of the corporation. However, it was this type of offbalance sheet financing structure that contributed to the collapse of Enron Corporation. As a
consequence, internal and external auditors (compliance institutions) are examining these SPEs
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in more detail and asking for evidence that they serve some business purpose other than to keep
debt off the parent company’s balance sheet.
Debt levels of 60% or higher place a considerable burden on the cash flow from the project for
the payment of principal and interest. For the commercial bank or syndicate of banks that
provide this capital to be comfortable with the risk they are assuming, the project financing
agreement usually contains the following provisions.163


The project is established as a new legal entity, separate from the legal and financial
responsibilities of its sponsors. This creates a defined environment within which lenders
(commercial banks) can evaluate the risks associated with a specific project and
guarantees that the project's cash flow will be used exclusively to repay the principal and
interest on the debt of that particular project. Project financing also protects the sponsor’s
other assets which are not a part of the project.



Projects should be long-lived and capital intensive; and they should have a unique
purpose. Oil and natural gas pipelines are particularly well suited to this type of
financing.



The project should include cash flow from third-party commitments (customers) that are
predictable and reliable. This is usually accomplished through the establishment of
commitments by third parties to “take or pay” for the output from the project. These third
party agreements are usually long term sales contracts that include price adjustment
clauses based on inflation.



The project should have a finite life, at the end of which, all debt and equity will have
been repaid.

The use of project financing for high-risk infrastructure construction began with the development
of the North Sea oil fields in the 1970s and 1980s. Projects of this type and size were previously
financed by issuing utility or government bonds; and within the framework of a centralized
163
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finance system. Examples of project finance include major LNG projects such as the Qatar Gas
II project (2009), as well as many of the largest individual pipeline investments undertaken in the
past three decades, such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (1977), Chad  Cameroon Pipeline (2003),
and the Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan Pipeline (2005). These projects often combine project financing
and equity joint ventures. For example, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline was a project finance joint
venture between Standard Oil of Ohio, Atlantic Richfield, Exxon, British Petroleum, Mobil Oil,
Phillips Petroleum, Union Oil, and Amerada Hess. 164
Structured Project Financing
Structured financing is a more refined approach to project financing. Structured finance involves
raising capital and managing risk through the issuance of securities designed to meet the specific
risk and reward requirements of a particular type of investor. Structured project finance
combines specific securities and derivatives with standard project financing.165
Structured project financing reduces the transaction costs created by information asymmetries,
by limiting the risks a particular group of investors assumes to those that the investors feel
comfortable evaluating. (Information asymmetries exist when investors in a firm’s securities do
not have the same information or the same level of understanding of the project’s risk as the
firm’s managers, which, is usually the case.) Structured project finance also helps the project
sponsors and investors ensure that the various types of project risk are allocated to those
participants most able and willing to bear them, which increases transaction efficiency and
reduces the cost of capital.166
Project finance structures can also solve remittance problems. This is particularly relevant to oil
and gas export projects located in countries with unpredictable monetary policy. Loans for these
ventures typically establish offshore accounts and cash waterfalls. Offshore accounts refer to
bank accounts set up in a secure banking center (e.g., New York or London) to which all export
customers are instructed to direct their payments. Cash waterfalls refer to written, irrevocable
instructions to the bank describing how cash that has been received, is to be paid out to suppliers,
short term creditors, long term creditors and others. Payments are usually made to suppliers first,
164
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then taxing authorities, short term lenders and long term lenders. What matters for sponsors,
however, is that the project’s revenues are kept in a hard currency and in a country with a stable
monetary policy, reducing the risk of inconvertibility or devaluation.167 Figure 9 below shows a
typical project finance structure.
Figure 9 - Typical Project Finance Structure

Source: Christopher L. Culp and Paul Forrester, Structured Financing Techniques in Oil and Gas Project Finance,
Chapter 21, in Energy and Environmental Finance Law and Taxation: New Investment Techniques, editors Andrea S.
Kramer and Peter C. Fusaro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)

This section examined financing sources and financing structures. The next section examines the
evolution of fiscal regimes and their effect on the distribution of risk.
6.7.3 Fiscal Regimes
There are three fiscal regimes for controlling assets and the distribution of revenue in the oil and
natural gas exploration and production sector: (1) concession or lease agreement (sometimes
167
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referred to as royalty/tax agreement); (2) a production sharing agreement or production sharing
contract; and (3) a service contract.

When a host country proposes a fiscal regime it must

balance two competing objectives. First, if the host country wants to encourage investment by
international oil and gas exploration companies (IOCs), it must provide sufficient incentives for
oil companies to invest in the country and sufficient opportunity for the companies to recover
their costs and earn an appropriate return on investment. Second, the state must balance the
interests of the oil companies with the interests of its own citizens and its export customers.168
Overview of Fiscal Regimes
Figure 10 below, summarizes the principal features of the three fiscal regimes mentioned above.
Figure 10

Source: Yi, Junseog, Merits and the Demerits of the Different Types of Petroleum Contracts,
https://www.google.com/#q=merits+and+demerits+of+the+different+types+of+petroleum+contracts
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Concession or Lease (Royalty/Tax Agreements)
In a concession or lease agreement the IOC takes ownership of the hydrocarbons at the wellhead.
(The wellhead is the component at the surface of an oil or gas well that provides the structural
and pressure-controlling interface for the drilling and production equipment.) The IOCs’ return
on investment is obtained from producing and selling the oil and natural gas; and the state's
financial returns are derived from royalty payments and taxes paid by the IOC. Royalties are
usually calculated as a percentage of the projects revenues and is a more stable source of revenue
for the host government than revenue based on the project’s profit or loss. For example income
taxes or dividend distributions will only be paid if the project or projects are operating at a profit.
Although the royalties paid to the host government will also vary with the price of oil, royalties
will provide income to the state every quarter, whereas as revenue derived from taxing the net
income of the IOC on that project will vary more and could be zero if the project is not profitable
in a particular quarter.169 (See Figure A.3 in Appendix IV for an example of the revenue split.)
Contractual Systems
The unfavorable terms received by host governments in concession agreements (royalty/tax
agreements) in the 1920s and 1930s led host governments and NOCs to develop so called
“contractual systems”. The two most commonly used contractual systems are the production
sharing agreement (PSA) and the risk service contract. In a contractual system the state retains
ownership of the oil and gas beyond the wellhead. The IOC only takes ownership of oil and gas
allocated for recovery of exploration and development costs and allocated from the profit split of
volumes for distribution and sale.170
Production Sharing Agreements/Production Sharing Contract (PSA/PSC)
Under the terms of a PSA, the IOC is completely responsible for the development of the oil and
natural gas. This includes all aspects of extracting the oil and gas and delivering it to a location
for transportation and sale. In most PSAs, the state receives revenue from three primary sources:
(1) royalties, (2) taxes, and (3) a share of the oil and gas produced.
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When PSAs were first introduced in Indonesia in 1960, the IOCs were not enthusiastic. The
prospect of investing large amounts of capital in exploration, equipment, and development, but
not holding title to the oil and natural gas was unsettling for most IOCs. The introduction of
PSAs was a major change to the structure of the industry and evidence that the bargaining
strength of host governments was increasing and the bargaining strength of IOCs was decreasing.
The resistance of the major oil companies to PSAs was overcome when several smaller
independent companies without established concession agreements and operations in these oil
producing countries, began signing PSAs to gain access to oil and natural gas prospects from
which they had previously been shut out.171 (See Figure A.4 in Appendix IV for an example of
the revenue split in a PSA, also called a PSC.)
Pure Service and Risk Service Contracts
In a pure service contract or risk service contract the IOC provides some or all of the financial
capital for exploration and development and is paid by the host government according to a fixed
price contract. In a “pure” service contract the IOC’s or service company’s revenue is based on
the activities it performs, similar to a fixed price construction contract.172 The Argentine
Frondizi contracts of the late 1950s are examples of “pure” service contracts, named for
Argentina’s President, at the time, Arturo Frondizi. IOCs were required to drill a specific
number of wells per year per exploration block and in exchange received a fixed dollar amount
based on a variety of metrics, including meters drilled, wells completed, and ultimately the oil
and gas produced per hour.
Under a risk service contract, if the IOC finds oil or gas, the host country government allows the
IOC to recover its costs by selling the oil and natural gas, however the IOC explores for oil and
gas at its own risk and expense.173 If no oil or gas is found, the IOC bears the cost. The choice
of the fiscal regime (concession/lease, production sharing agreement, pure service contract or
risk service contract) determines the allocation of risk and reward between the parties.
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6.7.4 - Alliances
IOC – NOC Alliances
The relationship between an IOC and an NOC is usually determined on a project-by-project
basis, consequently neither party has any assurance of a broader or longer-term relationship.
Some industry analysts have suggested that the interests of IOCs and NOCs would be better
served if they formed alliances that extended beyond a single project.174 They argue that NOCs
and IOCs each have unique strengths and that they are complimentary. NOCs are in a position to
manage resource and production controls in a manner that the host government perceives to be in
the national interest. Furthermore, NOCs are the principal organizations in many developing
countries for acquiring new technologies and transferring those technologies to other parts of the
domestic economy.175 Technology transfers can come from a variety of sources, including from
other countries’ NOCs and from oil field service companies, but technology transfers have most
often come from the IOCs.176 In addition, the IOCs possess substantial technical expertise,
project management skills, and the ability to define and develop new products and new
markets.177 At the 12th Ministerial of the International Energy Forum, the same observations and
recommendations were made.178
The arguments for these long term alliances are not entirely convincing for several reasons.
First, the benefits to be derived from combining the unique capabilities of the NOCs and IOCs
can be realized whether they work together on a single project or several successive projects.
Second, the typical oil or gas project extends over 10 to 30 years and therefore involves a longterm relationship in itself. Third, NOCs, IOCs and host governments have an incentive to
diversify their investment risk among several partners rather than just one or two. Fourth, there
are historical and political obstacles to a closer and longer term relationship between NOCs and
174

Robert A. James, Strategic Alliances between National and International Oil Companies, Working paper #104,
(Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, October, 2011) p. 9
175
Ibid p. 12
176
Peter A. Nolan & Mark C. Thurber, On the State’s Choice of Oil Company: Risk Management and the Frontier of
the Petroleum Industry (Stanford University PESD Working Paper No. 99, 2010), available at
http://pesd.stanford.edu/publications/on_the_states_choice_of_oil_company_risk_management_and_the_frontie
r_of_the_petroleum_industry/.
177
Robert A. James, Strategic Alliances between National and International Oil Companies (Working paper #104,
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, October, 2011) p. 12
178
International Energy Forum, NOC-IOC Partnerships, General guidelines for successful cooperation (Report for the
13th IEF Ministerial, Kuwait, March 12-14, 2012)

103

IOCs, including the experience of colonialism, the one-sided nature of the first concession
agreements, the potential for resource nationalism and the possibility of sudden political change
in the host country. These challenges exist even in a single project and are compounded if the
alliance includes several projects with the same partner.
NOC-NOC Alliances
An alliance between two NOCs may be a more feasible alternative to an IOC-NOC alliance if
“consorting” with an IOC is politically unacceptable in the host country. An alliance between
NOCs may also make sense in circumstances in which an IOC partner is either difficult to find,
or the potential NOC partner is willing to agree to more favorable terms than the IOC. However,
in an NOC-NOC alliance, some of the advantages that exist in an NOC-IOC alliance are lost, for
example, the technical know-how and project management skills of the IOC. In addition, NOCNOC alliances may be impeded by current or future political differences between the two
countries.
6.8 Managing Commercial and Non-Commercial Risk (Question #8)
Q8
1. What are the general classes of risk, after a project has begun operation?
2. What instruments are available for managing commercial risk?
3. What instruments are available for managing non-commercial risk?
H8
(1) The general classes of financial risk, after a project has begun operation are commercial and
non-commercial risk.
(2) The instruments for managing commercial risk are liability insurance and reinsurance.
(3) The instruments for managing non-commercial risk include derivatives, long term purchase
agreements and political risk insurance. Oil and gas companies use derivatives and long term
purchase agreements, but the oil and gas industry’s use of political risk insurance has not been
significant.
Commercial and Non-Commercial Risk
After a project is in commercial operation, it still faces several commercial and non-commercial
risks. The commercial risks include: (1) a decrease in revenue as a result of an unexpected
decline in product demand or an increase in aggregate product supply; (2) an unexpected
increase in operating cost; (3) loss of revenue from business interruption or lack of business
continuity; (4) property damage; (5) labor disputes and local labor management problems; and
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(6) liability (workers' compensation, product liability, environmental liability and general
liability). In addition, oil and gas companies operating onshore or offshore the United States are
required to demonstrate that they have sufficient financial resources to pay for damages and the
cost of cleanup created by an oil spill.
Non-Commercial risks can be divided into two broad categories (financial risk and political risk).
The financial risks include changes in interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and
inflation. Political risk includes: (1) asset impairment (degradation, destruction, and
expropriation); (2) political violence and war; (3) insecure property rights (contract frustration or
abrogation, patent violations, wrongful calling of guarantees, host country failure to honor
guarantees and changes in host country laws) and (4) currency inconvertibility and capital flow
restrictions.
Managing Commercial Risk
The risk of a decrease in revenue as a result of an unexpected decrease in product demand or an
increase in aggregate product supply; and (2) unexpected increases in operating costs are
generally not insured against. The oil and gas company’s management is responsible for
anticipating and adapting to changing economic conditions. Protection against loss of revenue
from business interruption or lack of business continuity; labor disputes and local labor
management problems and liability (workers' compensation, product liability, and environmental
liability) are obtained through property and casualty insurance.
The purpose and operation of property and casualty insurance is generally understood but the
purpose and operation of reinsurance is not as well understood. Reinsurance is the process by
which an insurance company transfers a portion of its risk portfolio to other insurers by some
form of legal agreement in order to reduce the risk that it bears for a specific project. The effect
of reinsurance is to spread the risk of completion, operation and maintenance of a project across
several insurance companies. In addition to re-insurance for traditional risks like liability,
project completion, errors and omissions, and business interruption, re-insurers may also provide
guaranties and sureties for contractors performance; provide financing guaranties and sureties for
credit risk borne by the project (e.g., the risk of nonpayment from contractually committed
purchasers of the oil and gas); and provide liquidity support to working capital.
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Some of the larger private sector business property and casualty insurers include American
International Group (AIG), the Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, and Travelers Group.
Insurance companies providing property and casualty insurance to exploration and development
companies drilling offshore include: Munich Reinsurance Co., Swiss Reinsurance Co. Ltd.,
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG, Chartis (a subsidiary of American International Group, Inc.),
W. R. Berkley Corporation and Lancashire Group. In response to the Deepwater Horizon
accident major insurance and reinsurance firms have increased the premiums they charge to
firms operating drilling rigs in shallow water by 15% to 25% and for firms operating drilling rigs
in deep water, as much as 50%.179
Mutual Companies
In 1972, 16 oil companies formed Oil Insurance Limited (OIL). OIL is a mutual insurance
company that has 50 members, all oil and gas companies. OIL only insures companies that meet
its definition of an energy company. The company’s All Risk Physical Damage insurance
provides protection against damage to cargo, construction, terrorism, and windstorm. Its Control
of Well Liability insurance provides protection against perils associated with drilling, for
example blow-outs. Its 3rd Party Pollutions Liability products insure against liability (including
punitive damages) or contractual liability of members for personal/bodily injury, loss of or
damage to property arising from a seepage, pollution or contamination incident. (The company
has a per project maximum of $300 million for All Risk Physical Damage, $300 million for
Control of Well Liability, and $300 million for 3rd Party Pollution Liability.180
Environmental Liability Insurance
In the early 1960s, a specialty energy insurance market emerged to offer pollution liability
coverage for third-party property claims and cleanup and contamination risks, oil well blowouts,
and re-drilling.181 Insuring the liabilities of vessels was not made compulsory until the adoption
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of the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC).182 At
the same time, the offshore oil and gas insurance industry began offering insurance coverage for
control of blowouts. Insurers subsequently expanded coverage to include the costs of drilling in
deeper water and the cost of re-drilling if a blowout occurred.
In 1990, the United States, in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound,
passed the Oil Pollution and Control Act (OPA). The OPA liability and compensation
framework includes a combination of elements that distribute the costs of an oil spill between the
responsible party or parties and a trust fund, which is largely financed through a per-barrel tax on
domestic and imported oil in the United States. Responsible parties are liable up to their liability
caps which range from $75 million to $350 million depending on the nature of the spill; the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund covers costs above the liability limits up to a per-incident cap of $1
billion. However, if the cost of the spill exceeds $1.350 billion, the liability above that amount
lies with the party responsible for the accident (usually an IOC or one of its contractors). In the
case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill the responsible party was primarily BP.183 The final
report prepared by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling highlighted a September 2010 announcement from the insurance company,
Munich Re advertising environmental coverage in the $10 billion to $20 billion range.184
However, this is the exception rather than the rule and there is no record of insurers underwriting
policies of that size or oil companies being willing to pay the insurance premiums for coverage of
that magnitude. Consequently, most exploration and production companies are self-insured for
environmental liability, for example, BP in the Deepwater Horizon accident.
Managing Financial Risk
Financial risks include changes in interest rates, currency exchange rates, commodity prices, and
inflation rates. Financial risks can be managed through a combination of derivatives and long
term purchase agreements. Derivatives include commodity futures, forward contracts, options,
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and swaps. Long term purchase agreements are usually negotiated prior to the development of
an oil or gas field to secure a market for the future output from the field.
Managing Political Risk
Political risk includes: (1) asset impairment (degradation, destruction and expropriation); (2)
currency inconvertibility and capital flow restrictions; (3) political violence and war; and (4)
insecure property rights (contract frustration or abrogation, patent violations, wrongful calling of
guarantees, host country failure to honor guarantees and changes in host country laws). Political
risk insurance (PRI) provides one means of recovery for companies whose foreign investment
has been expropriated or whose financial interests have been damaged by a host government or
its citizens.185 The first political risk insurance policies were issued by the United States after
World War II to encourage private investment in Western Europe.
Private sector insurers also offer political risk insurance coverage in developing and developed
countries and for various durations. Some of the larger private PRI issuers are Lloyd’s of
London; Zurich Financial Services Group; Sovereign Risk Insurance Ltd.; American
International Group, Inc. (AIG); and Chubb Corp. In addition, the U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) also
provide political risk insurance. Most government sector providers of PRI are national export
credit agencies (ECAs), which insure short-term export credit/trade transactions. Examples
include the U.S. Export/Import Bank (U.S.), Export Development Canada (Canada), and Eksport
Kredit Fonde (Denmark).
Coverage Limits
OPIC and MIGA offer maximum coverage limits of $250 million and $220 million, respectively.
The limits offered by private insurers range from $85 million at AIG to $125 million at
Sovereign Risk Insurance Limited. However, political risk insurers often form consortiums to
increase the total limits available to the policyholder and to diversify their own risk.186
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Overseas Private Investment Corporation
In 1971, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a wholly owned U.S. government
corporation, was established to provide direct financing and political risk insurance for projects
in developing countries.187 At the end of 2013, OPIC had a $18 billion portfolio of which 71%
was related to financing (i.e. loans), 12% to political risk insurance, and 17% to investment funds
(i.e. equity investments).188 The “loan limit” is $250 million per project and the “house limit”
for lending and insurance combined is $400 million. OPIC provides protection against (1) war,
civil strife, coups and other acts of politically-motivated violence; (2) terrorism; (3)
expropriation, and (4) abrogation, repudiation and/or impairment of a contract or other improper
host government interference. Companies can purchase protection against whatever risks they
choose, that is, the insurance menu is “a la carte”. In addition, a company can purchase
protection against “attenuated losses” or “trade related losses”, that is, losses created by a supply
disruption between facilities on which its operations depend. A senior official at OPIC noted
that regulatory risk and other types of “partial takings” are becoming more common than outright
expropriation and that this type of event is harder to put a dollar value on.189
This OPIC official also said that OPIC considers the existence of a bilateral investment treaty
between the host country government and the country of the investor to be very important in its
decision to insure a project. OPIC also places importance on a country’s signature and
ratification of the New York Arbitration Convention (established in 1958) and a country’s
membership in the ICSID
Dispute Resolution Procedures and Awards
The insurer usually waits until an international court or tribunal has rendered its decision and
award, before it considers the plaintiff’s claim for compensation. While the case is still in
arbitration, however, the insurer will try to get the parties to reach an out of court settlement. If
the defendant pays the claimant after either the parties have agreed to a settlement or the court
renders its decision and award, then the matter is ended. If the defendant does not pay the
claimant, then the insurance company pays the claimant and the insurance company then seeks
187
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payment from the defendant. A senior official at OPIC estimated that in the latter case OPIC
recovers 95% of what it is owed by defendants. This official estimated that the recovery rate in
the private sector of the PRI industry is about 35%. He explained the difference in recovery rates
by noting that: (1) OPIC can use the full force of U.S. government departments and agencies
(Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice) to enforce its claims for
compensation from the host government. (2) OPIC lends to and insures projects in countries
where no lender or insurer in the private sector is willing to lend, so a defendant country is not
likely to want to offend either OPIC or the United States government by refusing to pay what it
owes. If the country refuses to compensate OPIC, OPIC will most likely exit the country and not
finance or insure any other projects in that country.190
OPIC plays a dominant role in the political risk insurance market and its standard policy is
publicly available. For these reasons its expropriation coverage is used to illustrate the issues
likely to arise for companies affected by nationalization and expropriation. OPIC policies
provide coverage for “total expropriation” and cover an act or series of acts by the host
government that violate international law or materially breach local law and directly deprive the
insured of fundamental rights in the insured investment. However, the standard OPIC policy
does not further define when an expropriation constitutes a violation of international law
therefore OPIC applies general principles of international law (previously discussed).191 That is,
an expropriation violates international law when it is not for a public purpose, is discriminatory,
is not accomplished by due process and is not followed by just compensation.
Use of Political Risk Insurance in the Oil and Gas Industry
At the end of 2013, the total amount of political risk insurance in force, related to foreign direct
investment (not trade) was $234.7 billion.192 The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) accounted for $10.8 billion of that $234.7 billion and within the MIGA insurance
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portfolio, the political risk insurance in force related to oil and gas investments was $918.4
million or 8.5% of the $10.8 billion.193 (See Figure 11)
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Figure 11 - Insurance Portfolio - Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
Outstanding investment guarantees portfolio, Total $10.8 billion
(December 2012)

If other political risk insurers (OPIC, etc.) insure in roughly the same proportions then the total
PRI insurance in force in the oil and gas sector is approximately $20 billion ($234.7 billion x
.085 = $19.95 billion). In 2014, the estimated total value of all global oil and gas assets was
$4.65 trillion.194 These figures indicate that the use of PRI insurance by the oil and gas industry
is relatively small compared to the oil and gas assets in place. This may be explained in part by
the fact that many oil and gas assets are located in countries in which political risk is either
insignificant or non-existent and in part by the fact that most oil companies choose to self-insure.
A senior official at MIGA suggested that the amount of PRI in the oil and gas sector is small for
the following reasons (1) international oil companies have their own captive insurance
companies and therefore self-insure (2) Oil companies place high value and trust in the quality of
the relationship they have with the host government’s leaders (3) infrastructure projects
(electrical power generation plants, railroads, and dams) usually require more capital than all but
the largest oil projects (4) Developing countries usually need help with infrastructure projects
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more often than with oil and gas projects and (5) foreign investors usually own only a small part
of a given exploration block, thereby limiting their risk.195
This same official observed that although the existence of a bilateral treaty between the parties is
a consideration in deciding to insure a project, MIGA does not consider it critical, because
MIGA will only insure projects in which the contract between the parties includes a provision for
mediation and arbitration in the event of a dispute. In addition, MIGA only insures projects in
countries that are members of MIGA and all members of MIGA sign a “Legal Protection
Agreement” which guarantees MIGA the same rights as the country’s best treated “most
favored” partners.
This official also noted that the basis of compensation varies depending on the nature of the loss.
In the case of (1) expropriation, the compensation is based on net book value, (2) in the case of
breach of contract MIGA requires mediation by a panel of three experts and if that fails then
arbitration by an international court or tribunal (3) in the case of inconvertibility or transfer
restrictions the amount of money is known, (4) in the case of property damage, the compensation
is based on the cost of restoring the property to its prior condition. MIGA deposits the money in
an offshore account for the claimant and the claimant receives compensation in a currency that is
convertible.
6.9 Financial Reporting and Operational Transparency (Question #9)
The theoretical literature summarized in Chapter 3 argued financial reporting and operational
transparency can reduce risk and increase economic feasibility because they reduce information
asymmetry, bounded rationality, monitoring costs, and transaction costs. Financial reporting
includes financial statements showing (1) revenue, expenses, net income, cash flow, assets, and
liabilities; (2) the financial terms and conditions of specific transactions (purchase price, sales
price, and due dates) and (3) legal disputes and potential liability. Operational transparency
includes disclosure of the countries in which a company operates, its choice of partners,
environmental compliance, wells drilled, new discoveries, reserve depletion rates, and total oil
and gas reserves. This section addresses the following questions.
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Q9
(1) What is financial reporting quality and transparency?
(2) Can financial reporting quality be measured and if so how?
(3) Does financial reporting quality matter from a theoretical perspective?
(4) Does financial reporting quality matter from a practical perspective?
(5) Does the quality of financial reporting affect the amount of direct foreign investment in a
country?
(6) How are oil and gas reserves measured? How accurate are these measurements?
(7) Does reserve reporting matter from a practical perspective?
H9
(1) Financial reporting quality can be defined.
(2) Financial reporting quality can be measured.
(3) The quality of financial reporting does matter from a theoretical perspective.
(4) The quality of financial reporting does matter from a practical perspective.
(5) Financial reporting quality does affect the direct foreign investment in a country.
(6) Oil and gas reserves can be estimated but these estimates are frequently contested.
(7) Reserve reporting does matter from a practical perspective.
6.9.1 Financial Reporting Quality
Financial reporting quality refers to the extent to which the financial statements of a firm
provide accurate and complete information about the firm’s financial and economic
performance. Various measurement criteria have been developed to evaluate the quality of
financial reporting. Table 4 below provides a summary of the methods most often used in the
literature. They include: accrual models, value relevance models, research focusing on specific
elements in the annual report, and methods that operationalize the qualitative characteristics of
the information.196
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Table 4 – Methods Used for Measuring the Quality of Financial Reporting

Method

Accrual Models
Examines the level of
earnings management
as a proxy for earnings
quality

Value Relevance
Literature
Examines the
relationship between
stock returns and
earnings figures in
order to measure the
relevance and
reliability of financial
reporting information

Specific clements in
Annual Report
Examines specific
elements in the annual
report in depth, by
conducting an
experiment.

Qualitative
Characteristics
Examines the level of
decision usefulness of
financial reporting
information by
operationalizing the
qualitative
characteristics

Advantages

Relatively easy to
Relatively easyto
colledct data in order to measure
measure earnings
management

Focus on financial
reporting quality

Focus on financial
reporting quality

Disadvanages

Focus on earnings
quality

Focus on earnings
quality

Focus only on selected
elements

In general difficult to
operationalize, causing
measurement
difficulties

Indirect measure of
financial reporting
quality

Indirect measure of
financial reporting
quality

Difficult to measure

Difficult to estimate
discretionary accruals

No insight is provided
in the tradeoff between
relevance and
reliability

e.g. Jones, 1999; Healy
& Wahlen, 1999;
Dechow et al., 1995

e.g. Barth et al., 2001;
Choi et al., 1997;
Nichols & Wahlen,
2004; Nelson, 1996

Authors

e.g. Hirst et al.,
2004;Beretta &
Bozzolan, 2004; 2004;
Cohen et al., 2004

e.g. Schipper & Vincent,
2003; Van der Meulen,
et al., 2007; Barth et al.,
2006

Source: Ferdy van Beest, Geert Braam and Suzanne Boelens, Quality of Financial Reporting: Measuring Qualitative
Characteristics, NiCE Working Paper 09-108 April 2009, Nijmegen Center for Economics (NiCE) Institute for
Management Research Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands http://www.ru.nl/nice/workingpapers

In theory, high quality financial reporting and operational transparency should increase the
efficiency of markets by reducing transaction costs, monitoring costs and surrounding
uncertainty; and reducing the costs of asymmetric information, thereby expanding the limits of
bounded rationality, and limiting the adverse effects of opportunism. Several empirical studies
have concluded that higher quality financial reporting does increase market efficiency (Bushman
and Smith, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Lambert, Leuz and Verecchia, 2007; Biddle and
Hilary, 2006).197 Market efficiency can be defined in two ways. (1) It can be defined in terms of
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transaction costs, monitoring costs and surrounding uncertainty, that is, the lower these costs are
for a given transaction the more efficient the market is said to be. Market efficiency can also be
defined it terms of the cost and consequences of asymmetric information, bounded rationality,
and the adverse effects of opportunism. Understood in these terms, the higher the rate of return
to investors for a given level of risk and the lower the cost of capital to borrowers for given level
of risk, the more efficient the market is said to be.
The studies referenced above all evaluated market efficiency and the quality of financial
reporting in the context of buying and selling of financial securities on an organized exchange.
They did not relate market efficiency and the quality of financial reporting to foreign direct
investment. However, the largest part of investment in the upstream sector of the oil and gas
industry is made in the form of domestic or foreign direct investment. The question therefore
arises, whether the quality of financial reporting in a country affects foreign direct investment
inflows to that country in general and oil and gas exploration and development in particular. To
study this question data on the capital spending and exploration expenditures (CAPEX) made by
oil and gas companies in each country are needed, but this information is considered proprietary
by oil and gas companies and therefore not publicly disclosed.
However, the World Bank does report the total foreign direct investment in each country based
on figures provided by the member countries. Figure 12 below, compares total foreign direct
investment as reported by the World Bank and the quality of financial reporting calculated by
Tang, Chen and Lin.198 Figure 12 suggests that there is no observable relationship between
foreign direct investment inflows and the quality of the financial reporting in a country. The
absence of a relationship, however, could be attributable to the size of each country, that is,
countries with larger economies might attract more foreign direct investment than countries with
smaller economies, no matter what the quality of financial reporting in the country.
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Figure 12 - Foreign Direct Investment vs Ranking of
Financial Reporting Quality
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Figure 13 addresses this possibility by comparing the ratio of foreign direct investment inflows
to GDP and the quality of financial reporting. The results, however, are similar. There is no
observable relationship between the ratio of foreign direct investment inflows to GDP and the
quality of financial reporting of public companies.

Financial Reporting Quality

Figure 13 - Ratio of FDI Inflows/GDP vs Ranking of
Financial Reporting Quality
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These results are somewhat disturbing because they imply that higher quality financial reporting
does not increase the amount of direct foreign investment as theory suggests and the empirical
work on the market for publicly traded securities indicates.
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There are at least two possible explanations for this result. First, the quality of financial
reporting by public companies, which is what the financial reporting index is based on, is not
necessarily indicative of the quality of financial reporting related to foreign direct investment,
because a contract between a foreign direct investor and a host country will always include a
project accounting team comprised of personnel from the investor’s organization and the host
country’s government or NOC. In addition, the project is likely to be audited by external
auditors. In this environment, the project accounting team is likely to apply rigorous accounting
methods to the project, no matter what the quality of financial reporting elsewhere in the country.
Second, IOCs are compelled to invest in countries where oil and gas have been found or are
likely to be found and are therefore forced to mitigate financial reporting risk in other ways, as
noted above. If the quality of financial reporting could be measured in the context of direct
foreign investment with the same accuracy as it has been measured in studies of the securities of
public companies, there might an observable relationship between the quality of financial
reporting and foreign direct investment.
6.9.2 – Estimating and Valuing Reserves
Estimating and valuing reserves is the most difficult reporting challenge, because future
production can only be approximated given the technical, geologic and pricing uncertainty
surrounding oil and natural gas. The Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) and World
Petroleum Council (WPC) jointly developed a reserve assessment methodology to address the
technical uncertainty of estimating oil and gas reserves. The methodology uses a system that
classifies oil and gas reserves into three categories (1) prospective (undiscovered reserves), (2)
contingent (sub-commercial reserves), and (3) commercial reserves. This system includes both
conventional and unconventional deposits (shale oil, shale gas and tar sands). As oil prices rise
and extraction technology improves, conventional and unconventional oil resources are
reclassified from sub-commercial to commercial reserves.199
Reporting Oil and Gas Reserves
The first tier of reporting is performed by individual oil and gas companies (NOCs, IOCs and
domestic oil companies). A second tier of reporting is carried out by public information agencies
199
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(the International Energy Agency, the U.S. Energy Information Administration, and the OPEC
Secretariat) and private companies (BP and the Oil & Gas Journal). Owen et al concluded that in
some cases, these organizations acknowledge sources of reporting error, but in general they
reproduce the data obtained from the first tier reporting organizations with only small
adjustments to account for differences in oil grades.200 They suggested that second tier sources
make more optimistic estimates than independent analysts, because the second tier reporting
organizations do not question the estimates made by the first tier, possibly because they consider
such questions politically sensitive and diplomatically offensive.201 In 2010, Owen et al
concluded that that on average, conventional world proved oil reserves should have been revised
down from 1,184 billion barrels and 1,241 billion barrels estimated by World Oil (WO) and the
International Energy Agency (IEA) respectively, to approximately 903 billion barrels.202 This
represents a 24% to 27% reduction in the estimate of conventional world proved reserves.
However, a senior official at the Department of Energy believes that the International Energy
Agency (IEA) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) make a diligent effort to
evaluate first tier estimates and where necessary, reduce them.203
In 2010, the Oil & Gas Journal (O&GJ) estimated that conventional and unconventional world
proved oil reserves were 1,354 billion barrels. Suggesting that in 2010, unconventional reserves
accounted for 113 to 170 billion barrels of oil (1,354 – 1,241 and 1,354 – 1,184). The decision to
include unconventional reserves complicates the estimation of world proved oil reserves because
unconventional reserves are more expensive to recover and are therefore more sensitive to
changes in the world price of oil. In addition, unconventional reserves are becoming an
increasing percentage of total reserves. For example, at the end of 2013, BP and the Oil & Gas
Journal estimated world proved oil reserves (conventional and unconventional) at 1,687.9 billion
barrels204 and 1,644.5 billion barrels205, respectively. In 2011, U.S. Energy Information
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Administration estimated that commercially recoverable shale and tight oil worldwide was 32
billion barrels, but in 2013, the EIA estimated that recoverable shale/tight oil worldwide was 345
billion barrels.206 This increase in recoverable shale/tight oil was in part the result of an increase
in the average global price of oil from $79.50 per barrel in 2010 to $108.66 per barrel in 2013.
The decrease in the spot price of crude oil (West Texas Intermediate) from $106 per barrel in
June 2014 to $56 per barrel at the end of December 2014 will reduce that quantity of
conventional and unconventional oil and gas that is economically recoverable in the short term
and will complicate the problem of estimating and valuing reserves.
Practical Relevance of Reserve Estimates
In the short term, current oil inventories, that is oil above ground, is the most important
determinant of current (spot) oil prices and the level of capital investment (CAPEX) expended in
the search for new oil and gas reserves. In the long term, however, estimates of proved and
probable reserves below ground play the most important role in determining CAPEX and the
supply and price of oil. If the actual proved and probable reserves turn out to be less than those
estimated, the current price of oil may be lower than is justified by long term supply and
demand. This problem could be made worse because it takes more time and more evidence to
convince oil and gas company executives that an oil price increase will persist, than it does to
convince them that an oil price decrease will persist. That is, an increase in oil price does not
stimulate exploration drilling in the short run, but a decrease in oil price will cause an almost
instantaneous reduction in exploration expenditures. 207 This could result in under-investment in
exploration and development and could set the stage for another rapid increase in the price of oil
when it is discovered that reserves are overstated and capital spending has been too low.
6.10 Geopolitics and Global Governance (Question #10)
The previous sections have focused on the interaction between individual organizations and
institutions. The first three questions in this section examine the interaction between
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organizations and institutions acting together. The last three questions examine some unique
relationships between oil companies and host governments.
Q10
(1) How important are multilateral treaties in the oil and gas industry?
(2) How important are international energy forums?
(3) Who is responsible for the quality of financial reporting in the international environment?
(4) How have signature bonuses affected NOCs, IOCs and host governments?
(5) What is energy diplomacy and does it really matter?
(6) Who is responsible for coordinating Foreign Direct Investment and National Security in the
United States?
H10
(1) There are a relatively small number of multilateral investment treaties and no global
investment treaties.
(2) The impact of international energy forums has been limited in the oil and gas industry.
(3) The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) are the dominant rulemaking bodies for financial reporting.
(4) Signature bonuses have increased in size and create an obstacle to good national
governance.
(5) The successes of energy diplomacy have been limited.
(6) There is a formal network of agencies and departments that are authorized to review foreign
direct investment in the United States.
6.10.1 Multilateral Treaties
In 2010, Goldthau observed that during the previous twenty-five years, the political and
economic mainstream promoted the liberalization of energy trading, for example, the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and bi-regional forums
such as the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council and the EU-Russian Dialogue, but direct foreign
investments in energy were still managed through a “patchwork of national laws and bilateral
treaties”.208 The Permanent Court of Arbitration only lists two multilateral investment treaties,
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (1966) and the Energy Charter Treaty (1994). There are still no internationally agreed
upon set of rules for trading energy resources and energy investment. The absence of an
international agreement or even a substantial number of multilateral agreements is reflected in
the small number of cases that have been brought before the ICSID and other tribunals, in which
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the legal instrument being referenced was a multilateral treaty. For example, of the 68
investment cases related to oil and natural gas reported by UNCTAD, 51 were brought with
reference to a bilateral investment treaty, 9 were brought with reference to the Energy Charter
Treaty, 3 with reference to NAFTA, 2 with reference to a combination of a bilateral investment
treaty and the Energy Charter Treaty. In 3 cases, the legal instrument being referenced was
either ambiguous or unknown.
Does the absence of an international energy investment agreement or even a substantial number
of multilateral agreements matter? In section 6.2 it was noted that in 2012 and 2013, the total
number of deals (lease/concession agreement, production sharing agreements, technical service
contracts, joint ventures, acquisitions and divestitures) in the oil and gas industry, was 1,800 and
1,400, respectively.209 However, only 3 cases were brought before a court or tribunal in 2012, 4
in 2011, 5 in 2010, 2 in 2009 and 8 in 2008. Therefore a relatively small number of transactions
result in a dispute that must be adjudicated with reference to a bilateral treaty or multilateral
treaty. It was also noted that the outcome of an international court proceeding or tribunal is
dependent on the standard of treatment applied by the court or tribunal and the definition of fair
and equitable compensation. Therefore, even if there was an international investment treaty or
an extensive network of multilateral investment treaties, the problems of interpretation of
specific provisions and standards of treatment would still exist.
6.10.2 International Energy Forums
The International Energy Forum (IEF)
The International Energy Forum’s (IEF) mission is “to foster greater mutual understanding and
awareness of common energy interests among its members”.210 The IEF has 76 member
countries and all of them have signed the IEF Charter, which outlines a framework for “global
energy dialogue through this inter-governmental arrangement”.211 The member countries of the
IEF account for approximately 90% of world oil and natural gas supply and demand. Its
members include not only the consuming and producing countries of the IEA and OPEC, but also
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countries outside of their memberships, including Argentina, China, India, Mexico, Oman,
Russia and South Africa.
The IEF met for the first time in Paris in 1991. Its biennial Ministerial Meetings are the largest
gathering of Energy Ministers in the world. Through the Forum and its associated events, IEF
Ministers, their officials, energy industry executives, and other experts exchange information
regarding common energy interests and global energy security. However, this inclusiveness has
not guaranteed a successful and constructive dialogue.212
For example, during a meeting of the (IEF) in London in 2008, it was suggested that planned
capital expenditures be collected from international and national oil companies and published.
However, persuading IOCs and NOCs to publish their planned capital expenditures ultimately
proved to be impossible, because it demanded a high level of accuracy and required companies
to disclose proprietary information about their current and future operations. 213 Consequently,
although transparency would have increased market efficiency and reduced risk, IOCs and
NOCs still only report in the level of detail required in their home country. Consequently, in
the last twenty years, the main achievement of the IEF has been to raise awareness of the high
level of energy interdependence among nations and the compilation and publication of historical
data regarding production, consumption and capacity expansion, but not future investment
spending (CAPEX). Three of these IEF initiatives are discussed below.
Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI)214
At the 7th IEF Ministerial in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 2000, six organizations: Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat),
International Energy Agency (IEA), Latin American Energy Organization
(OLADE), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and United Nations
Statistical Division (UNSD) collaborated in the development of the Joint Oil Data Exercise.
The Joint Oil Data Exercise was subsequently renamed the Joint Oil Data Initiative and was
established as a permanent organization of the IEF. In January 2005, following the endorsement
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by Energy Ministers, the IEF secretariat assumed responsibility for coordinating the Joint Oil
Data Initiative. The Initiative's oil database (JODI Oil) provides comprehensive statistics on
global oil production and consumption on a monthly basis.
In November 2005, the JODI partners published the JODI Oil World Database
(www.jodidata.org), a first step to improved transparency in the oil and gas markets. The
successful establishment of the oil data database subsequently led to an initiative to develop a
natural gas database (JODI Gas) and annual data on upstream and downstream capacity and
expansion plans (JODI Investment).
6.10.3 Financial Reporting
The institutions responsible for financial reporting include the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB), the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and its counterparts in Europe and Asia. Beginning in the 1990s,
the most significant developments in financial reporting have been (1) a convergence between
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) developed and updated by the IASB and
the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) developed and updated by the
FASB; and (2) the increasing adoption of IFRS worldwide. The influence of the IASB
dominates other international institutions engaged in international accounting issues, such as the
OECD Working Group on Accounting Standards, the UN Intergovernmental Working Group of
Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting and the European Union’s
Accounting Advisory Forum.215
The ascendance of IFRS since the 1990s has had a significant impact on financial reporting,
capital markets, companies listed on public exchanges and investors. These companies are able
to raise financial capital in other countries without having to first restate their financial results
using that country’s accounting standards. In addition, investors have access to financial data
that is more consistent and comparable. In 2005, approximately 15,000 companies listed on
exchanges around the world were preparing and presenting their financial results in compliance
with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and at the same time, the differences

215

Jochen Zimmermann and Jorg R. Werner. Regulating Capitalisim? The Evolution of Transnational Accounting
Governance (New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan, 2013) p. 15

123

between IFRS, U.S. GAAP and Japanese GAAP were also diminishing. The convergence of the
IFRS standards, U.S. GAAP and Japanese GAAP since 1990, is an example of how
organizations, in this case investors, oil companies and financial organizations operating through
the institutions of the IASB, FASB and SEC have reshaped the institutional environment to
increase the efficiency of financial reporting and capital allocation.
6.10.4 Signature Bonuses
Signature bonuses are a part of the bid made by IOCs for the rights to explore and develop a
particular block or blocks in the host country’s territory. These payments are made by the IOC
to the host government immediately or shortly after, a contract is signed. As the price of crude
oil has increased, the amount of these bonuses has also increased. In the beginning, signature
bonuses were between $1 million and $10 million per bid, however, recent exploration and
development agreements have included signature bonuses exceeding $100 million.216 The size
of these signature bonuses and the occasional diversion of these payments by government
officials to personal bank accounts have produced an ongoing controversy about their impact on
host country governance.
For example, in July 2000, Marathon Oil made a signature bonus payment of $13.7 million to
Sonangol, the national oil company of Angola. It was the first in a series of three payments for
the rights to develop a block offshore Angola.217 The payment was made to a bank in Jersey, one
of the Channel Islands offshore the United Kingdom. (Jersey laws permit a high level of bank
secrecy and zero tax rates on income from foreign sources.) Subsequently, several news stories
reported that the funds were rewired within a matter of hours to other Sonangol accounts around
the world. Some of these were later proven to be the personal accounts of the Angolan president,
Angolan government ministers and other government officials.218
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Alleged corruption in other countries, similar to the kind reported in Angola, led to demands by
several international organizations for transparency in the payments made by IOCs to national
governments. In February 2001, in response to these demands, BP announced that it would
begin publishing an annual statement of payments made to Sonangol. BP had paid $111 million
for the development rights to Angola's Block 31.219 Sonangol’s Chief Executive Officer, Manuel
Vicente, responded with a letter to BP's Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, John Browne,
stating that Sonangol considered BP to be "violating the conditions of legal contracts signed
with Sonangol . . . and if confirmed, is a sufficient reason to apply measures established in Article
40 of the PSA [production sharing agreement] i.e., contract termination”.220 Since that incident,
no other major international oil company has reported financial payments made in the form of
signature bonuses. They have chosen instead, to conform to the host country’s demand for
confidentiality, in order to preserve their relationship with the host government, avoid contract
termination and maintain access to exploration blocks in future rounds of bidding.
However, the lack of transparency associated with these cash payments to governments and
NOCs is considered to be a major cause of corruption in many oil producing countries.221 To
address this problem a public interest group, Publish What You Pay U.S. (PWYP) was formed in
2004 to advocate for greater disclosure of payments made by IOCs to host governments,
however, the success of this campaign has been limited for the reasons cited above.
6.10.5 Energy Diplomacy
Energy diplomacy can be defined as the use of foreign policy to secure access to energy supplies
abroad and promote government to government cooperation in the energy sector.222 Energy
diplomacy is motivated by the belief that importing and exporting countries can enhance the
security of supply; and improve and protect the competitive position of other sectors of their
economy, by giving their domestic oil and gas companies a competitive advantage in buying and
selling oil and natural gas.
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For example, the Chinese government, through its state-owned banks and sovereign wealth fund,
has been particularly aggressive in its lending to developing countries in Africa and Latin
America. China has provided economic development assistance to these countries in exchange
for access to natural resources. Countries that do not have credit ratings of sufficient quality to
borrow from international commercial banks have gained access to capital by pledging proved
oil and natural gas reserves in their country as collateral, in exchange for loans needed to develop
their oil and gas resources and to fund public infrastructure projects. These agreements are
frequently referred to as “loans for oil agreements”.
Russia has until recently, relied more on subsidies, price incentives, preferential relationships
with the states of the former Soviet Union, and occasional military cooperation or intimidation.
This system of barter was tried in Ukraine (in-kind gas payments in exchange for political
allegiance to Russia), and Belarus (transit and political allegiance) for oil and gas.223 In 2014,
Russia began reducing subsidies and instead agreed to provide oil and gas under long term
supply agreements in exchange for the loans it needs to build pipeline and transport
infrastructure and acquire entry into the downstream markets of other countries, particularly in
Central and East Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and China).
Loans for Oil Agreements
Pipeline projects are particularly well suited to loans for oil deals because pipelines do not have
alternative uses, thereby reducing the risk that either party will abrogate the contract. See for
example the loans for oil and gas agreements between China and Russia, and China and
Kazakhstan (Appendix VII). In addition, in a loan for oil deal, the resource owner retains
ownership of the oil and natural gas, precluding the risk of expropriation.
Some analysts have dismissed loans for oil deals for not delivering what they promised. For
example, despite its aggressive use of loans for oil, the share of equity oil (the amount of crude
oil produced by China’s foreign oil assets remains relatively small. Equity oil accounts for only
12% of China’s oil consumption and only 1% of global oil production.224 Other analysts have
drawn similar conclusions, but for a different reason. They claim that China has received
223
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relatively little in the form of engineering and construction contracts from the countries to which
it has loaned money and in some cases has received less oil and natural gas than was agreed,
particularly from Venezuela. 225 226
Energy diplomacy in the form of loans for oil have also been criticized from the perspective of
the borrowing country, because they frequently require that 60% to 70% of the funds advanced
by the Chinese government be spent on projects constructed by Chinese engineering and
construction companies, which may ultimately prove to be “white elephants”, that is, an asset
which when completed, the state cannot dispose of, but the operating and maintenance costs
exceed its actual use or value. In addition, it has been alleged that too little is being spent on
developing the technical competencies of the local workforce that will be needed to operate and
maintain these facilities after they are completed, including those that are for oil and gas
production.227
Furthermore, they note that the market for oil is global and “liquid” and argue that these
characteristics limit the value of energy diplomacy. For example, they argue that an increase or
decrease in the global supply of oil will immediately translate into a change in the price of oil
worldwide for all oil consuming countries. Consequently, it does not matter who gets the crude
out of the ground (China, United States or Venezuela) but how much oil is available
worldwide.228 They also argue that energy diplomacy aimed at foreign suppliers makes no
difference to producing countries, provided the crude oil they produce reaches the global market
somehow.229 However, this microeconomic analysis gives little, if any weight, to the fact that
energy diplomacy involves more than simply establishing a diplomatic relationship between an
oil exporting country and an oil importing country. Energy diplomacy frequently leads to legally
binding contracts that include specific price provisions that may lock in a below-market oil or
gas price and a dedicated source of supply for years. These benefits are directly related to the
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issues of organizational arrangements, gained control, asset specificity, strategic behavior,
contractual safeguards, surrounding uncertainty and bargaining strength.
In addition, the market for natural gas is still a regional market, because most natural gas is
delivered by pipeline rather than by LNG tanker. Even the neo-classical economists would
acknowledge that in a regional market, energy diplomacy can be effective, because a natural gas
pipeline connects the exporting country’s gas fields and the importing country’s markets, and
after it is built there are no efficient alternatives to this relationship.
6.10.6 Foreign Direct Investment and National Security
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an inter-agency
committee “authorized to review transactions that could result in control of a U.S. business by a
foreign person (‘covered transactions’) in order to determine the effect of such transactions on
the national security of the United States”.230
CFIUS was involved in the China National Offshore Oil Company’s (CNOOC) proposed
acquisition of Unocal. Although this acquisition was not opposed by CFIUS and the Bush
Administration, it was criticized by several members of Congress and after a vote in the United
States House of Representatives the bid was referred to the President on the grounds that its
implications for national security needed to be reviewed. While this review was still in progress,
Unocal was acquired by Chevron.
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Chapter 7 Case Studies
This chapter presents six case studies. They include the Frade Oil Field offshore Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil; the Gorgon Natural Gas project in the Indian Ocean off the northwest coast of Australia;
the BTC Oil Pipeline through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey; the DeepWater Horizon Oil
Drilling Rig in the Gulf of Mexico; Expropriation of Oil and Gas Assets in Venezuela and a brief
digression on events in Argentina; and the TNK-BP Joint Venture Oil Venture in Russia. These
cases were chosen because of their size and complexity and because together they illustrate the
wide range of political risks that can be encountered during oil and gas exploration projects. The
events in each case study are presented in chronological order. At the end of each case there is
an analysis of those events as they relate to the theory presented in Chapter 3 and the findings
presented in Chapter 6. The cases are analyzed using an explanation building approach.
7.1 Case 1 - The Frade Field
The Frade oil field is located in the Northern Campos Basin, approximately 370 kilometers
offshore Rio de Janeiro, Brazil at a water depth of 1,100 meters (3,609 feet). The field was
discovered in 1986. The project is a joint venture in which Chevron is the project operator
holding a 51.7% interest. Petroleo di Brasiliero (Petrobras) has a 30% interest and Frade Japao
Petroleo Limitada (FJPL), a Japanese consortium has an 18.3% interest.
Conceptual engineering studies and the acquisition of 3-D seismic data were completed in 2000
by Texaco.231 In June 2008, the process of installing subsea pumps and valves on the seafloor
began. There were several delays related to the drilling rig and the floating, production, storage
and offloading vessel (FPSO).232 Recoverable reserves are estimated at 200 to 300 million
barrels of oil. The cost of developing the field was estimated at $2.8 billion.233 Oil production
began on June 20, 2009. The project was expected to achieve peak production of 90,000 barrels
per day of crude oil and petroleum gas liquids in 2011.234 This project is included because of its
size and because it demonstrates the operation of a legal system that is not entirely impartial.
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Timeline
11/07/2011 - Oil began to seep from cracks in the seabed above the field after a drilling accident
in November 2011.235
11/09/2011 - The wellhead was tightly sealed and the leak was stopped in four days. About 18
vessels were deployed to support the oil sheen remediation and the activities necessary for well
abandonment. The total oil spilled was estimated at 2,700 to 3,600 barrels.236
11/20/2011- Development-drilling operations in the field remained suspended. Production from
the field was maintained at approximately 79,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day.237
11/22/2011 – The Brazilian government imposed a $28 million fine on Chevron for causing an
offshore oil spill.238 The ANP (Brazilian National Petroleum Agency) cited Chevron for 25
infractions related to the spill. Chevron agreed to pay the agency more than $17 million in fines.
Drill-rig operator Transocean was cleared of any liability.239
11/25/2011. Brazilian prosecutors sought 20 billion reals (US $10.9 billion) in damages from
Chevron and offshore drilling contractor Transocean Ltd for the 3,600 barrel leak in the Frade
field.240
12/02/2011 - Chevron Brazil Upstream Frade, a subsidiary of Chevron Corp., was ordered by
Brazil's National Petroleum Agency (ANP) to shut in one of its 11 production wells and four
“produced water” injection wells at Chevron’s offshore Frade Floating Production Storage and
Offloading (FPSO) facility. The production wells cited by the ANP accounted for less than 10
percent of Frade's total production of about 79,000 barrels per day.241
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The possible existence of a hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas leak was the basis for ANP requesting the
wells be closed temporarily. Chevron said that it respected the decisions of the ANP and would
respond appropriately to the agency's requests for additional information. Chevron also said it
would continue to keep the Brazilian agencies fully informed and work with them to address
their specific concerns regarding Chevron’s activities in Brazil. Chevron informed the ANP that
it had conducted regular monitoring of the hydrogen sulfide leak and had safety systems and
processes in place to ensure the safety of employees, contractors and operations at all times.
Chevron said it was confident it would successfully respond to the ANP's concerns and be able
to resume operation of its production and injection wells.242
2/3/2012 – Chevron cemented a well to stop the oil and gas seep through the fissures as a first
step toward the capping and abandonment of the appraisal well.243
03/03/2012 - Chevron identified a new small seep in another part of the Frade field. Chevron
notified the Brazilian authorities and immediately placed containment devices on the source.
The total volume of this intermittent seep was approximately one barrel of oil. Chevron and its
partners temporarily suspended production at the field as a precautionary measure while Chevron
conducted a comprehensive technical analysis of the cause of this new seep and additional
studies on the geological structure of the field.244
03/15/2012 – Chevron’s subsidiary Chevron Brasil Upstream Frade Limitada requested
authorization to temporarily suspend production operations at the Frade Field because of the
new seep and subsidence in the area. The company said it would conduct a comprehensive
technical study and prepare a complementary study to better understand the geological features
of the area, by working with their partners and seeking necessary approvals from the National
Petroleum Agency (ANP). The decision was endorsed by Chevron's partners. The company
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filed its request with the appropriate regulatory agencies and anticipated a response fairly
quickly. 245
04/04/2012 - A Brazilian federal prosecutor initiated a second 20 billion real ($10.9 billion)
lawsuit against Chevron and driller Transocean, doubling the claim against the companies even
though critics assailed the prosecutor as overzealous.246 Both companies also faced criminal and
civil lawsuits related to the spill. The criminal lawsuit was dismissed, but federal prosecutors
appealed that decision. The two civil lawsuits sought approximately $21.8 billion in damages.
In response, Chevron offered to pay approximately $150 million to settle the case.247
08/6/2012 - Chevron appealed against an injunction banning it and its drilling contractor
Transocean Ltd from operating in Brazil while civil and criminal charges over the oil spills were
being adjudicated.248
08/29/2012 - An injunction banning Chevron and Transocean from operating in Brazil was
upheld by a panel of three Brazilian federal judges, while charges related to the November 2011
oil spill were being considered by the Brazilian court.249
02/20/2013 - A Brazilian judge dismissed criminal charges against Chevron Corp., Transocean
Ltd and 17 of their employees related to the offshore oil spill.250
04/08/2013 - Chevron Corp was authorized to restart production at the Frade field for a period of
12 months. Output from an additional two wells was also approved, but only for two months.251
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04/15/2013 - Final documents allowing a restart of production were issued.252
04/30/2013 - Chevron was in the final stages of obtaining authorization from local oil regulators
and was expected to begin production soon.253
10/01/2013 - A Brazilian federal judge dismissed the two lawsuits totaling $21.8 billion against
Chevron and approved a negotiated settlement for an undisclosed amount, a decision that closed
a two-year legal battle over the oil spill in the Frade Field.254
04/01/2014 - The Brazilian National Petroleum Agency (ANP) authorized Chevron to resume
full production at the Frade field.255
Case Analysis
Brazil was heavily criticized for the over-zealous manner in which regulators and prosecutors
pursued Chevron for what was regarded in the industry as a minor accident. Estimates were that
2,400 to 3,600 barrels of crude oil leaked into the Atlantic Ocean.256 (The consensus estimate of
the oil spill in Prince William Sound in 1989 when the Exxon Valdez ran aground is 260,000
barrels 257 and the U.S. Government has estimated the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010
when BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling platform caught fire and sank, at 4.9 million barrels of
oil.258
Although, Chevron and its partners were the targets of a $21.8 billion lawsuit and criminal
charges for a relatively small oil spill, the criminal charges were ultimately dismissed by a
Brazilian federal judge and the civil charges were settled for an undisclosed amount. The
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excessive charges originally brought against Chevron and its partners suggests that some
prosecutors in Brazil were driven more by political considerations than legal or substantive
considerations. This may explain in part why the Rule of Law in Brazil is rated just 51.7 on a
scale from 0 to 100.
In this case, however, the Brazilian federal judge’s decision was enough to make it unnecessary
for Chevron to take the case before an international court or tribunal, suggesting that a country’s
legal system does not need to work perfectly, but only well enough to compensate for
deficiencies in other parts of the country’s legal system.
Second, Chevron’s decision to pay in excess of $150 million to settle the case rather than keep
production shutdown after the panel of three federal judges upheld an injunction banning
Chevron and Transocean from operating in Brazil, demonstrates the bargaining leverage that
national governments and their agencies acquire after the sunk costs in exploratory drilling,
development and production equipment have been made.
Third, the defendants Chevron and Transocean, did not bring the dispute with the Brazilian
regulatory agencies or the prosecutor before an international court or tribunal, but instead chose
to seek a solution in the Brazilian courts and ultimately agreed to a settlement. The reluctance to
resort to an international court or tribunal, except in those cases in which the investor believes he
is unlikely to receive an impartial hearing in a domestic court, is also evident in the DeepWater
Horizon case (Case #4). This supports the observation that oil and gas companies try to avoid
bringing a case before an international court or tribunal, if possible.
Fourth, there is no evidence that the United States government tried to intervene on Chevron’s
behalf, at least no evidence that made its way into the public record, supporting Lipson’s
observation that national governments seldom intervene in investment disputes on behalf of their
citizens. This appears to also be true of Venezuela’s expropriation of Conoco Philips’ and
ExxonMobil’s assets in Venezuela (Case #5). There is also no evidence that the British
government intervened on behalf of BP in the dispute between TNK-BP and the Russian
regulatory authorities (Case #6) or on behalf of BP regarding its environmental liability in the
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DeepWater Horizon oil spill (Case #4). The Gorgon Field (Case #2) and the BTC Pipeline (Case
#3) did not involve a dispute with any national government.
7.2 Case 2 – The Gorgon Field
The Gorgon project, in the Indian Ocean off the northwest coast of Australia was once
considered stranded gas (not recoverable) but is now part of one of the most complex and
expensive LNG projects in the world.259 The Gorgon project is a joint venture between Chevron
(47%, project operator), ExxonMobil (25%), Shell (25%), Osaka Gas (1.25%), Tokyo Gas (1%)
and Chubu Electric Power (0.417%) When the project began in 2009, the cost was estimated at
43 billion Australian dollars, (37 billion U.S. dollars; 3.4 trillion Japanese yen). The field is
estimated to contain more than 13.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (the equivalent of 2.25
billion barrels of oil) and is expected to have a production life of approximately 40 years.260 This
case is included because of the size of the project, the magnitude of the cost overruns, and
because it illustrates the economic consequences of unanticipated economic events.
Timeline
04/24/2009 - Chevron requested approval from Australian authorities to expand its Gorgon LNG
production capacity to 15 million metric tons per year to compensate for rising development and
production costs.261
04/30/2009 - The Western Australian EPA approved Chevron’s request for authorization to add a
third, 5 million metric-tons-per-year LNG train (unit) to the original two-train proposal already
approved for Barrow Island. Chevron continued to assess the geologic and environmental
conditions as it worked toward a final investment decision in the second half of 2009.262
08/10/2009 - Environment Minister, Donna Faragher, gave final environmental approval for the
proposed Gorgon gas field development on Barrow Island, but this approval also imposed new
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environmental conditions requiring higher levels of protection for regionally significant coral
reefs and flat-back marine turtles.263
09/01/2009 – Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Norman Moore, offered the Gorgon joint
venture partners, production licenses for its biggest natural gas fields.264
09/14/2009 - Development proposals for the project were approved by the Premier of Western
Australian State, Colin Barnett, and production licenses were granted by the Australian Minister
for Resources and Energy, Martin Ferguson.265
12/01/2009 - The construction of a three-train (unit) 15 million metric ton per year LNG facility
for the Gorgon LNG Project began.266
12/14/2009 - Chevron made another natural gas discovery in the Carnarvon Basin offshore
Western Australia with its Satyr-1 well.267
01/26/2010 - A third gas discovery was made in the Greater Gorgon Area in the Carnarvon Basin
offshore Western Australia.268
02/09/2011 - Chevron made an additional discovery in the Orthrus-2 well located in the WA-24R permit area in the Carnarvon Basin offshore Western Australia.269
01/19/2012 – Chevron appraised the Satyr-3 well in the Exmouth Plateau area of the Carnarvon
Basin, offshore Western Australia and concluded that it was commercially viable.270
07/23/2012 - Chevron made a natural gas discovery in the Greater Gorgon area of the Carnarvon
Basin, offshore Western Australia.271
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09/2012 - Chevron continued a successful run in the Greater Gorgon area offshore Western
Australia with the announcement of positive results from the Satyr-2 exploration well.272
10/2012 - Australian energy minister, Martin Ferguson, said the carbon dioxide (CO2) capture
and sequestration project related to Chevron’s Gorgon LNG project was on schedule and would
begin injection of CO2 in 2015. (The world’s largest carbon capture and sequestration project
was designed to inject 3.5 million tons of carbon dioxide per year at a depth of about 2,300
meters below Barrow Island off Western Australia.)273
12/06/2012 - Chevron increased the estimated cost of the Gorgon project by $15 billion U.S.,
bringing the total cost of the project to $52 billion U.S. Chevron attributed the cost increase
primarily to labor shortages, logistics challenges and the strength of the Australian dollar.
Despite the increase in the project’s cost, Chevron said that the increase in the price of crude oil
would still make the project profitable, because LNG (liquefied natural gas) prices usually move
in tandem with the price oil, which Chevron estimated had increased by 80 percent between
December 2009 and December 2012. However, the increased cost of the project was expected to
significantly reduce its profitability. Some analysts estimated that if the price of Brent crude
dropped below $80 per barrel (U.S), the project would not be competitive with other energy
sources and therefore be unprofitable.274 (The spot price of Brent crude was $112.60, $109.66
and $90.65 per barrel during the first week of October 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively.)
12/12/2013 - Chevron announced that the cost of the Gorgon LNG project increased a second time,
from $52 billion U.S. to $54 billion U.S., bringing the total cost increases to $17 billion.
Chevron said that cost overruns and delays were the result of the high value of the Australian
dollar, high Australian wages, low productivity, weather delays and the logistical challenges of
building an LNG plant on Barrow Island (a Class A nature reserve). The secretary of the
Western Australia Maritime Union of Australia (WAMUA), Christy Cain, claimed that “red
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tape” and waste were the reasons the cost of the project had increased. The Maritime Union also
disputed Chevron's claims of low productivity among workers on the project and said workers
were being unfairly blamed for the cost overruns. The Australian Mines and Metals Association
(AMMA, a resources industry group) claimed that high wages in Australia were a major factor
contributing to the cost over-runs.275
02/2014 - Former Labor Resources Minister and former union leader, Martin Ferguson, blamed
the WAMUA (Western Australia Maritime Union of Australia) for the cost overruns and delays
to the Gorgon project.276 The WAMUA responded that the Australian Mines and Metals
Association (AMMA) was unfairly blaming the WAMUA for problems on the Gorgon project,
because the union had sought to negotiate a new Enterprise Bargaining Agreement for maritime
workers working in the offshore oil and gas industry. WAMUA secretary, Christy Cain, said
maritime workers were being used as scapegoats by Chevron Australia.277
03/12/2014 - The Associated Press and the Dow Jones Newswire reported that the Gorgon
project was 78% complete and that two thirds of gas production was already committed to
buyers. However, the start-up date for “first gas production” was revised from the middle of
2014 to the middle of 2015.278
08/01/2014 – Chevron reported that the Gorgon Project was 83% complete and that “first gas
production” was still expected in the middle of 2015.279
08/25/2014 – Reuters reported that Chevron was finding it difficult to lock-in 20-year sales
contracts for its Gorgon liquefied natural gas (LNG) export plant in Australia and commented
that the high level of unsold LNG expected from the Gorgon field demonstrated that the shale
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gas “boom” in the United States has significantly reduced the profitability of this project and
other major LNG investments in Australia.280
01/07/2015 - As of January 7, 2015 the spot price of Brent crude oil was trading at $49.92 per
barrel, well below the breakeven point of $80 per barrel referenced above.281
Case Analysis
A project in which the original cost estimate was overrun by $17 billion dollars (46%) might be
expected to give rise to considerable litigation, as each party tried to recoup its position under the
provisions of a stabilization or equilibrium clause in one or more contracts. For example, the
value of the Australian dollar increased from 1.3996 Australian dollars per U.S. dollar in April
2009 to .9328 Australian dollars per U.S. dollar in July 2011which made it more expensive for
Chevron and its subcontractors to pay for locally sourced equipment, services and labor. (The
increase in the value of the Australian dollar was driven by strong demand for Australian raw
material exports, including iron ore and coal to the rapidly growing economies of Asia.) The
increased value of the Australian dollars persisted through August 2014, 1.0742 Australian
dollars per U.S. dollar.
In addition, the approval of the third LNG unit was conditioned on the implementation of more
costly environmental protection measures. Despite these adverse developments neither Chevron
nor any of the other parties to the contract have sought compensation in the Australian courts.
This is in part because the changed economic circumstances (strong demand for Australian coal
and iron ore and appreciation of the Australian dollar) were not the result of a change in
government policy, but rather the consequence of natural market developments; and because the
decision to add a third LNG unit was Chevron’s idea not the Australian Government’s.
The only instance of apparent political manoeuvring involved the disagreement over the relative
importance of labour costs in the project cost overruns. Chevron provided a balanced
explanation for the cost overruns, but the Australian Mines and Metals Association (AMMA)
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and the Former Labour Resources Minister, Martin Ferguson blamed the WAMUA. It is not
surprising that the AMMA would blame the cost overruns on the WAMUA, but it is surprising
that a former labor resources minister and former union leader, serving in the government of
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard (a member of the Labor Party) would blame the WAMUA.
Chevron, for the most part, has remained above the fray, because the problems encountered
during the project could not be solved by a court or tribunal.
7.3 Case 3 – The BTC Pipeline
The Caspian Sea lies above one of the world's largest group of oil and natural gas fields, but the
sea is landlocked making the transportation of oil to Western markets complicated. During the
Soviet era, all transportation routes from the Caspian region passed through Russia. However,
the dissolution of the Soviet Union made it possible to consider alternative routes. The BTC
pipeline follows one of those routes.282
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline links Baku, Azerbaijan with the Turkish Mediterranean
port city of Ceyhan. It is 1,100 miles long (1,768 kilometers), requires more than 100 surface
stations, associated pumping facilities and plants to maintain the flow of oil, and can carry one
million barrels of oil per day. The pipeline follows a winding path from Azerbaijan through
Georgia to Turkey.283 The pipeline cost approximately $3.7 billion.284
It was constructed by a consortium of companies led by BP and was financed with a high level of
debt using a project financing structure. The BTC Company shareholders include BP (30.1
percent), Azerbaijan (BTC) Limited (AzBTC, 25.0 percent), Chevron (8.9 percent), Statoil (8.71
percent), Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO, 6.53 percent), Eni (5.0 percent), Total (5.0
percent), Itochu (3.4 percent), Inpex (2.5 percent), ConocoPhillips (2.5 percent) and ONGC (Oil
and Natural Gas Company Limited, 2.36 percent).285 The pipeline was completed in May 2005.
This case is included because of its size, its transit route through three countries any one of
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which could have interfered with the operation of the pipeline, and the number of partners in the
project.
Timeline
Spring 1992 - The Turkish Prime Minister, Suleiman Demirel, proposed to Central Asian
countries including Azerbaijan that the pipeline run through Turkey.
03/09/1993 - The first document related to the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline
was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on March 9, 1993 in Ankara, Turkey.286 The
Turkish route necessitated that the pipeline from Azerbaijan run through Georgia or Armenia,
but the route through Armenia was politically impossible because of the unresolved conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territorial status of Nagorno-Karabakh. This left the
circuitous Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey route, which was longer and more expensive to build than
a route through Armenia.287
10/29/1998 - The project gained momentum following the Ankara Declaration, signed on
October 29, 1998 by the President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev; President of Georgia, Eduard
Shevardnadze; President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev; President of Turkey, Suleiman
Demirel and President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov. The declaration was witnessed by the
United States Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, who expressed strong support for the
pipeline. 288
11/18/1999 - The intergovernmental agreement in support of the pipeline was signed by
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey during a meeting of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey. 289
08/01/2002 - The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company (BTC Co.) was established in London
286
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on August 1, 2002.
04/2003 - Construction began in April 2003. The Azerbaijan section was constructed by
Consolidated Contractors International of Greece, and the Georgia section was constructed by a
joint venture of France’s Spie Capag and UK Petrofac International. The Turkish section was
constructed by BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation. Bechtel Corporation was the general
contractor for engineering, procurement and construction.290
02/2004 - Financing was agreed in February 2004, after more than two years of appraisal of the
potential environmental and social impacts of the project. Approximately 70% of the project
costs were funded by a group of lenders including the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the export credit agencies of
seven countries, and a syndicate of fifteen commercial banks. 291
05/10/2005 - The first oil began to flow on May 10, 2005 and reached Ceyhan, Turkey on May
28, 2006.292
03/2009 – In March 2009, the capacity of the BTC pipeline was increased to 1.2 million barrels
per day.293
04/21/2014 - Since June 2006, 2,500 tankers carrying oil delivered via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline have been shipped from the Turkish marine terminal in Ceyhan, carrying 1.9
billion barrels of oil (256 million tons). 294
08/11/2014 – The BTC Pipeline shipped its 2 billionth barrel of oil.295
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Case Analysis
The planning, design and construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline had to
overcome many political, social and environmental issues, but the sponsors of the project and the
lenders were committed to achieving a sustainable arrangement and ensuring that the project was
constructed and operated in accordance with international environmental and social standards.296
To achieve these objectives, several of the strategies discussed in Chapter 6 for managing the risk
associated with large projects were employed. These include project financing using a high level
of debt and the participation of numerous public and private financial organizations; numerous
legal agreements designed to ensure continued cooperation between the parties in the
consortium; multilateral agreements between host governments that stipulated that the provisions
in the principal legal agreement and other legal agreements override the domestic law of any of
the countries involved in the project; and the inclusion of eleven equity partners. All of this
reduced the risk of unilateral action by one of the sponsors or host governments that could
impede the shipment of oil or result in expropriation of the fields or the pipeline. There has not
been a major disruption or dispute since the project began operation in 2005, proving that
multilateral agreements can be effective and that parties to such agreements generally honor their
commitments.
7.4 Case 4 – The Deepwater Horizon Drilling Rig
The Deepwater Horizon was an ultra-deep-water, offshore oil drilling rig owned by Transocean.
The rig was built in 2001 in South Korea by Hyundai Heavy Industries, was commissioned by
R&B Falcon (which later became part of Transocean), was registered in Majuro, Marshall
Islands, and was leased to British Petroleum (BP) from 2001 until September 2013. In
September 2009, the rig drilled the deepest oil well in history at a vertical depth of 35,050 feet
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(10,683 meters), approximately 250 miles (400 km) southeast of Houston, in 4,132 feet
(1,259 meters) of water. 297
On April 20, 2010, while drilling at the Macondo Prospect, an explosion on the rig caused by a
blowout, killed 11 crewmen and ignited a fire which was visible from 35 miles away (56 km).
The fire could not be extinguished and, on April 22, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon sank, leaving
the well discharging oil and natural gas at the seafloor for 87 days, until it was successfully
capped on July 15, 2010; making it the largest offshore oil spill in U.S. history.298 The U.S.
government estimated the total discharge of oil at 4.9 million barrels (210 million
U.S. gallons).299
Civil and criminal legal actions resulting from the loss of the Deepwater Horizon and the oil spill
began shortly after the explosion, including a large number of individual and class action claims,
which continued into 2014. Many claims were resolved administratively from a fund set up by
BP for that purpose. The civil trial brought by the U.S. government began in early 2013 and was
split into three phases, one to assign blame for the disaster, a second to determine how much oil
spilled, and a final phase to set penalties for BP and Anadarko Petroleum Corp., its partner in the
failed well.300 This case is important because of its size and because it illustrates the operation of
environmental liability law and the role of the courts in calculating damages and apportioning
blame.
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Timeline
04/20/2010, 9:56 pm – Gas, oil and concrete from the Deepwater Horizon exploded up the
wellbore onto the deck of the drilling platform and caught fire. The explosion killed 11 platform
workers and injured 17 others; another 98 survived without serious physical injury.301
04/22/2010, 10:21 am – The Deepwater Horizon rig sank.302
04/24/2010 - BP reported a leak of approximately 1,000 barrels per day (42,000 U.S. gallons per
day).303
04/26/2010 – An oil slick was reported 36 miles (58 km) southeast of Louisiana. Booms were
set up to keep the oil from washing ashore.304
04/27/2010 - The oil slick expanded to 100 miles (160 km) across and 20 miles (32 km) from the
Louisiana coast.
04/28/2010 - the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimated that the leak was
likely to be 5,000 barrels per day (210,000 U.S. gallons per day), five times larger than initially
estimated by BP.305 306
04/30/2010 – Oil washed ashore at Venice, Louisiana.
05/09/2010 – Tar balls were reported on Dauphin Island in Alabama.
05/13/2010 – Tony Hayward called the oil spill "relatively tiny" in comparison with the size of
the "ocean”.307
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05/13/2010 Transocean (a Swiss company and owner of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig)
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to limit its liability under the
Limitation of Ship Owner's Liability Act to only its interest in the Deepwater Horizon which it
valued at $26.8 million.308
05/19/2010 – Oil washed ashore on mainland Louisiana.309
05/27/2010 (1) President Obama announced a six-month moratorium on new deep water oil
drilling permits, that is, in 500 feet (150 m) of water or more.310 311
(2) BP Plc and Transocean Ltd. faced at least 36 lawsuits, including group cases with potentially
thousands of plaintiffs, over environmental damage and personal injuries caused by the oil
spill.312
06/01/2010 – Oil washed up on the beaches of Gulf Islands National Seashore.313
06/04/2010 – Tar balls arrived on beaches in Pensacola, Florida.314
06/11/2010 – Flow Rate Technical Group, a consulting firm, estimated that the leak could be
20,000 to 40,000 barrels per day (840,000 to 1,680,000 U.S. gallons per day).315
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06/16/2010 – President Obama met with BP executives, during which BP agreed to fund a $20
billion escrow account administered by Kenneth Feinberg.316
06/23/2010 – Oil appeared on Pensacola Beach and in Gulf Islands National Seashore, and
officials warned against swimming for 33 miles (53 km) east of the Alabama line. 317
07/15/2010 – The well was capped on July 15, 2010.
08/10/2010 – Seventy-seven cases, including those brought by state governments, individuals,
and companies, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana were combined
under Multi-District Litigation docket MDL No. 2179, captioned In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, presided over by U.S. District
Judge Carl Barbier.318 319
09/19/2010 – BP officially declared the oil well completely and permanently sealed.320
12/15/2010 –The U.S. federal government sued BP Exploration and Production, Inc., and eight
other corporations for unlimited liability, to pay the expenses involved in the cleanup and
environmental recovery from the spill. It also sought civil penalties under the Clean Water Act
(see entry for December 15, 2010 below).
12/15/2010 - The U.S. Department of Justice filed a civil suit against BP and other defendants
for violations of the Clean Water Act in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, this case was subsequently consolidated with the other cases 321 which were captioned
United States of America v. BP Exploration & Production Inc. et al., Civ. Action No. 2:10-cv04536.322
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04/21/2011 - BP filed $40 billion in lawsuits against rig owner Transocean, cement contractor
Halliburton and blowout preventer manufacturer Cameron International Corporation. BP alleged
that failed safety systems and irresponsible behavior of the contractors had led to the
explosion.323
03/02/2012 - BP settled with most private plaintiffs in March 2012, just before its trial on
liability for the oil spill began. BP initially estimated the cost of the settlement at $7.8 billion. In
a subsequent regulatory filing, it revised the cost of the settlement to $9.2 billion.324
08/13/2012 - BP asked U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier to approve the settlement, claiming its
actions "did not constitute gross negligence or willful misconduct". 325 326 (Under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, a company is only liable for $75 million in economic damages, provided
it did not exhibit "gross negligence"; the U.S. federal government is required by law to pay the
next $1 billion in claims.) 327
08/31/2012 - In response to BP’s filing; and in order to ensure that BP could not use its filing and
any possible acceptance of the settlement to escape a judgment of gross negligence, 328 the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed papers describing the spill as an example of "gross negligence
and willful misconduct". 329 330 (A ruling of gross negligence would result in a four-fold increase
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in the penalties under the Clean Water Act, which would increase the penalties to approximately
$17.6 billion, and would increase damages in the other suits as well.) 331 332 333
11/14/2012 - BP agreed to pay $4.5 billion in fines and other payments, the largest of its kind in
U.S. history. BP also agreed to plead guilty to 11 felony counts related to the deaths of the 11
workers.334 335 The Justice Department had previously filed criminal charges against one BP
employee in April 2012 and against three BP employees in November 2012.336 337 Two of the
employees were indicted on manslaughter charges for acting negligently in their supervision of
key safety tests performed on the rig prior to the explosion and failure to alert onshore engineers
of problems with the drilling operation;338 and two employees were charged with obstruction of
justice and for lying to federal investigators, one was later found guilty. 339 340 341
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01/03/2013 - The U.S. Justice of Department announced that "Transocean Deepwater, Inc.
agreed to plead guilty to violating the Clean Water Act and to pay a total of $1.4 billion in civil
and criminal fines and penalties".342
01/13/2013 - Judge Barbier approved the medical-benefits portion of BP's proposed $7.8 billion
partial settlement (subsequently revised to $9.2 billion). People living at least 60 days along the
shores affected or involved in the clean-up, who could document one or more specific health
conditions caused by the oil or dispersants were eligible for benefits. 343
02/25/2013 - BP and its partners (Transocean and Halliburton) went on trial in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in New Orleans to determine payouts and
fines under the Clean Water Act and the Natural Resources Damage Assessment. The trial's first
phase was to determine the liability of BP, Transocean, Halliburton, and other companies, and to
determine whether the companies acted with gross negligence and willful misconduct.344 345
07/09/2013 - BP reported that it had spent approximately $25 billion on the Gulf Oil Spill,
however, this did not include the $4.5 billion that was owed to the U.S. Government as the result
of a settlement between BP and the U.S. Department of Justice for fines and penalties for
violation of the Clean Water Act (see entry on November 14, 2012 above).346
09/30/2013 - The second phase of the trial of BP and its partners focused on how much oil
spilled into the Gulf of Mexico and who was responsible for stopping it.347 Claims against BP's
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drilling fluids contractor M-I LLC were dismissed by U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier during the
second phase of the trial, and the judge also ruled out punitive damages against Cameron
International, the manufacturer of the blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon rig.348
10/2013 – The payment of claims by BP’s claims administrator was placed on hold after BP filed
an appeal with the 5th Circuit of appeals regarding the $9.2 billion settlement BP had signed in
March 2012.
11/25/2013 - BP argued before the Texas Supreme Court that it should be covered by a $750
million insurance policy taken out by Transocean Ltd., the Deepwater Horizon rig’s owner, prior
to the spill.349
12/17/2013 - By December 2013, BP had paid almost $13 billion in claims to businesses,
individuals and federal and state governments.350
02/09/2014 - As of February 9, 2014, BP had sold $38 billion in assets, including half of all its
offshore platforms and refineries, to pay a projected total of $42 billion for the clean-up,
compensation to businesses and individuals and other costs associated with the spill. 351
03/04/2014 – BP was told by a panel of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that it must abide
by the terms of a $9.2 billion settlement with victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, after BP
failed to satisfy judges that a claims administrator was misinterpreting the agreement and was
paying claims that BP described as “fictitious” and “absurd”.352
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04/20/2014 - BP refused to pay a $148 million bill for U.S. government studies related to the
2010 oil spill, including research into its impact on dolphins, whales and oysters; and published
figures indicated that BP had reduced its spending on the Natural Resource Damage Assessment
(NRDA). Still, at the end of 2012, BP had paid $973 million for NRDA studies, and by April
2014 it estimated it had paid $1 billion pursuant to the NRDA.353
05/19/2014 - A federal appeals court refused to reconsider its previous ruling that businesses did
not have to prove they were directly harmed by BP's 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill to receive
settlement payments.354
06/09/2014 - The U.S. Supreme Court declined a request from BP to block payments to
businesses while it appealed the district and appeals courts’ interpretation of the $9.2 billion
settlement. The decision upheld the ruling by the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in New
Orleans that under terms of the settlement, businesses claiming damages from the oil spill did not
have to prove direct harm.355
09/02/14 - Halliburton Co. announced it had reached a $1.1 billion agreement that it said would
settle most of the class action claims asserted by plaintiffs against the company following the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The proposed settlement, which was still
subject to the U.S. District Court for Eastern Louisiana’s approval and an agreed-upon
participation level by current claimants, would be paid into a trust fund until all appeals have
been resolved in three installments over the next two years. The company previously had taken a
$1.3 billion contingency loss for the Deepwater Horizon lawsuits in multiple districts.
Halliburton said it would withdraw the proposed settlement if not enough claimants agreed to
accept it.356
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09/04/2014 - U.S. District Judge Barbier ruled that BP was guilty of “gross negligence and
willful misconduct” under the Clean Water Act. He described BP's actions as "reckless”, and
Transocean's and Halliburton's actions as "negligent." He apportioned 67% of the blame for the
spill to BP, 30% to Transocean, and 3% to Halliburton. Fines would be apportioned
commensurate with the degree of negligence of the parties and the number of barrels of oil
spilled. (Under the Clean Water Act fines can be based on a cost per barrel of up to $4,300 at the
discretion of the judge. The number of barrels was in dispute at the conclusion of the trial. BP
argued that 2.5 million barrels were spilled over the 87 days, but the U.S. government and the
court contend 4.2 million barrels were spilled.357 This decision could potentially quadruple the
fines and penalties for violating the Clean Water Act to $18.1 billion (4,200,000 barrels x $4,300
per barrel = $18.1 billion).358 This ruling would increase BP’s total cost for the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill well beyond the $43 billion it has already provided for.359 BP issued a
statement strongly disagreeing with the court’s ruling and immediately filed an appeal.
10/03/2014 - BP asked Judge Carl Barbier for a new judgment or retrial in the 'gross negligence'
suit, claiming that the verdict allegedly relied on evidence that had been excluded from court.360
12/08/2014 – The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear BP’s appeal that some businesses were
receiving payouts despite being unable to trace their losses to the effects of the BP oil spill. The
U.S. Supreme court’s refusal to hear BP’s appeal meant that BP would have to make the
payments.361
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02/19/2015 - U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier ruled that BP could pay a maximum civil penalty
of up to $4,300 for each barrel of oil spilled under the Clean Water Act. He rejected BP's
argument that the fines should be capped at $9.57 billion, approximately one-third lower than the
$13.7 billion penalty federal prosecutors are seeking. At the time of this writing, the court had
not yet ruled how much BP will pay in fines and penalties for the oil spill.362
Case Analysis
This case exhibits several of the features observed in Chapter 6 related to the management of risk
in the international oil and gas industry. First, there is no evidence that the British government
tried to intervene at any time on BP’s behalf, supporting the observation that national
governments do not intervene on behalf of investors involved in a dispute arising from foreign
direct investment.
Second, international oil and gas companies are likely to use the domestic courts of the host
country before resorting to international courts or tribunals, if the courts are thought to be
reliable and fair (see actions initiated by BP on April 21, 2011; March 2, 2012; August 13, 2012;
October 2013; November 25, 2013; April 20, 2014; June 9, 2014, September 4, 2014 and
October 3, 2014 above). BP’s decision to use the U.S. court system to protect its interests and
minimize its liability was probably made easier by the fact that in the United States the Rule of
Law is rated 91, indicating a high level of fairness and reliability. (However, the ICSID does not
require that domestic court remedies be exhausted before filing a claim with the ICSID.)
Third, like most international oil and gas companies BP chose to self-insure against
expropriation and liability rather than purchase insurance against the potential risk of either.
BP has some insurance through Lloyd’s of London, as well as through its captive insurance
company, Jupiter Insurance Ltd, which has already set loss reserves at its policy limit maximum
of $700 million.363 In November 2013, BP argued that it should be covered by a $750 million
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policy taken out by the rig owner, Transocean.364 Losses above these amounts have been borne
by BP. The cost to BP is reflected in its sale of $38 billion in assets to cover the cost of the spill.
7.5 Case 5 – Expropriation of Oil and Gas Assets in Venezuela and Argentina
Venezuela
Venezuela nationalized its oil and gas industry in the 1970s, creating the country's state-owned
oil and natural gas company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA). However, during the mid1990s, PDVSA implemented a policy referred to as the Apertura Petrolera (oil opening), which
was intended to mobilize the capital, technology and managerial capabilities of international oil
companies in order to maximize the production of crude oil in Venezuela and simultaneously
reduce the government revenue needed to finance oil and gas exploration and development in the
country. 365
The “flagship” projects of the Apertura were four large projects dedicated to the production,
upgrading (i.e. partial refining) and marketing of extra-heavy crude oil from the Orinoco Oil Belt
(OOB), a large reservoir with an estimated one trillion barrels of heavy (dense and highly
viscous) crude oil. Three of these projects (Petrozuata, Hamaca and Cerro Negro) are at the
center of the arbitration proceedings that ConocoPhillips (COP) and ExxonMobil (XOM)
brought against Venezuela at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) in late 2007 in response to Venezuela’s nationalization of ConocoPhillips and
ExxonMobil’s assets in Venezuela.366 This case illustrates the impact of political and ideological
change on the security of investor ownership rights, the operation of the ICSID and the options
available to claimants and defendants involved in investment disputes.
Timeline
12/06/1998 - Hugo Chavez, the presidential candidate of the Fifth Republic Movement/United
Socialist Party, ran on an anti-corruption and anti-poverty platform and was elected president of
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Venezuela.
11/22/2001 - President Chavez announced the enactment of 49 new economic laws, just before a
law giving legislative power to the president of Venezuela and the executive branch expired.
These laws included new legislation that increased royalty taxes on oil production from new oil
ventures from 16.6% to 30% and mandated the Venezuelan government own more than 50% of
all new oil ventures.367
04/11/2002 - The first coup attempt against President Chavez occurred.
12/2002 to 02/2003 - A general strike was organized by the political opposition to President
Chávez to force a new presidential election. The primary economic impact of the strike was to
shut down the Venezuelan oil industry, in particular, state-run PDVSA, which provided a
majority of Venezuela’s export revenue.368 The strike lasted approximately two months. The
Chavez government responded by firing 19,000 PDVSA employees and replacing them with
employees loyal to the Chávez administration.369
10/2004 - President Chavez declared that Venezuela was increasing the royalties to be paid by
foreign oil companies operating in the Orinoco Basin from 1% of the sales price to 16.6% on
existing oil ventures. The President said that this decision marked “the second and true phase of
the nationalization of the country’s oil”. He said the purpose of the increase was to secure
“sovereignty” over the country’s energy reserves; and that oil prices had undergone a structural
(as opposed to a cyclical) change that justified the increase. Political and economic observers
outside the country suggested that the government’s growing budget deficit was an important
factor in the decision to raise royalty rates. 370
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04/14/2005 - Venezuelan authorities announced a unilateral revision of 32 contracts signed with
oil companies between 1992 and 1997. These contracts would become joint ventures in which
the state, through PDVSA, would have at least a 51% stake in each joint venture. The
Hydrocarbons Law of 2001 had required new joint ventures to include the state oil company, but
now the law was being applied retroactively (see entry for November 22, 2001 above).
Venezuelan authorities also announced that they would increase income taxes in the oil industry,
from 34 percent to 50 percent and increase royalties from 16.6% to 30% on these contracts. This
new tax level was applicable to all companies that drilled, produced, operated, or processed oil in
Venezuela. The Venezuelan government would therefore receive a minimum of 82.5% of net
income (revenue less production costs).371
Furthermore, the government made the tax increase from 34% to 50% retroactive to 2001 and
demanded that 16 foreign oil companies pay back-taxes of $3 billion U.S. These companies
included Total (France), BP (United Kingdom), ENI (Italy), Royal/Dutch Shell (The
Netherlands), Harvest Vinccler (U.S.), Chevron (U.S.), and Statoil (Norway).372 Total, Chevron,
Statoil and BP agreed to the restructuring and still hold minority interests in their Venezuelan
projects.373
2007 - ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused to comply with the requirement that they grant
PDVSA a 51% interest in their properties in the Orinoco Basin.374 Venezuela responded by
claiming a majority stake in four oil projects with a total value of $30 billion operating in the
Orinoco river basin (Petrozuata, Hamaca, Cerro Negro and Corocoro).375
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09/06/2007 – ExxonMobil registered its claim with the ICSID in response to Venezuela’s
expropriation of its assets in Venezuela, seeking compensation of 10.0 billion. 376
12/13/2007 – ConocoPhillips registered its claim with the ICSID in response to Venezuela’s
expropriation of its assets in Venezuela, seeking compensation of $5.5 to $6.0 billion.377
05/08/2009 – (1) A gas injection project owned by Williams Companies was confiscated by the
Venezuelan government.378 (2) Venezuela’s National Assembly passed a law allowing the
Venezuelan government to nationalize the assets of certain domestic and foreign oil service
companies.379
06/2010 – The Venezuelan government seized 11oil rigs owned by Helmerich and Payne, a U.S.
oil company. Helmerich and Payne’s 11 oil rigs had been shut down for several months because
Venezuela was unwilling or unable to pay H & P what it was owed.380
03/2011 - Williams Companies, Inc. filed an international arbitration suit against Venezuela at
the ICSID, seeking compensation for two natural-gas compression facilities seized by the
Venezuelan government in 2009.381
09/2011 - The Venezuelan government said it was willing to pay a combined sum of $2.5 billion
to ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips in their arbitration cases at the ICSID against Venezuela.382
09/30/2011 - Oklahoma based services company, Helmerich & Payne Inc., filed a lawsuit against
Venezuela in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for expropriation of 11 drilling
rigs in June 2010. The lawsuit sought $32 million in back payments for unpaid services and
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several hundred million dollars for the value of its 11 drilling rigs. Citing increasing hostility
toward U.S. companies by the Venezuelan government, the company argued that it could not get
a fair trial in the Venezuelan courts, where its request for compensation had not progressed or
even been answered.383
01/01/2012 - The Paris based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) awarded ExxonMobil
$907.6 million for breach of contract, substantially less than the $10.0 billion ExxonMobil was
seeking. The ICC reduced the $907.6 million award by $160.6 million for liabilities owed by
ExxonMobil to Venezuela, making the net award $747.0 million. In addition, ExxonMobil had
previously petitioned a New York Court to seize $305 million from a PDVSA bank account,
which was subsequently turned over to ExxonMobil. The actual amount Venezuela was ordered
to pay ExxonMobil therefore was, $442 million (907.6 – 160.6 – 305.0 = 442.0), which is the
smallest amount ExxonMobil could have expected to receive, because it represented the book
value of its 41.7% interest in the Cerro Negro partnership.384 The arbitration in the ICC was
intended to determine damages, if any, related to ExxonMobil’s claim that Venezuela and
PDVSA had breached the contract when it changed its provisions unilaterally and subsequently
expropriated the partnership.385
However, the case was not over because ExxonMobil had sought arbitration in two separate
courts: the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (just discussed) and the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). This was possible under international
law, because in the early 1990s, when ExxonMobil decided to participate in the Cerro Negro
project it signed a contract with PDVSA and Venezuela in which ExxonMobil owned a 41.7%
stake in Cerro Negro through a subsidiary based in the Netherlands; and Venezuela and the
Netherlands had signed a bilateral investment treaty to promote and protect investments in both
countries. The ICSID arbitration panel was therefore judging whether this treaty had been
violated by the Venezuelan government. The tribunal’s judgment would be based on the text of
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the treaty and any violations that may have occurred.386 The ICSID panel could award
ExxonMobil compensation for violations of this treaty, for example, not being paid for amounts
owed by Venezuela before the expropriation took place, modifying contracts unilaterally, not
being treated fairly and equitably, discriminating against foreign investors in relation to local
investors, and not providing prompt and equitable compensation for the assets expropriated.387
01/2012 - President Chávez threatened to ignore any ICSID decision regarding a multi-billion
claim made by ExxonMobil for its nationalized oil projects and threatened to withdraw from the
arbitration panel.388
01/2012 - Venezuela’s Energy Minister said an agreement could not be reached with
ConocoPhillips over the company’s expropriated assets.389
01/24/2012 - The World Bank received “written notice of denunciation of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID
Convention) from the Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. The denunciation was to take effect
six months after the receipt of Venezuela’s notice, that is, on July 25, 2012.390
02/15/2012 - Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA, claimed that it had paid ExxonMobil
Corp. approximately $255 million in compensation for nationalized assets, which was
substantially less than the $907.6 million ordered by the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC). President Chávez claimed that the difference reflected the debt owed by ExxonMobil to
PDVSA.
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(However, this was still less than the $442 million calculated above.)

386

Ibid
Ibid
388
What’s Next Venezuela, “Timeline of Expropriations,” https://www.whatsnextvenezuela.com/mediakit/timeline-of-expropriations/
389
Ibid
390
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, LLP, “Venezuela Withdraws from the World Bank’s International Centre for
Investment Disputes, Litigation,” (January 30, 2012),
http://www.milbank.com/images/content/7/2/7277/Venezuela-Withdraws-From-ICSID-1-30-2012.pdf
391
What’s Next Venezuela, “Timeline of Expropriations,” https://www.whatsnextvenezuela.com/mediakit/timeline-of-expropriations/
387

160

03/22/2012 – The Williams Companies, Inc. and the Venezuela government reached a settlement
in which Venezuela agreed to pay Williams Companies $420 million as compensation for its
nationalization of the company’s assets in Venezuela in May of 2009.392
09/03/2013 - The World Bank's arbitration panel, the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, ruled that Venezuela illegally expropriated ConocoPhillips’ Petrozuata,
Hamaca, and Corocoro projects.393
09/30/2013 - U.S. District Judge Robert Wilkins ruled that Helmerich & Payne International
Drilling and its Venezuelan subsidiary have standing to pursue its expropriation claim against the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and its state-sponsored energy company, Petroleos de
Venezuela SA and its subsidiary PDVSA Petroleo.394
10/10/2014 - Venezuela announced that it would pay ExxonMobil more than a billion dollars for
the nationalization of its operations in Venezuela in 2007 after the ICSID ordered the Venezuela
government to pay $1.6 billion (1.2 billion euros) to the company. The award was compensation
for the expropriation of the Cerro Negro project, the La Ceiba project and "production and
export curtailments" imposed on the Cerro Negro development in 2006 and 2007.
ExxonMobil said the decision supported its view that Venezuela failed to fairly compensate it at
the time of the expropriation. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Rafael Ramirez said the
compensation ordered by the ICSID in the case was within a "reasonable range".
Venezuela also claimed victory in the court case. Ramirez said the tribunal's award was a
victory for Venezuelan sovereignty over "exaggerated" claims. He said, however, that
Venezuela would pay the fee, only after deducting a previous payment to ExxonMobil made by
Petroleos de Venezuela of $908 million related to the Cerro Negro expropriation.395
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Digression on Argentina
Between 2001 and 2004, natural gas and electricity transmission companies brought 15 cases
against the Argentine government at the ICSID in response to domestic energy pricing policies
and tariffs, but not expropriations. Nestor Kirchner served as Argentina’s President from May
25, 2003 to December 10, 2007. President Kirchner was considered by some as a left wing
president 396 however, he did not propose left-wing policies such as socialization of production
or the nationalization of public services that had previously been privatized during the
presidency of Carlos Menem (July 8, 1989 to December 10, 1999). On December 10, 2007 his
wife, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, succeeded him and began a second term on December 10,
2011.
04/16/2012 - The Argentine government announced that it would acquire a controlling interest in
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) by nationalizing the Spanish oil company Repsol’s
57.4% ownership of YPF. The takeover followed more than two months of increasing
government pressure on YPF after the cost of fuel imports into Argentina doubled to $9.4 billion
in 2011.397
2012 - Repsol registered a claim with the ICSID seeking compensation of $10 billion for its
57.4% interest in YPF.
07/30/2014 – Argentina defaulted on $539 million in interest payments due July 30, 2014.398
09/13/2014 – Argentina neared default on $200 million in interest payments due September 30,
2014.
Case Analysis
The developments in Venezuela and Argentina provide an opportunity to evaluate the factors
that lead to resource nationalization. Possible explanations include: (1) a change in the ruling
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party’s economic and political ideology (2) the residual resentment left by colonialism and the
political opportunism of politicians (3) national budget deficits and (4) political instability. The
discussion below examines each of these as they relate to Venezuela and Argentina.
Political Ideology
The socialist ideology of the Chavez and Maduro governments has been a major factor in the
expropriation of oil and natural gas assets in Venezuela. This is less true in Argentina where the
decision to expropriate has been driven more by Argentina’s worsening budget deficit.
Colonialism and Political Opportunism
The legacy of colonialism is still evident in the degree of income inequality that exists in
Venezuela and Argentina. The resentment this produces among the lower classes in both
countries allows politicians to exploit this sentiment by encouraging resource nationalism.
National Budgets
The increasing budget deficits in Venezuela and Argentina have compelled politicians in both
countries to seek additional sources of revenue through nationalization. Figures 14 and 15 below
illustrate the increasing budget deficits in both countries.
Figure 14 – Venezuela’s Government Budget Balance – 2005 to 2014
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Figure 15 – Argentina’s Government Budget Balance – 2005 to 2014

Political Instability
In 2007, the period during which the largest number of expropriations of oil and gas assets
occurred in Venezuela, the country’s political stability rating had fallen to 13. (0 is least stable
and 100 most stable.) In 2012, the period during which Repsol’s 57.4% interest in YPF was
expropriated, Argentina’s political stability rating had declined to 39. The expropriation of the
oil companies operating in Venezuela may have been the ruling party’s response to its mounting
financial problems and its increasing vulnerability to the political opposition in the voting booth.
In summary, in Venezuela, the primary factors leading to expropriation were the socialist
orientation of the Chavez government and the political instability of the country. In Argentina,
the primary factors leading to expropriation were the worsening budget deficit and popular
appeal of nationalization among Argentina’s voters.
7.6 Case 6 – The TNK-BP Joint Venture and Russian Politics
Investing in the Russian oil and gas industry has been an unsettling experience for many foreign
oil and natural gas companies, particularly for BP, which sold its 50% interest in its TNK-BP
joint venture in March 2013. The TNK-BP joint venture had experienced a long list of problems
including the imposition of a billion dollar claim for back taxes by the Russian government;
delays in the issuance of environmental permits; having its offices searched by Russian state
police; and having its chief executive officer, a BP appointee, forced to leave Russia under the
threat of arrest. At the time of the sale, TNK-BP accounted for more than 25% of BP’s global oil
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production. This case is unique in its specific details, but representative of the sometimes
complex interaction between a foreign investor (BP), Russian investors (AAR), state owned oil
and gas companies (Gazprom and Rosneft) and a national government (Russia).
Timeline
06/26/2003 - The agreement establishing the TNK-BP joint venture was signed by BP Chief
Executive Officer, John Browne and Mikhail Fridman, co-founder and Chairman of Alfa Group a
company that was formed after the Soviet Union was dissolved and Russian state owned
industries were privatized. To manage their interests in TNK-BP, Fridman and his Russian
partners (Viktor Vekselberg and Leonard Blavatnik) formed a consortium named Alfa-AccessRenova (AAR). BP and AAR agreed that each would hold a 50% interest in TNK-BP.
2003 to 2005 - TNK-BP’s oil and gas production increased by 24%, after BP engineers
introduced new drilling technology that reversed a long decline in production at TNK-BP’s most
important oil field, the Samotlor field in western Siberia. However, the partnership between BP
and AAR experienced problems almost from the beginning and became more contentious over
time. BP and AAR repeatedly disagreed about the investment strategy the joint venture should
pursue. AAR wanted TNK-BP to invest in oil and gas exploration outside of Russia, for
example, Iraq, Lithuania and Turkey, but BP considered TNK-BP to be its Russian subsidiary
and saw no value in having TNK-BP compete with BP’s projects in other parts of the world. In
addition, AAR owned interests in other businesses including telecommunications, banking,
aluminum, media, entertainment, and retailing; and wanted TNK-BP to reinvest some of the cash
it produced, in those businesses.399
07/2003 – Platon Lebedev, the fourth largest shareholder in OAO Yukos (a private sector oil
company), was arrested on charges of illegally acquiring a stake in the state-owned fertilizer
company, Apatit, in 1994. The arrest was followed by investigations into tax returns filed by
OAO Yukos, a large privately owned oil company in Russia.400
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10/2003 – Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Chairman and CEO of OAO Yukos was arrested and charged
with fraud and tax evasion. His arrest and subsequent conviction on these charges were widely
interpreted to mean the Kremlin was cracking down on the so-called oligarchs, who had become
wealthy and powerful during the period of privatization in Russia in the 1990s.401
10/2005 - Russian tax authorities imposed a claim for $936 million in back-taxes on TNK-BP,
temporarily raising the prospect of expropriation by the Russian government. However, that
prospect diminished after BP’s CEO, John Browne, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin
and President Putin praised BP as a “good corporate citizen”. The claims for back-taxes were
later substantially reduced. 402
10/03/2006 - Other private sector oil companies that had invested in Russia also came under
pressure from the Russian government. For example, after being accused of environmental
violations and threatened with multi-billion dollar penalties, Shell Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (a
subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell), Mitsui Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (a subsidiary of Mitsui) and
Diamond Gas Sakhalin (a subsidiary of Mitsubishi), agreed to give up controlling interest in the
Sakhalin - 2 offshore oil and gas development project. Gazprom, the state-owned gas producer,
acquired majority ownership in Sakhalin – 2; and Royal Dutch Shell and its partners Mitsui and
Mitsubishi had their shares in the project reduced. (These developments made BP’s continuing
50% ownership in TNK-BP an exception in an otherwise rapidly renationalizing Russian oil and
gas industry.) 403
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03/19/2008 - Officers from Russia’s Interior Ministry raided the Moscow offices of BP and
TNK-BP in connection with several new investigations for tax evasion. The investigations,
which had begun in 2007, gained momentum in early 2008, and by April 2008, the ministry was
again investigating claims for back-taxes of more than $900 million against various TNK-BP
subsidiaries. In addition, the Federal Security Service (known by its Russian acronym, the FSB)
arrested an employee of TNK-BP and his brother, an independent energy consultant, and charged
them with industrial espionage.404
04/2008 - Tetlis, (a Moscow based brokerage firm and one of a small group of minority
shareholders in TNK-BP Holdings), filed a lawsuit against TNK-BP. Tetlis sued TNK-BP in a
Siberian court over a longstanding agreement that allowed technical specialists from BP to be
“seconded” to TNK-BP. (When an employee is seconded, the person remains an employee of
their current employer (BP), but a contractual agreement is entered into between the employing
organization and a third party company (TNK-BP) pursuant to which the employee will perform
duties for the benefit of the third party company. At no time does the employee become
employed by the third party company.) However, a Siberian court issued an injunction that
prevented 148 seconded BP employees from entering the offices of TNK-BP.
At the same time, BP and AAR became engaged in a public argument regarding the salaries of
BP employees working at TNK-BP. AAR insisted the BP expatriates were unnecessary and
overpaid, but BP defended them. Furthermore, TNK-BP’s chief executive officer, Bob Dudley
accused AAR of interfering with the Russian work-permit application process to prevent BP
employees from renewing their Russian visas, forcing them to leave the country when their old
visas expired.405
05/2008 - The FSB conducted another raid on BP’s Moscow office. Separately, Russia’s Natural
Resources Ministry announced an environmental inspection of TNK-BP’s Samotlor oil field.
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07/2008 - In a separate lawsuit, a group of Russian managers at TNK-BP accused TNK-BP Chief
Executive Officer, Bob Dudley, of discrimination, claiming that TNK-BP’s Western employees
were paid much more than local Russian staff. Eventually, the 148 seconded employees were
forced to leave Russia and dozens of other Western employees not directly employed by TNKBP had to leave the country because they were unable to renew their visas. One of them was
Dudley himself, who finally left on July 24, 2008, ending a long struggle with AAR and the
Russian authorities.406
09/2008 - BP reached an agreement with AAR, in which it ceded operating control of the TNKBP joint venture to the Russian shareholders (AAR). Under the terms of the agreement,
announced in September 2008 and finalized four months later, Dudley resigned as TNK-BP’s
chief executive officer and AAR obtained the right to approve his replacement. The two sides
also agreed to increase the size of TNK-BP’s board of directors and add three independent
directors, fulfilling another key demand of AAR.407
TNK-BP’s legal problems diminished significantly after the agreement with AAR was reached.
In September 2008, the Russian Interior Ministry announced that TNK-BP had settled most of
the claims against it for back-taxes, and the ministry eventually ended its investigation for tax
evasion against TNK-BP. In addition, the two brothers arrested by the FSB for industrial
espionage were given suspended sentences and Tetlis and the Russian managers dropped their
discrimination lawsuits.408
2009 to 2010
In 2009, BP played a more passive role in TNK-BP, allowing AAR to run the joint venture.
However, that changed on April 20, 2010, when an explosion on BP’s Deepwater Horizon
drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico produced a massive oil spill that resulted in billions of dollars
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in fines by the U.S. government, cleanup costs and liability to individuals, businesses and states
along the Gulf Coast.
07/27/2010 - BP announced that Bob Dudley would succeed Tony Hayward as BP's Chief
Executive Officer on October 1, 2010. Dudley was also appointed to the board of directors of
BP.409
01/2011- Dudley announced a strategy that was intended to stabilize BP’s financial position and
give the company access to significant undeveloped oil and gas reserves in Russia. The plan
proposed a common share swap between BP and Rosneft (a Russian state owned oil company) in
which Rosneft would take a 5% stake in BP in exchange for BP taking a 9.5% stake in Rosneft.
In addition, BP and Rosneft agreed to explore and develop three license blocks in the Kara Sea, a
Russian part of the Arctic Ocean. However, the proposal was “derailed” by AAR which was
upset that BP had not thought to include them in the Arctic deal. AAR cited the original BPAAR shareholder agreement, which required that BP pursue any Russian projects exclusively
through TNK-BP; and sued to block the BP-Rosneft deal. A London court and a Stockholm
arbitration tribunal agreed that BP was violating the shareholder agreement. Despite last-minute
negotiations with AAR to preserve the deal with Rosneft, discussion of the proposed alliance
ended in May 2011.410
10/2012 - BP and AAR simultaneously announced they would sell their respective 50% interests
in TNK-BP to Rosneft, a deal, that valued the joint venture at $55 billion.
03/21/2013 – BP and AAR sold their respective 50% stakes in TNK-BP to the Russian stateowned oil company Rosneft, in a deal that closed on March 21, 2013. BP received compensation
of $26.7 billion ($12.5 billion in cash and 19.75% of Rosneft common stock valued at $14.2
billion). AAR received $27.7 billion in cash from Rosneft.411 412
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Case Analysis
The role of the Russian government in the disputes between BP and AAR has been the subject of
considerable speculation. Those familiar with the dispute do not believe that the Russian
government orchestrated the legal campaign against TNK-BP. Rather, they believe that AAR
used its connections in Russia’s government ministries and agencies to apply pressure on Dudley
and his team, whom they disliked, as noted by Osipovich.
The security services were used by AAR as one of the means of achieving their main goal. They
[AAR] wanted to seize operational control of the company and squeeze out Dudley, who was a very
major irritant for them… It’s no secret that they had the ability to do this, since they had tight
relationships with very senior individuals in the Russian leadership. 413
BP was not properly prepared for the pressure. It reacted slowly, sometimes even passively, since it
is a huge and risk-averse bureaucratic machine that functions relatively well in normal times, but at
the time it was not fully up to the task of outright corporate warfare in the Russian style.414

However, the Russian oil and natural gas industry had been renationalizing under President Putin
since his election. The evidence for this includes: (1) The intentional bankruptcy and subsequent
sale of Yukos’ assets to the state-owned company Rosneft; and (2) the allegation of threats to
marine life and other environmental problems at the Sakhalin -2 site and a subsequent injunction
that rescinded permits for Sakhalin -2’s second phase and paved the way for Gazprom’s eventual
acquisition of a controlling interest in the Sakhalin -2 project. Therefore the Russian ministries
did not object when they were asked to put pressure on TNK-BP.
In the case of Yukos the charges against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev and the
intentional bankruptcy of the company were motivated primarily by Vladimir Putin’s desire to
remove two businessmen that were a threat to his political power and re-election. In the case of
TNK-BP neither BP nor AAR presented a threat to Putin’s continuance in office, but TNK-BP
was a large and successful project that had significant economic and geo-political value to the
Russian government.
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Chapter 8 – Summary, Conclusions and Next Steps
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
In Chapter 1, the nature of the bargaining relationship between host countries and international
oil companies and the process by which this relationship changes as a project progresses were
examined. The evidence supports the view that while exploratory drilling is in progress, and
production facilities and pipeline infrastructure are being built, the bargaining power of oil
companies and host governments is roughly equal. However, after oil or gas has been
discovered and these facilities are operating, the host government and the transit countries
acquire the superior bargaining position.
The superior bargaining position of the host country government can manifest itself in several
ways. The executive branch of the host country government can unilaterally change the fiscal
terms of an agreement; deliberately change the economic or regulatory environment in the
country; interrupt the conduct of business by the IOC or expropriate the foreign investor’s assets.
The judicial branch can refuse to enforce a contract or fail to award fair compensation in a
dispute. More generally, host governments can place national politics and geopolitical priorities,
such as political popularity, energy security, and national security above the fulfillment of their
commercial commitments.
The vulnerability of oil and natural gas projects to politically motivated decisions, including
expropriation is derived from: (1) the immobility of oil and gas reserves, (2) the perception in
developing countries that foreign ownership of oil and gas reserves is a form of neo-colonialism,
making government ownership a source of national pride; and (3) the important role that oil and
gas revenue play in the national budget of most oil and natural gas exporting countries.
In Chapter 2, ten research questions were formulated to investigate the development and
operation of the institutions that support the oil and gas industry. In Chapter 3, it was argued that
(1) the commercial and non-commercial risk of oil and natural gas exploration and production
can be reduced by the development of appropriate institutions; and (2) that these institutions
contribute to the economic efficiency of the oil and natural gas industry and the world economy.
In Chapters 4, the design of the research study was presented and in Chapter 5, the research
methods were described.
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In Chapter 6, the findings related to these 10 research questions were presented. First, it
evaluated the evidence for and against the assertion that the frequency of expropriation of foreign
direct investment in the oil and gas industry has increased; and examined the circumstances in
which expropriation is more or less likely to occur? It was observed that the frequency of
expropriation has varied between 1960 and the present and concluded that the risk of
expropriation in the oil and natural gas industry increases when the price of oil rises faster than
the long term price trend.
Second, it examined the frequency of investment disputes and the efficiency with which these
disputes have been resolved. It found that most IOCs and host governments comply with the
terms and conditions of the contracts they sign; and resolve most disputes on their own.
Third, the study summarized the provisions most often included in an oil or gas contract to limit
the number of disputes and resolve those that occur. These include a general clause that requires
both parties to act “in good faith”, “use reasonable efforts” and fulfill their obligations “in a
timely manner”. Other provisions include: an equilibrium clause intended to compensate for
changes in the legal or the investment environment in which a contract was originally signed:
and a clauses specifying, the choice of law and the court or tribunal to be used in the resolution
of a dispute.
Fourth, the study examined the most important clauses in bilateral investment treaties and how
effective these treaties have been in resolving disputes. The most common provisions include: a
statement of purpose, choice of law, standards of treatment and the legal instruments to be
applied in a dispute. The most contentious issue in cases brought before an international court or
tribunal is the interpretation of the phrases “fair and equitable treatment” and “fair and equitable
compensation”. Nevertheless, bilateral investment treaties are the legal document most often
referenced in a dispute brought before an international court or tribunal.
Fifth, this study evaluated whether countries that have signed a large number of bilateral
investment treaties or have a higher quality of governance and a more reliable legal system are
less likely to be involved in disputes before an international court or tribunal? The number of
bilateral treaties a country has signed and the quality of governance in a country are not reliable
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predictors of the number of cases that will be brought against it in an international court or
tribunal.
Sixth, it evaluated whether a relationship exists between the amount of oil a country consumes
and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed? The evidence indicated that there is
no observable relationship between the amount of oil a country consumes and the number of
bilateral investment treaties it has signed. It also evaluated whether a relationship exists between
the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed and the amount of foreign direct investment
outflows from that country. The evidence indicated that if the United States is excluded from the
data, there is a relationship between the number of bilateral investment treaties a country has
signed and FDI outflows, but there are other factors affecting the number of bilateral investment
treaties a country signs. It also evaluated whether a relationship exists between the number of
bilateral treaties a country has signed and the amount of foreign direct investment inflows to that
country. The evidence indicated that there is a relationship between the number of bilateral
investment treaties a country has signed and FDI inflows, but there is disagreement over the
degree of importance of BIT’s on FDI inflows. The data on the decisions reached by various
international courts and tribunals was insufficient to prove that courts and tribunals are mostly
impartial, but it was observed that the amount awarded is frequently less than what the claimant
was seeking.
Seventh, this study described the sources of financing and found: (1) that commercial bank debt
is the dominant source of financing, followed by bonds, project financing (also usually financed
with bank debt) and equity. Master limited partnerships, venture capital and multilateral
financing play a smaller role. (2) The centralized finance system is still the most common
financing structure. (3) There are three types of fiscal regimes (a) concession or lease
(royalty/tax agreements), (b) production sharing agreement, or (c) service agreement.
(4) Although some authors have suggested that the interests of IOCs and NOCs might be better
served if they formed longer term alliances involving several projects, this study identified
several reasons why multi-project alliances between NOCs and IOCs are not likely to be widely
adopted.
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Eighth, this study examined the financial instruments available for managing commercial and
non-commercial risk in the oil and gas industry. The evidence indicates that there is a wide
variety of financial instruments available for re-allocating risk. Some of these instruments
developed in response to the needs of the oil industry, but most developed in response to the
needs of the business community in general.
Ninth, this study examined the relationship between the quality of financial reporting and
investment. The theoretical and empirical literature supports the view that higher quality
financial reporting results in higher investment efficiency in the context of financial securities
traded on a public exchange. However, in this study, a relationship was not found between the
quality of financial reporting and foreign direct investment. Some possible explanations were
proposed to explain this finding.
Arguments were presented why the estimates of proved, probable and possible reserves made by
individual oil companies, NOCs and country ministries are thought by some analysts to be too
optimistic. However, estimating the quantity of reserves (conventional and un-conventional) is
an inherently difficult process for technical reasons (geology) and economic reasons (changes in
the price of crude oil).
Tenth, there are no internationally agreed set of rules for trading energy resources and energy
investment, but the absence of an international energy investment agreement or even a
substantial number of multilateral agreements may not be significant, because (1) a relatively
small number of disputes are adjudicated with reference to an investment treaty. (2) The
outcome of an international court proceeding or tribunal is dependent on the standard of
treatment applied and the definition of fair and equitable compensation, by the court or tribunal.
Therefore, even if a global investment treaty existed, the problems of interpretation would still
exist.
The formation of the International Energy Forum (IEF) has led to more cooperation among
nations on energy issues, for example the Joint Oil Data Initiative and Joint Gas Data Initiative,
but these organizations have been successful primarily in the compilation of historical
information. Obtaining data regarding future capital spending has proven more elusive. The
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convergence of the IFRS standards, U.S. GAAP and Japanese GAAP since 1990 is an example
of organizations (investors, banks and oil companies) reshaping the institutional environment to
increase the efficiency of financial reporting.
Signature bonuses are a part of the international oil and gas industry and a source of controversy.
How this issue is resolved will depend on the relative economic and political power of the host
governments, international oil companies, and the public interest groups.
Critics have argued that energy diplomacy has not lived up to its promise, but these arguments
depend in part on a classical or neoclassical view of markets. However, organizational
arrangements, gained control, asset specificity, human assets, strategic behavior, contractual
safeguards and surrounding uncertainty may ultimately prove to be of greater importance than
has been evident so far.
Concluding Remarks
This study supports North’s observation that “Incremental change comes from the perceptions of
the entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that they could do better by altering the
existing institutional framework at some margin”.415 The evidence for this is the institutions that
have been created to promote and protect foreign direct investment in general (bilateral
investment treaties, political risk insurance and the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) and in the international oil and gas industry in particular (Energy
Charter Treaty). In addition, the large number of financing sources, financing structures, fiscal
regimes and risk management tools demonstrate that organizations are continually experimenting
with new techniques for mitigating and re-allocating risk.
Finally, Columbia University law Professor Louis Henkin has observed “It is probably the case
that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all of the time”.416 This includes contracts, bilateral treaties and multilateral
treaties. The evidence in this study suggests that this observation is also valid in the oil and gas
industry. Of the approximately 1,500 major transactions that take place each year in the oil and
415

Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1990) p. 8
416
Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) p. 47
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gas industry, only a small number result in disputes before the ICSID or some other international
tribunal. This is the case despite the fact, that there is no supranational organization capable of
enforcing international contracts and bilateral treaties. This is in part because parties to an
agreement want the other side to comply with its obligations and one way to encourage this
compliance is to meet one’s own obligations; and second, parties honor their commitments
because if they do not, other parties will be reluctant to contract with them again.
8.2 Next Steps
This study has examined several research questions in considerable detail, but there is a need for
additional research at the institutional level, the operational level and the quantitative level.
Institutional Level
First, the process by which individual institutions have been created and the role that specific
organizations have played in the development of those institutions, need to be understood in
greater detail.
Operational Level
Second, the process by which the parties to a transaction allocate the various types of risk
between them, needs to be better understood. Third, the process by which IOCs evaluate
political risk needs to be investigated in more detail. Fourth, the political motivations, rather
than economic motivations, for signing bilateral treaties needs to be better understood. Fifth,
energy diplomacy, in all its forms, needs to be better defined and its impact on the countries that
practice it, better understood.
Quantitative Level
Sixth, this study indicated that the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed and the
quality of its governance are not reliable predictors of the number of cases brought against it in
an international court or tribunal. The variables contributing to the number of cases brought
before an international court or tribunal should be studied in more detail.
Seventh, it was observed that if the United States is excluded from the comparison of the number
of bilateral treaties a country has signed and FDI outflows and inflows, there appears to be a
relationship between them, but the large number of countries clustered on the left side of the
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chart indicated that there are other factors affecting the number of bilateral investment treaties a
country signs. The variables influencing the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed
need to be investigated further.
Eighth, the apparent absence of a relationship between the quality of financial reporting and
foreign direct investment needs to be analyzed further to determine whether this result is correct
or whether reporting quality has not been operationalized correctly.
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Appendix I - Total Petroleum Liquids Consumptions and Production
Table A.1 below shows total petroleum liquids consumption in 66 countries, between 2008 and
2012.
Table A.1 - Total Petroleum Liquids Consumption
(Thousand Barrels Per Day)
United States
China
Japan
India
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Brazil
Germany
Korea, South
Canada
Mexico
France
Iran
Indonesia
United Kingdom
Singapore
Italy
Spain
Australia
Taiwan
Netherlands
Thailand
Venezuela
Egypt
Iraq
Argentina
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
Belgium
South Africa
Malaysia
Poland
Pakistan
Vietnam
Kuwait
Chile
Algeria
Ukraine
Greece
Sweden
Philippines
Hong Kong
Colombia

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

19,498.0
7,467.5
4,798.2
2,864.0
2,906.0
1,979.9
2,204.6
2,542.3
2,142.3
2,224.9
2,161.1
1,945.4
1,741.9
1,360.9
1,726.1
1,006.5
1,666.8
1,547.0
1,054.7
888.8
1,068.7
729.1
862.4
700.7
585.0
581.9
655.3
620.0
716.6
526.9
669.1
535.9
389.8
292.8
325.3
369.9
286.3
337.6
428.9
336.8
300.2
296.0
259.8

18,771.4
8,539.7
4,389.9
3,112.7
2,950.4
2,194.5
2,481.5
2,453.0
2,188.5
2,162.9
2,070.7
1,868.4
1,765.9
1,405.9
1,636.8
1,169.6
1,544.2
1,467.5
1,041.8
933.3
1,005.2
973.5
674.7
720.7
643.5
588.6
678.1
565.9
630.2
532.6
585.1
541.1
390.9
294.0
372.1
367.6
319.1
293.8
403.4
318.3
295.1
353.3
257.5

19,180.1
9,330.2
4,455.5
3,255.4
2,992.1
2,371.4
2,621.8
2,469.6
2,268.5
2,264.6
2,080.4
1,833.4
1,726.4
1,465.5
1,621.5
1,380.1
1,544.2
1,441.0
1,059.7
972.0
1,019.8
1,010.5
718.2
737.6
662.0
620.3
649.8
618.3
655.2
549.4
598.4
564.2
392.3
320.4
383.4
322.9
323.3
289.2
372.5
335.8
309.2
382.5
267.5

18,882.1
9,852.1
4,470.7
3,410.5
3,115.0
2,816.0
2,721.6
2,396.6
2,257.7
2,266.0
2,113.4
1,792.4
1,700.0
1,534.7
1,583.8
1,380.0
1,493.8
1,385.3
1,104.6
1,030.0
1,016.5
1,020.0
750.9
745.0
720.0
678.0
655.4
618.0
622.6
595.0
598.0
559.5
418.0
365.0
383.0
333.9
330.0
300.0
351.0
324.1
316.0
365.0
282.0

18,490.2
10,276.8
4,726.3
3,621.8
3,195.5
2,861.0
2,806.9
2,388.4
2,301.0
2,280.8
2,144.1
1,739.8
1,709.4
1,590.0
1,502.7
1,380.0
1,352.8
1,289.0
1,126.1
1,079.9
1,020.8
1,009.0
776.9
755.0
751.2
698.8
694.2
618.0
617.8
608.8
598.0
522.0
440.1
387.9
383.0
356.2
328.1
318.8
317.9
310.8
302.3
289.6
287.2
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Israel
Nigeria
Austria
Syria
Kazakhstan
Switzerland
Portugal
Norway
Romania
Ecuador
Morocco
Finland
Czech Republic
Qatar
Belarus
Peru
Cuba
Libya
Denmark
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands, U.S.
New Zealand
Oman
All Other
Total

246.1
269.1
282.7
309.6
247.5
267.4
288.3
229.3
230.9
219.8
215.7
217.6
215.0
165.5
157.3
186.5
141.4
257.7
181.1
175.2
108.3
157.4
121.6
4,203.7
84,696.7

232.8
242.5
271.5
314.5
210.0
259.8
274.7
225.3
201.3
208.1
235.3
206.4
205.5
134.2
182.5
188.2
169.6
262.9
166.5
155.6
111.3
150.6
108.6
4,247.4
84,918.2

251.3
242.2
279.3
317.8
206.3
265.6
274.5
222.3
193.5
226.4
243.9
215.9
201.4
123.3
152.4
192.5
163.9
280.3
167.5
176.0
113.5
151.6
113.5
4,317.7
87,528.8

247.6
240.0
265.3
320.0
216.0
246.6
260.6
223.9
217.0
216.0
240.0
207.7
196.9
160.0
188.0
182.0
184.0
130.0
164.0
152.0
138.0
150.9
123.0
4,421.2
88,744.0

281.5
269.9
258.8
257.6
250.7
249.9
234.0
221.9
216.3
212.7
206.2
196.5
195.5
189.7
187.6
171.7
170.9
170.4
155.5
152.6
152.4
149.8
144.9
4,481.0
89,432.6

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Total Petroleum Consumption, Last accessed on July 9, 2014
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=5&aid=2

Table A.2 shows total petroleum liquids production in 33 countries, between 2009 and 2013.
Table A.2 - Total Petroleum Liquids Production
(Thousand Barrels Per Day)

2009
United States
Saudi Arabia
Russia
China
Canada
Iran
United Arab Emirates
Iraq
Mexico
Kuwait
Brazil
Venezuela
Nigeria
Qatar
Algeria
Angola
Norway

9,133.8
9,819.2
9,933.8
4,067.5
3,318.8
4,178.3
2,794.6
2,399.2
3,000.8
2,505.9
2,561.7
2,509.7
2,212.2
1,573.2
1,909.8
1,908.0
2,352.6

2010

2011

2012

2013

9,684.5
10,642.3
10,156.9
4,362.7
3,441.7
4,243.1
2,813.2
2,402.9
2,978.6
2,460.3
2,712.5
2,405.0
2,459.4
1,787.9
1,881.0
1,947.8
2,134.6

10,136.2
11,264.3
10,239.2
4,347.0
3,597.3
4,265.0
3,088.3
2,629.0
2,960.0
2,691.8
2,685.2
2,489.2
2,554.5
1,936.4
1,863.0
1,799.9
2,007.4

11,109.6
11,725.7
10,397.0
4,372.4
3,856.4
3,589.4
3,213.2
2,986.6
2,936.0
2,796.8
2,651.9
2,489.2
2,524.1
2,032.6
1,875.2
1,831.6
1,902.1

12,316.1
11,591.9
10,498.2
4,459.4
4,096.6
3,422.0
3,229.6
3,057.7
2,907.8
2,811.8
2,712.0
2,489.2
2,373.2
2,067.3
1,846.9
1,838.5
1,826.1
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Kazakhstan
Colombia
Libya
India
Oman
Indonesia
Azerbaijan
United Kingdom (Offshore)
Egypt
Argentina
Malaysia
Ecuador
Thailand
Australia
Vietnam
Equatorial Guinea
Other
Total

1,541.6
690.3
1,790.1
873.6
818.9
1,053.2
1,015.9
1,422.1
728.6
801.7
693.9
485.7
428.7
592.5
339.8
346.0
5,145.4
84,947.1

1,608.7
805.9
1,789.1
965.3
869.9
1,038.7
1,044.9
1,318.7
717.4
790.5
683.1
487.3
430.3
604.1
332.3
322.7
5,183.4
87,506.5

1,638.4
938.5
501.5
995.8
890.9
1,015.5
993.2
1,084.1
725.7
763.7
626.0
500.6
448.8
530.5
323.6
298.9
5,058.8
87,887.8

1,605.9
969.1
1,483.0
990.2
923.8
974.3
931.9
922.4
720.0
723.2
642.7
504.5
465.3
519.1
363.5
310.4
4,420.7
89,759.8

1,653.0
1,028.5
1,000.5
982.2
945.1
925.7
883.3
836.3
709.9
707.9
630.5
527.0
473.4
446.7
352.0
290.8
4,398.0
90,335.2

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Total Oil Supply,
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1, Last accessed on July 9, 2014.

Figure A.1 – Crude Oil Prices 1861-2013
Figure A.1 presents crude oil prices in the money of the day and 2013 dollars

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/aboutbp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/review-by-energy-type/oil/oil-prices.html
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Table A.3 presents a list of risks in the oil and gas industry. This study focuses on the risks in
bold font.
Table A.3 - Types of Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry
Below-Ground Uncertainty
Above-Ground Uncertainty
Resource
Domestic Politics
Technologies
International Politics
Product Quality
Economics
Technical Performance
Regulation
Supplier Performance
Contracts
Costs
Corruption and Fraud
Timing and Project Schedule
Fiscal Terms
Contractor Performance
Partners
Operations Logistics
Joint Ventures
Project Execution
Alliances
Corporate Governance
Competitors
Human Resources
Community
Security/Terrorism/Piracy
Health and Safety
Public Relations and Reputation Risks
Environment
Natural Disasters
Adapted from David Wood, Petroleum Economics, Risk and Opportunity Analysis, Chapter 10 in Betty J. Simkins and
Russell E. Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and the Future of
Energy (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013) p. 240

Appendix II Expropriations and the Price of Oil
Table A.4 presents a comparison of the number of expropriations, the average price of crude oil
in the United States and the average world price of crude oil.
Table A.4 - Comparison of the Number of Expropriations and the Price of Oil
(Dollars per Barrel and Percent Change)

Year
1960
1961
1962

Number of
Expropriations

Annual
Average
U.S.
Crude
Oil Price

1

$2.91

2

$2.85

3

$2.85

Change
in the
Price of
U.S.
Crude
Oil in
Dollars

Change
in the
Price of
U.S.
Crude
Oil in
Percent

Annual
Average
Global
Crude
Oil Price

Change
in the
Global
Price of
Crude
Oil in
Dollars

Change
in the
Global
Price of
Crude
Oil in
Percent

$1.90
($0.06)
$0.00
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-2.11%

$1.80

($0.10)

-5.56%

0.00%

$1.80

$0.00

0.00%

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

1

$2.91

1

$3.00

1

$3.01

0

$3.10

1

$3.12

2

$3.18

5

$3.32

3

$3.39

5

$3.60

9

$3.60

11

$4.75

13

$9.35

10

$12.21

9

$13.10

6

$14.40

1

$14.95

5

$25.10

1

$37.42

2

$35.75

0

$31.83

0

$29.08

0

$28.75

0

$26.92

0

$14.44

0

$17.75

0

$14.87

0

$18.33

0

$23.19

0

$20.20

0

$19.25

0

$16.75

0

$15.66

0

$16.75

0

$20.46

0

$18.64

0

$11.91

0

$16.56

0

$27.39

0

$23.00

0

$22.81

($0.19)

0

$27.69

1

$37.66

0

$50.04

2.06%

$1.80

$0.00

0.00%

$0.09

3.00%

$1.80

$0.00

0.00%

$0.01

0.33%

$1.80

$0.00

0.00%

2.90%

$1.80

$0.00

0.00%

0.64%

$1.80

$0.00

0.00%

$0.06

1.89%

$1.80

$0.00

0.00%

$0.14

4.22%

$1.80

$0.00

0.00%

2.06%

$1.80

$0.00

0.00%

5.83%

$2.24

$0.44

19.64%

$0.00

0.00%

$2.48

$0.24

9.68%

$1.15

24.21%

$3.29

$0.81

24.62%

$4.60

49.20%

$11.58

$8.29

71.59%

23.42%

$11.53

($0.05)

-0.43%

$0.89

6.79%

$12.80

$1.27

9.92%

$1.30

9.03%

$13.92

$1.12

8.05%

3.68%

$14.02

$0.10

0.71%

40.44%

$31.61

$17.59

55.65%

$12.32

32.92%

$36.83

$5.22

14.17%

($1.67)

-4.67%

$35.93

($0.90)

-2.50%

-12.32%

$32.97

($2.96)

-8.98%

-9.46%

$29.55

($3.42)

-11.57%

($0.33)

-1.15%

$28.78

($0.77)

-2.68%

($1.83)

-6.80%

$27.56

($1.22)

-4.43%

-86.43%

$14.43

($13.13)

-90.99%

18.65%

$18.44

$4.01

21.75%

($2.88)

-19.37%

$14.92

($3.52)

-23.59%

$3.46

18.88%

$18.23

$3.31

18.16%

20.96%

$23.73

$5.50

23.18%

-14.80%

$20.00

($3.73)

-18.65%

($0.95)

-4.94%

$19.32

($0.68)

-3.52%

($2.50)

-14.93%

$16.97

($2.35)

-13.85%

($1.09)

-6.96%

$15.82

($1.15)

-7.27%

6.51%

$17.02

$1.20

7.05%

$3.71

18.13%

$20.67

$3.65

17.66%

($1.82)

-9.76%

$19.09

($1.58)

-8.28%

-56.51%

$12.72

($6.37)

-50.08%

28.08%

$17.97

$5.25

29.22%

$10.83

39.54%

$28.50

$10.53

36.95%

($4.39)

-19.09%

$24.44

($4.06)

-16.61%

-0.83%

$25.02

$0.58

2.32%

17.62%

$28.83

$3.81

13.22%

$9.97

26.47%

$38.27

$9.44

24.67%

$12.38

24.74%

$54.52

$16.25

29.81%

$0.06

$0.09
$0.02

$0.07
$0.21

$2.86

$0.55
$10.15

($3.92)
($2.75)

($12.48)
$3.31

$4.86
($2.99)

$1.09

($6.73)
$4.65

$4.88
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2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Jan 2015

4

$58.30

4
0
0
2
1
1
0
0
0

$64.20
$91.48
$53.48
$71.21

14.17%

$65.14

$10.62

16.30%

$5.90

9.19%

$72.39

$7.25

10.02%

$27.28

29.82%

$97.26

$24.87

25.57%

-71.05%

$61.67

($35.59)

-57.71%

24.90%

$79.50

$17.83

22.43%

$8.26

($38.00)
$17.73

$87.04

$15.83

18.19%

$111.26

$31.76

28.55%

$86.46

($0.58)

-0.67%

$111.67

$0.41

0.37%

5.17%

$108.66

($3.01)

-2.77%

-41.37%
-6.36%

$55.27

($53.39)
($4.19)

-49.13%
-7.58%

$91.17
$53.45
$50.05

$4.71
($37.72)
($3.40)

$51.08

Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show
http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp
EIA, “Petroleum and Other Liquids”, Energy Information Administration,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm
Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin and Konstantin Sonin, “Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory
and Evidence from Panel Data,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, (2011) 27 (2): 301

Summary of Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin’s Determinants of Nationalization
Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin analyzed the determinants of oil and gas asset nationalizations
(expropriations) from1960 to 2006. They found that the largest number of nationalizations took
place when oil prices were rising rapidly relative to the long term price trend; and were more
likely to occur in countries in which political institutions were weak.417
Empirical Method
Their model has two testable hypotheses (1) a positive oil price shock increases the risk of
nationalization and (2) weak political institutions increase the risk of nationalization. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether an expropriation took place in a
given country in a given year (yes = 1, no =0) in firms in SIC codes 1300 (Oil and Gas
Extraction) and 1310 (Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas). Their study covers the period from
1960 to 2006 and includes 98 nationalizations in 42 countries. Hypothesis 1 asserts that the
probability of nationalization depends on the deviation of the oil price from its long term trend,
rather than on the trend itself. To model this theory and derive empirical implications, they
removed the trend from the data.
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The independent variables include:
(1) The deviation in price from the trend. They refer to this variable as the “oil price shock”.
(2) They also included the logarithm of the real oil price to determine whether the
nationalizations were better explained by the oil price itself, or the “de-trended” change in price
(1 above).
(3) To evaluate the influence of the quality of institutions on the probability of expropriation they
used the Polity IV data set prepared by Marshall and Jaggers. This variable which they
designated, XCONST, ranges from 1 to 7 (in which 1 is the lowest quality of institutions and 7 is
the highest quality. The XCONST variable captures the strength of institutions, understood as
the rules of the game. (This reference to the “rules of the game” is included in their paper.)
(4) They controlled for the general level of economic development by using the logarithm of the
real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The data was taken from the World Development
Indicators, but they note that there are many gaps in these data prior to 1980 in less developed
countries, where and when most nationalizations took place. For this reason, they estimated the
regression specifications with and without per capita GDP (the latter to increase the sample size).
(5) In their model, governments are infinitely lived, but in reality, nationalizations may be driven
by a change in regime. The authors used the data on leadership turnover to control for this
relationship. The change in a ruler is a dummy variable, which indicates that there was a
transition in a given country in a given year or there was not. The data were compiled from
www.worldstatesmen.com.
Main Results
The authors used a linear probability model with fixed country effects. The results are presented
in Table A.5. Regression 1 indicates that nationalizations are more likely to occur when the oil
price shock is large. For example, an oil price shock of 38%, increases the probability of
nationalization in a given country and year by approximately 1.2% (.030 x 38.0% = 1.14%)
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There are approximately 130 countries in the sample, therefore a 38% increase in the price of oil
relative to the trend, increases the number of nationalizations in a given year by approximately
1.6, (130 x .012 = 1.56). This is statistically and substantively significant given that oil
nationalizations are rare. The average number of nationalizations per year in 1960 - 2006 was
2.1 (98 nationalizations/47 years = 2.09) with a standard deviation of 3.3 expropriations).
Table A.5 - Regressions Using the Nationalization Dummy
(1960-2006)

Oil price shock
Standard Error

Regression

Regression

Regression

Regression

Regression

Regression

1

2

3

4

5

6

0.030

0.038

0.037

0.037

(0.011)***

(0.013)***

(0.014)**

(0.014)**

Executive constraints
Standard Error

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.005

-0.005

(0.001)***

(0.001)**

(0.001)***

(0.002)***

(0.002)***

0.000

0.000

(0.005)

(0.005)

Log real price change

0.042

Standard Error

0.042

Log real oil price

-0.002

Standard Error

(0.005)

Log GDP per capita
Standard Error
Change in
government

0.009

Standard Error

(0.005)*

Observations

7567

5759

5759

5759

5030

4978

R-squared

0.07

0.08

0.08

0.07

0.09

0.09

Observations = 161 countries x 47 years per country = 7,567
Observations = 161 countries x an average of 36 years per country = 5,796
Observations = 107 countries x 47 years per country = 5030
Observations = 106 countries x 47 years per country = 4,978
All regressions use the linear probability model with country fixed effects; Standard errors are clustered at the year
level.
In regressions 1, 2, 5, and 6, the authors use the oil price shock, that is, the deviation of the log real price of oil from
its 50-year trend.
In regression 3, the authors replace the oil price shock with the log of the change in real oil price.
In regression 4, the authors use the log of the real price of oil.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level.
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Regression 2 indicates that controlling for price shock and country fixed effects (i.e. factors that
do not vary with time, such as legal origin, colonial legacies, religion and culture), a higher
quality of institutions reduces the risk of nationalization. The effects are statistically and
substantively significant. For example, if the quality of institutions change by 1.9 points (on a
scale from 1 to 7). This change in institutional quality implies a change of .8% in the number of
nationalizations in a given country-year (1.9 x -.004 = .008). Multiplying the number of
countries in the sample (130) by .8% gives 1.0 more nationalization per year. Again this is
statistically and substantively significant given that expropriations in general are rare. The R2
value in every regression involving the quality of political institutions, XCONST, is between .07
and .09 however R2 is not an appropriate measure of goodness of fit in a dichotomous linear
probability model.
Regressions 3 and 4 tests whether the results are similar for the year over year change in price
and the price itself, respectively. Neither is statistically significant, therefore nationalizations are
not correlated with the year over year change in price or the price itself.
Regressions 5 and 6 control for GDP per capita and for changes in government leadership;
adding these variables does not affect the coefficients of the oil price shock or executive
constraints; and per capita GDP and a regime change does not increase the risk of
nationalization.
Figure A.2 - Number of oil expropriations (left vertical axis) and oil price deviation from
the long-term trend (right vertical axis), 1910-2006

Source: Guriev et al. (2008).
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Table A.6 - Detailed Chronology of Privatizations and Expropriations (1989 to 2014)
1989 - Repsol (a Spanish oil company) was privatized by selling 100% of the company to the
public between 1989 and 1997.
1990-1991- No expropriations were reported.
1992 - Total (a French oil company) began the process of privatizing the company. The
company sold a 30% interest to the public in 1992 and the remaining 70% to the public in 1998.
08/24/1992 - ARCO and Sun Co. Inc. agreed to separate settlements totaling almost $261 million
that resolved their claims over oil field assets expropriated by Iran in 1978-80. The agreements
were subject to approval by the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal at The Hague. The tribunal was set up
in 1981 to resolve foreign claims to assets nationalized by the government of Ayatollah
Khomeini following the fall of the Shah of Iran during the 1978-79 Iranian revolution.418
12/13/1993 - (1) Effective November 18, 1993 Peru established a new state petroleum company,
Perupetro SA, to oversee new and existing contract responsibilities of Petroleos del Peru SA
(Petroperu), which was to be privatized in 1994. Petroperu would continue to operate its oil
field, refining, transportation, and marketing assets. (This privatization had not occurred as of
August 7, 2014.) (2) In addition, the government of Peru made a $30 million payment to AIG in
late September 1993. AIG was owed $184.8 million because they were Belco’s insurer. Belco’s
assets were expropriated by the Peruvian government in December 1985.419 420
1993 - Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) sold a 16% interest to the public.
1994 - OAO Gazprom (a Russian natural gas company) sold a 62% interest to the public; and
Lukoil (a Russian oil company) became a private sector company (100%).
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09/05/1994 - Peru agreed to pay $55 million in compensation to a German group for the military
government's 1974 expropriation of the undeveloped Aguaytia gas field and the producing
Maquia oil field in Peru's central jungle.421
1995 - (1) Three privatizations occurred. IndianOil Corporation Limited sold 11% of its shares
to the public. As of 2014, the Indian government owned 79% and the public owned 21%. (2)
Enersis S.A (ENI, Italy) sold a 15% interest in the company to the public. (3) Petróleo Brasileiro
S.A. sold a 49% interest in the company to the public.
1996-1999 - No significant privatizations or expropriations occurred.
2000 - Two significant partial privatizations occurred. China Petrochemical Corporation
(SINOPEC) began the sale of a 24% interest in the company to the public; and PetroChina
Company Limited (PetroChina) began the sale of a 14% interest in the company to the public.
2001 - Three significant partial privatizations occurred. (1) The Chinese National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC) sold a 29% share of its common stock to the public. (2) Statoil, a
Norwegian national oil company, sold a 38% interest to the public. (3) Public ownership in ENI
was increased to 70%.
2002 - No expropriations were reported.
2003 - Following a tax reassessment, the Russian government presented OAO Yukos with a
series of tax claims that totaled US $27 billion. Yukos' assets were frozen by the government at
the same time and the company was therefore unable to pay these tax claims.422 Most of Yukos's
assets would subsequently be sold at low prices to oil companies owned by the Russian
government.423 (See entry for 11/19/2004.) The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
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Europe condemned Russia's campaign against Yukos and its owners as “manufactured” for
political reasons and a violation of human rights.424
03/02/2004 - Marathon Oil Corp. cancelled its proposed LNG complex in Baja California, after
the state government appropriated the land near Tijuana known as "Il Monumento," for public
use, an area which included land Marathon had selected for its project. Marathon had options to
purchase the land, but did not own it at the time the property was taken.425
07/20/2004 - Bolivian President, Carlos Mesa, declared victory regarding the referendum to
increase state involvement in the country’s gas reserves, after early returns showed that Bolivians
approved all five measures on the ballot. 426
08/02/2004 - The Overseas Private Investment Corp (OPIC) denied charges made by
Venezuela's state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) that the U.S.
agency's decision to pay $6 million on an insurance claim to Science Applications International
Corp. (SAIC), an information technology contractor, was politically motivated.427
11/19/2004 - The Russian government announced bidding opened for an auction of a subsidiary
of OAO Yukos to be held on December 19, 2004. The auction of 76.79% of Yuganskneftegaz
was open to international companies. The Russian government required a $1.7 billion deposit to
bid and set the minimum bid at $8.6 billion. Yukos claimed the subsidiary's value was $20
billion.428
2005 - There were no expropriations or threats of expropriation.
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05/08/2006 - Bolivia demanded that Brazil’s state-run Petroleo Brasileiro SA (Petrobras), Royal
Dutch Shell PLC, and other private firms turn over their Bolivian retail networks to state-owned
Yacimientos Petroliferas Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) within 180 days.429
05/17/2006 - Occidental Petroleum Corp. filed an arbitration claim against Ecuador on May 17,
2006 seeking reparation for losses following Ecuador’s termination of Occidental’s exploration
and development contract and the immediate confiscation of the company’s Amazon oil field
operations in Block 15 and its Eden-Yuturi, Limonchcha, Indillana, Paca Norte, Paca Sur, and
Yanaquincha fields on May 15, 2006.
Occidental filed a claim with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), invoking the US-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty to try to restore the company’s
rights in Ecuador and prevent the Ecuadorian government from turning operations over to a third
party, until the claim was settled.430
06/05/2006 - (1) Bolivia’s President Evo Morales issued a decree reaffirming that Brazil’s staterun Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), Royal Dutch Shell PLC, and other private firms must
turn over their Bolivian retail networks within a month to state-owned Yacimientos Petroliferas
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). He also demanded that Petrobras, which owned 25% of the
country’s retail outlets, give up its 27,250 b/d refinery at Cochabamba and a 20,000 b/d refinery
at Santa Cruz de la Sierra.431 (2)Alaska’s Governor Frank H. Murkowski released a revised
natural gas pipeline agreement negotiated with the three North Slope oil producers, which he
said the oil companies were ready to sign if the state legislature approved it.432
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08/01/2006 - A Russian court declared OAO Yukos bankrupt.433
09/25/2006 - (1) A Russian government injunction rescinded permits for the second phase of
Sakhalin-2, alleging threats to marine life resulting from inadequate environmental safeguards.
Shell and its partners Mitsubishi and Mitsui, disputed the claims, but revocation of the permits
effectively suspended the project. In addition, Interfax reported that an official of the Natural
Resources Ministry had implied that the other projects at Sakhalin Island were in violation of
their licenses. At the same time, Gazprom was lobbying for a stake in the Sakhalin-2 venture.
(2) The Financial Times reported threats by Russian prosecutors to suspend the license of TNKBP to develop Kovytka gas field in eastern Siberia. In that case, as with Sakhalin-2, the
allegations were related to environmental issues.434
01/15/2007- An agreement was signed between Royal Dutch Shell PLC and OAO Gazprom, the
Russian state-owned natural gas company, under which Gazprom would become the majority
shareholder in the Sakhalin-2 LNG Project. Under the terms of the agreement, Gazprom would
purchase 50% plus one share of the project for $7.45 billion, thereby forcing Shell and its
partners, Mitsui & Co. Ltd. and Mitsubishi Corp. to dilute their interest by 50% in order to
accommodate their new partner, Gazprom. Shell was forced to give up majority control in one
of its most valuable assets after having invested over $6 billion to develop the project.
Immediately following the agreement, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a press conference
at which he announced that the environmental violations at Sakhalin-2 had been resolved to the
satisfaction of the Russian regulatory authorities.435
06/27/2007 - Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) assumed ownership of ConocoPhillips's
interests in the Petrozuata and Hamaca heavy-oil ventures in Venezuela and the offshore
Corocoro development project, after PDVSA and ConocoPhillips were unable to reach an
agreement under which ConocoPhillips would transition to a “Empresa Mixta" structure
433
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mandated by Venezuelan law. ConocoPhillips said it intended to record a complete impairment
of its interest in its oil projects in Venezuela which it valued at $4.5 billion. Prior to the
expropriation of its interests, ConocoPhillips held a 50.1% interest in Petrozuata, a 40% interest
in Hamaca, and a 32.5% interest in Corocoro.436
10/2007 - In October 2007, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa imposed a windfall profits tax on
oil and operations whereby the government would receive 99% of oil profits, changing the prior
law which required a 50-50 split of profits.437
2008 - There were no reports of expropriation or privatization.
04/19/2010 - Rafael Correa, president of Ecuador, the smallest oil producer within the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, said a bill would be introduced in the legislature
that would allow expropriation of those companies that refused to convert their productionsharing contracts into service contracts.438
07/02/2010 - Venezuela nationalized 11 oil rigs owned by Helmerich & Payne (H&P).439
03/29/2011 - Madagascar Oil of Houston, declared force majeure under the four productionsharing contracts for Blocks 3104, 3105, 3106, and 3107 that it operated in Madagascar in order
to safeguard its rights under those agreements. The company said the declaration of force
majeure was made in response to the threat of expropriation made by the Minister of Mines and
Hydrocarbons and the failure by the Ministry to instruct the state regulatory authority to proceed
with the approval of Madagascar Oil’s 2011 work program.440
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04/23/2012 - Argentina took control of the energy company YPF SA. The Spanish company
Repsol, part owner of YPF SA issued a statement saying it would take all legal measures to
preserve the value of its assets and the interests of its shareholders. Repsol valued YPF SA at
$18 billion of which Repsol owned 57.43%.441
04/26/2012 - Argentina’s Senate approved a bill to expropriate YPF and the Lower House of
Congress was expected to vote on the measure.442
Source: Entries above not assigned a citation are from Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil &
Gas Industry – Management, Strategy and Finance, (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Corporation,), 2011, p. 62
The complete listing of media reports of expropriations can be found at the Oil & Gas Journal website,
http://www.ogj.co*m/_search?q=expropriation.

Appendix III - List of Cases Reported by UNCTAD Related to Oil and Natural Gas
Table A.7 - Complete List of Cases Reported by UNCTAD Related to Oil and Natural Gas
Year
Year
Amount
Amount
Case
Award
Parties
Sought by
Awarded to
Status
was
was
Investor
Investor
Initiated Rendered
1996

2002

1999

2004

Biederman v.
Kazakhstan

Occidental Exploration
and Production
Company v. Ecuador
(LCIA Case No.
UN3467)

441

unknown

US$ 8.9 million
awarded

awarded
in favor
of the
investor

US$
201,563,930

US$ 71,533,649
awarded plus
simple interest of
US$ 3,541,280 to 1
January 2004, plus
simple interest of
2.75% to date of
award; London
Court of Appeal
dismissed request
for review on 4 July
2007

awarded
in favor
of the
investor

Oil & Gas Journal, “Repsol calls Argentina's nationalization of YPF 'unlawful', (04/17/2012)
http://www.ogj.com/articles/2012/04/repsol-calls-argentinas-nationalization-of-ypf-unlawful.html
442
Paula Dittrick, Argentina's Senate approves bill to expropriate YPF, Oil & Gas Journal, 04/26/2012,
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2001

2003

2001

2002

2005

2003

2005

CMS Gas Transmission
Company v. Argentina
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8)

US$ 261.1
million (or 243.6
million and
shares) plus
interest

US$ 132 million
plus interest
awarded; The
application for
annulment of
Argentina was
partially dismissed

awarded
in favor
of the
investor

US$ 4,084,651
plus interest

US$ 1,130,859
awarded plus
interest;
Application for
setting aside of
award rejected by
Svea Court of
Appeal on 13 April
2006

awarded
in favor
of the
investor

2005

Petrobart v.
Kyrgyzstan (Arb. No.
126/2003)

2007

Enron Corporation
and Ponderosa Assets
LP v. Argentina (ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/3)

2007

Sempra Energy
International v.
Argentine Republic
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16)

approximately
US$ 210 million

Saipem S.p.A. v.
People's Republic of
Bangladesh (ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/7)

US$
5,883,770.80,
and US$
265,000.00 and
€ 110,995.92
awarded plus
interest

US$ 5,883,770.80,
and US$
265,000.00 and €
110,995.92
awarded plus
interest

awarded
in favor
of the
investor

US$ 238.1
million

Tribunal has
jurisdiction and
awards US$
185,285,485.85
plus interest and
arbitration costs

awarded
in favor
of the
investor

2009

2007

up to US$ 582
million

BG Group Plc v.
Argentina

US$ 106.2 million
awarded plus
interest (2%);
annulment
proceeding
pending
US$ 128,250,462
awarded plus
interest (2%
beginning on 1
January 2007 until
the date of the
award); annulment
proceeding
pending

awarded
in favor
of the
investor

awarded
in favor
of the
investor

8
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2001

1999

2003

2002

2003

2006

2008

2010

2004

CCL Oil v. Kazakhstan
(SCC Case 122/2001)

2005

Methanex Corp. v.
United States

2006

Encana v. Ecuador
(LCIA Case No.
UN3481)

2007

LG&E Energy Corp.,
LG&E Capital Corp.
and LG&E
International Inc. v.
Argentine Republic
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1)

2008

Plama Consortium
Limited v. Republic of
Bulgaria (ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/24)

2009

2010

2010

Tribunal has
jurisdiction;
Tribunal rejects
claims on the
merits (awards
only partly public)

awarded
in favor
of the
state

claim dismissed in
its entirety

awarded
in favor
of the
state

$330,000 awarded
to plaintiff

awarded
in favor
of the
state

Approx. US $248
million plus
interest

Tribunal partially
granted investor's
claims; US $57.4
million plus
interest

awarded
in favor
of the
state

US$ 300 million

Tribunal has
jurisdiction but
claims dismissed
on the merits

awarded
in favor
of the
state

unknown

tribunal lacks
jurisdiction

awarded
in favor
of the
state

$227 million

300,000 Euros

awarded
in favor
of the
state

unknown

Tribunal finds
claims manifestly
without legal merit

awarded
in favor
of the
state

Euro
178,892,338

US$ 970 million
including
interest and
costs
Approx. C$ 100
million
(equivalent to
approx. US$ 70
million)

Azpetrol International
Holdings B.V.,
Azpetrol Group B.V.
and Azpetrol Oil
Services Group B.V. v.
Republic of Azerbaijan
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/15)
Mohammad Ammar
Al-Bahloul v. Republic
of Tajikistan, SCC Case
No. V (064/2008)
RSM Production
Corporation and
others v. Grenada
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/6)

8
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2003

Pending

2003

Pending

2003

pending

2003

pending

2004

pending

2004

pending

2004

pending

2005

pending

2005

2014

Camuzzi International
SA v. Argentine
Republic (ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/2)
Gas Natural SDG, S.A.
v. Argentine Republic
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/10)
Pan American Energy
LLC and BP Argentina
Exploration Company
v. Argentine Republic
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/13)
(consolidated with
ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/8)
El Paso Energy
International
Company v. Argentine
Republic (ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/15)
Wintershall
Aktiengesellschaft v.
Argentine Republic
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/14)
Total S.A. v. Argentine
Republic (ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/1)
Mobil Exploration and
Development Inc. Suc.
Argentina and Mobil
Argentina S.A. v.
Argentine Republic
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/16)
RosInvestCo. UK Ltd.
v. Russian Federation
(V 079 / 2005)
Yukos Universal Ltd. v.
Russian Federation
(PCA Case No. AA 227)
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unknown

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

tribunal lacks
jurisdiction

pending

Approx. US$ 1
billion

pending; Tribunal
has jurisdiction
(decision not public
yet)

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

Court orders Russia
to pay $50 billion
for seizing Yukos
assets

Award in
favor of
Investor

$114 billion
sought by 3
investors
against the
Russian
Federation

(amount sought
by each investor
is not available)

2005

2005

2014

Hulley Enterprises Ltd.
v. Russian Federation
(PCA Case No. AA 226)

2014

Veteran Petroleum
Ltd. v. Russian
Federation (PCA Case
No. AA 228)

2005

pending

2006

Pending

2006

pending

Ioannis
Kardossopoulos v.
Georgia (ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/18)
Chevron Block Twelve
& Chevron Blocks
Thirteen and Fourteen
v. People’s Republic of
Bangladesh (ICSID
Case No. ARB/06/10)
Occidental Petroleum
Corporation and
Occidental Exploration
and Production
Company v. Republic
of Ecuador and
Empresa Estatal
Petróleos del Ecuador
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/11)

$114 billion
sought by 3
investors
against the
Russian
Federation
(amount sought
by each investor
is not available
$114 billion
sought by 3
investors
against the
Russian
Federation
(amount sought
by each investor
is not available

Court orders Russia
to pay $50 billion
for seizing Yukos
assets

Award in
favor of
Investor

Court orders Russia
to pay $50 billion
for seizing Yukos
assets

Award in
favor of
Investor

US $350 million

pending; Tribunal
has jurisdiction

pending

unknown

pending

pending

US $1 billion

pending

pending
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2006

pending

Renta 4 et al v Russian
Federation (SCC Case
No 24/2007)

up to US$ 40
million

pending; Tribunal
has jurisdiction

pending

2006

pending

Chevron Corporation
and Texaco Petroleum
Corporation v Ecuador

up to US$ 553
million plus
interest

pending; Tribunal
has jurisdiction

pending

2006

pending

The Rompetrol Group
N.V. v. Romania (ICSID
Case No. ARB/06/3)

unknown

pending; Tribunal
has jurisdiction

pending

unknown

pending

pending

at least $500
million

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

More than $6
billion

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

2007

pending

2007

pending

2007

pending

2007

pending

2008

pending

Liman Caspian Oil BV
and NCL Dutch
Investment BV v.
Republic of
Kazakhstan (ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/14)
Shell Nigeria Ultra
Deep Limited v.
Federal Republic of
Nigeria (ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/18)
Ron Fuchs v. Republic
of Georgia (ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/15)
ConocoPhillips
Petrozuata B.V.,
ConocoPhillips
Hamaca B.V. and
ConocoPhillips Gulf of
Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/30)
Itera International
Energy LLC and Itera
Group NV v. Georgia
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/7)
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2008

pending

2008

pending

2008

pending

2008

pending

2008

Pending

2009

pending

2009

pending

2010

pending

2010

pending

Perenco Ecuador
Limited v. Republic of
Ecuador and Empresa
Estatal Petróleos del
Ecuador
(Petroecuador) (ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/6)
Murphy Exploration
and Production
Company
International v.
Republic of Ecuador
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/4)
Burlington Resources,
Inc. and others v.
Republic of Ecuador
and Empresa Estatal
Petróleos del Ecuador
(Petroecuador) (ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/5)
Caratube International
Oil Company LLP v.
Republic of
Kazakhstan (ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/12)
Repsol YPF Ecuador,
S.A. and others v.
Republic of Ecuador
and Empresa Estatal
Petróleos del Ecuador
(PetroEcuador) (ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/10)
Mærsk Olie, Algeriet
A/S v. People's
Democratic Republic
of Algeria (ICSID Case
No. ARB/09/14)
Itera International
Energy LLC and Itera
Group NV v. Georgia
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/22)
Ascom S.A v.
Kazahkstan
Oil Tanking GMBH v.
Bolivia
199

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

over US$ 2 billion

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

unknown

pending

unknown

unknown

pending

2010

pending

2010

pending

2011

pending

2011

Pending

2011

pending

2012

pending

2012

pending

Pan American Energy
LLC v. Plurinational
State of Bolivia (ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/8)
Universal
Compression
International Holdings
S.L.U. v Venezuela
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/9)
The Williams
Companies,
International Holdings
B.V., WilPro Energy
Services (El Furrial)
Limited and WilPro
Energy Services (Pigap
II) Limited v.
Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela (ICSID Case
No. ARB/11/10)
National Gas S.A.E. v.
Arab Republic of Egypt
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/7)
Mamidoil Jetoil Greek
Petroleum Products
Societe Anonyme S.A.
v. Republic of Albania
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/24)
Ampal-American Israel
Corporation and
others v. Arab
Republic of Egypt
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/12/11)
Repsol, S.A. and
Repsol Butano, S.A. v.
Argentine Republic
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/12/38)

unknown

unknown

pending

up to US$ 380
million

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

USD 24 Million

pending

pending

unknown

pending

pending

$10 billion US

pending

pending

38
1997

1998

Ethyl Corp v. Canada

not less than
US$ 251 million
plus interest
200

case was settled
for US$ 13 million
after decision on

settled

jurisdiction

2003

2004

2006

2007

2005

2008

2008

2008

Pioneer Natural
Resources Company,
Pioneer Natural
Resources (Argentina)
S.A. and Pioneer
Natural Resources
(Tierra del Fuego) S.A.
v. Argentine Republic
(ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/12)
BP America
Production Company,
Pan American Sur SRL,
Pan American
Fueguina, SRL and Pan
American Continental
SRLothers v. Argentine
Republic (ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/8)
(consolidated with
ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/13)
Técnicas Reunidas,
S.A. and Eurocontrol,
S.A. v. Republic of
Ecuador (ICSID Case
No. ARB/06/17)
Mobil Investments
Canada Inc. and
Murphy Oil
Corporation v. Canada
(ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/4)

2007

2008

Eni Dación B.V. v.
Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela (ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/4)

2008

2008

AEI Luxembourg
Holdings v Bolivia
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unknown

case was settled on
undisclosed terms

settled

unknown

Tribunal has
jurisdiction;
settlement reached
(terms are
unknown)

settled

approx US$ 35
million

settlement reached
in May 2008 and
proceedings
discontinued

settled

approx US$ 60
million

parties reached a
settlement (details
of the settlement
agreement are not
public)

settled

up to US$ 1
billion

settlement agreed
by the parties and
proceeding
discontinued at the
request of the
Claimant

settled

unknown

settlement reached

settled

2007

2009

2012

2012

2007

2014

Trans-Global
Petroleum, Inc. v.
Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan (ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/25)
Slovak Gas Holding
BV, GDF International
SAS and E.ON Ruhrgas
International GmbH v.
Slovak Republic (ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/7)

US$ 540 million

claim is only partly
manifestly without
merit

settled

unknown

unknown

settled

Over $10.0
billion

$1.6 billion

settled

Mobil Corporation
and others v.
Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela (ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/27)

10

2001

2006

2011

pending

2005

unknown

2008

unknown

F-W Oil Interests, Inc.
v. Republic of Trinidad
& Tobago (ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/14)
Türkiye Petrolleri
Anonim Ortakligi v.
Republic of
Kazakhstan (ICSID
Case No. ARB/11/2)

over US$ 200
million

concluded (award
not public)

unknown

unknown

pending

unknown

Swiss investor v.
South American Govt.

unknown

unknown

unknown

Tatneft v. Ukraine

US $1.1 billion

unknown

unknown
4

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show, no longer available, a “reduced” version is available at
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/IIA-Tools.aspx

Appendix IV - Production Service Agreements and Service Contracts
Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 below demonstrate the distribution of revenue between an IOC and a
host government or its national oil company in a Concession or Lease Agreement and a
Production Sharing Agreement. In both examples, the price per barrel is $100. No inference
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should be made regarding the split in revenue, because the percentages that the parties negotiate
will ultimately determine how much of the revenue each will receive.
In a Concession or Lease agreement, the IOC pays all production costs, receives all residual
profits and absorbs all residual losses after paying royalties and taxes to the state. The
advantage to the host government is that it will receive income each quarter in the form of
royalties whether the project is operating at a loss or a profit. The state's royalty receipts are
calculated before operating costs and the state’s tax receipts are calculated after operating costs,
assuring the state an income stream even if oil prices decline or operating costs increase. This
example is a modern form of concession or lease agreement (royalty/tax system) because it
contains a large “draw” on gross revenues in the form of taxes.
Figure A.3 – Typical Concession or Lease Agreement (Royalty/Tax)
($ per barrel)
Gross
Revenue
IOC
Share

State
Share

$100.0

$12.00

Royalty @ 12%
$88.00

($15.40)

(Operating Cost
$72.60
Special Oil Tax @
60%

$43.56

$29.04
Income Tax @ 30%

$8.71

$20.33
Total

$20.33
24.0%

$64.27

Profit
Percent of Total Net Cash Flow

Total

76.0%

Source: Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry – Management,
Strategy and Finance. Chapter 6 (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Corporation, 2011), page 222

Figure A.4 illustrates a typical production sharing agreement (PSA or PSC) with a 10% royalty, a
60/40 profit split (state/IOC), and a 40% tax rate. In principle, royalties should not exist in PSAs
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because the state retains ownership of the oil and gas that is produced (reduced only by the IOC’s
right to the percentage of oil agreed to in the PSA. In this example the IOC’s share is $17.76 of
each barrel of oil produced on a successful discovery). Nevertheless, royalties are often a
component of PSAs.) It is also common for PSAs to provide that as production increases, the
proportion attributable to the State also increases either in an individual year or cumulatively
over the production life of the reservoir. This is usually referred to as a “cumulative production
sliding scale”.443 444
Cost recovery in a PSA is in principle, the deduction of a portion of the oil, so called “cost oil”,
to compensate the IOC for the capital and operating expenses incurred in finding and producing
the oil. If, these costs exceed the specified cost recovery limit, however, expenses are not
deductible beyond this specified maximum in the current year. The cost recovery limit is
typically stated as a percentage of gross revenues earned during the period (40% in the example
below).445
Figure A.4 – Typical Production Sharing Agreement (PSA/PSC)
($ per barrel)
Gross
Revenue
IOC
Share

State
Share

$100.00

$10.00

Royalty @ 10%
$90.00
Cost Recovery
($16.00)

(18%; 40% Maximum)
$74.00
Profit Oil Split @ 60%

$44.40

$29.60

443

Ibid Chapter 6, page 223
World Bank Institute, Guide to Extractive Industries Documents – Oil & Gas, World Bank Institute Governance
for Extractive Industries Program, January 2013, http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupalacquia/wbi/World%20Bank%20Extractive%20Industries%20Programme%20-%20Oil%20&%20Gas%20Guide.pdf
445
Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry – Management, Strategy and Finance.
Chapter 6 (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Corporation, 2011), page 224
444
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Income Tax @ 40%

$11.84

$17.76

Total

$17.76

IOC Profit Oil

$17.76

Total Net Cash Flow after Cost Recovery

$66.24

21.1%

Percent of Total Net Cash Flow

78.9%

Total

Source: Adapted from Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil & Gas Industry
- Management, Strategy and Finance (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Press, 2011) p. 224

The Evolution of PSAs 446 447
The first PSA was introduced in Indonesia in 1966. The evolution of PSAs has been influenced
by changing petroleum market conditions and the interpretation of laws and incentives for states
and IOCs.
First generation (1966 to 1975)
The state retained ownership of all oil and gas produced, including that oil or gas stored at export
terminals. Although there were no royalty rates and taxes applied, the state was guaranteed
revenue as a result of a specified profit split, without regard for cost recovery.
Second generation (1976 to 1983)
By1976, all producing countries were aware of the market value of their oil and gas resources
and their increased bargaining power. Consequently, the split of so called “profit oil” was
increased to 85/15 (state/IOC), but more flexible cost recovery limits were included in the PSAs
to take into account the increasing technical (geological) uncertainty associated with newer
exploration prospects.
At that time, under U.S. tax law, payments made by an IOC to an NOC were not considered
foreign corporate income taxes. Consequently, payments made to the NOC could not be used as
tax credits on the IOC’s U.S. tax return when the IOC remitted its foreign profits to the United
States. The Saudi government was the first to realize that if the provisions of the PSA were
446

Ibid, page 241-242
Junseog Yi, “Merits and the Demerits of the Different Types of Petroleum Contracts,”
https://www.google.com/#q=merits+and+demerits+of+the+different+types+of+petroleum+contracts
447
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modified so that the payments were made to the Saudi government rather than the NOC, the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service would classify the payments as foreign taxes, making them eligible for
foreign tax credit classification in the United States. This removed a major obstacle to the major
U.S. oil companies signing PSAs in other countries.
Third generation (1984 to 1987)
Minor adjustments to investment tax credits, corporate tax obligations, and corporate tax rates
increased the sophistication of PSAs, but did not significantly alter the incentives or
disincentives to participate in PSA’s.
Fourth generation (1988 to present)
After the substantial decrease in oil prices in the mid-1980s, new PSAs included more flexible
terms and conditions in order to attract IOCs.
Appendix V - Financial Reporting Quality Indexes
Table A.8 shows the overall and annual financial reporting quality index, capital market
development level and sample distribution referred to in section 6.9 Financial Reporting and
Operational Transparency. The greater the Overall Financial Reporting Quality Index (OFRQI),
the higher the quality of the financial reporting among private sector companies listed on an
exchange (e.g. NYSE, NASDAQ, and Euronext).

THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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Table A.8 – Financial Reporting Quality Index and Ranking

Source: Qingliang Tang, Huifa Chen and Zhijun Lin, “How to measure country level financial reporting quality,”
Social Sciences Research Network (May 18, 2012) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2114810

Appendix VI - Accounting Terminology and Classification
Under the rules of United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP)
company expenditures for assets with a useful life of more than one year are classified and
recorded as capital additions. This includes property, equipment and infrastructure whether
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acquired by direct purchase, through the acquisition of another company or participation in a
joint venture. The oil and gas industry frequently uses the more inclusive term CAPEX which is
the sum of capital additions (which are capitalized on the balance sheet) and exploration
expenses (which are expensed on the income statement in the period in which they occur). For
example in the Notes to ExxonMobil’s 2013 Summary Annual Report, the company defines
CAPEX as:
“…the combined total of additions at cost to property, plant and equipment and exploration expenses
on a before-tax basis from the Summary Statement of Income. ExxonMobil’s CAPEX includes its
share of similar costs for equity companies [companies less than 50% owned]. CAPEX excludes
assets acquired in nonmonetary exchanges (effective 2013) and depreciation on the cost of
exploration support equipment and facilities recorded to property, plant and equipment when
acquired”.448

Loans made in exchange for oil or gas are not a part of CAPEX, nor or mergers between
companies. The term transaction is another grouping of expenditures used in the news media,
but has no meaning in U.S. GAAP or IFRS.
Figure A.5 below shows that the financial figures reported by the news media, industry databases
and oil and gas companies (IOCs and NOCs) overlap each other. Global CAPEX in the oil and
gas exploration and development sector were $682 billion in 2013,449 represented by the largest
circle and includes specifically identified capital projects, the large amount of capital
expenditures that are not publically identified with a specific project, acquisitions and joint
ventures.
In 2013, the total value of reported oil and gas transactions was $337 billion, but by definition
this figure excludes all the transactions the value of which are not disclosed.450 Transactions are
therefore, a “potpourri” of deals that include specific capital expenditures, acquisitions, joint
ventures, loans for oil deals and mergers that are made public in some way, but excludes a large
448

ExxonMobil, 2013 Summary Annual Report (2014) p. 44,
http://nasdaqomx.mobular.net/nasdaqomx/7/3395/4843/
449
Barclays, “Global 2014 Capital Spending Outlook,” (December 9, 2013)
http://www.pennenergy.com/content/dam/Pennenergy/onlinearticles/2013/December/Global%202014%20EP%20Spending%20Outlook.pdf
450
E&Y, “Global Oil and Gas Transactions Review 2013,”
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013/$FILE/EYGlobal_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013.pdf
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number of transactions not identified with a specific expenditure or deal.
Figure A.5 - Relationship between Various Measures of Expenditures 2013
All Reported
Transactions
$337 billion
in 2013

All CAPEX - $682
billion in 2013

Mergers

Loans
for Oil

Specific
Capital
Projects

CAPEX not identified
by a company with a
specific project

Specific JVs &
Acquisitions

These technical distinctions are only distantly related to the politics and economics of the oil and
gas industry, but demonstrate the importance of developing and using a consistent measure of
expenditures. CAPEX is the term most often used in understanding investment trends in the oil
and gas industry and the one that is used throughout this study.
Appendix VII - Loans for Oil Agreements
This section presents a list of Loans for Oil Deals from 2006 to the 2014. Loans for oil financing
continued in 2013 ($89 billion) and in 2014 ($463.2 billion, as of June 1, 2014). Of the $89
billion in loans for oil or natural gas that occurred in 2013, $85 billion is accounted for by one
transaction that extends over 10 years. Of the $463.2 billion loans for oil or gas that occurred in
2014, $456 billion is accounted for by one transaction between Russia and China that extends
over 30 years. These transactions usually involve a long term supply agreement in which, the
country producing the oil or gas immediately receives loans from the other country for the
purpose of developing natural resources and infrastructure. The country making the loan is
repaid by delivery of gas or oil over a specified period.
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Table A.9 - Loans for oil Deals between 2006 and 2014.
2006 - (1) China and Nigeria signed a $4 billion agreement for oil and infrastructure projects; an
agreement that includes four drilling licenses for China.
(2) Separately, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) purchased 45 percent of
an oil exploration block off the coast of Nigeria for $2.3 billion.451
2007 - The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed a $3 billion loan deal with
the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) to increase the firm's supply capacity so that
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) can continue providing oil exports to Japan.452
2008 - The Venezuelan Economic and Social Development Bank (BANDES) and Petroleos de
Venezuela SA (PDVSA) signed a $4 billion loan for oil deal with China Development Bank
(CDB). The loan was intended to fund infrastructure and other development projects.453
2009 - (1) Ecuador’s national oil company, Petroecuador, signed a $1 billion loan for oil deal
with PetroChina, a subsidiary of the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) in the form
of an advance payment for oil to be delivered later.454
(2) Venezuela’s BANDES and PDVSA signed a $4 billion loan for oil deal with China
Development Bank for infrastructure development.455
02/18-24/2009 - China and Russia agreed on terms of a loan from the China Development Bank
to Russian state oil exporter Rosneft for $15 billion and pipeline company Transneft for $10

451

Michail Vafeiadis, “China 'buying out' Africa: Top 5 destinations of Chinese money
The Christian Science Monitor,” (March 1, 2012)
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2012/0301/China-buying-out-Africa-Top-5-destinations-of-Chinesemoney/Nigeria
452
Jake Simpson, “JBIC Loans $3B to Buoy UAE-Owned Oil Co. Upstream Growth,” Law 360, New York, (February 8,
2012) http://www.law360.com/articles/413892/jbic-loans-3b-to-buoy-uae-owned-oil-co-upstream-growth
453
Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America
Inter-American Dialogue,” (February 2012)
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf
454
Ibid
455
Ibid
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billion, to finance crude oil shipments over a 20-year period of not less than 241,000 barrels per
day (15 million tons per year).456
04/18/2009 - State-owned China National Petroleum Corp. agreed to lend Kazakhstan's national
energy company KazMunaiGas $5 billion and to join with KazMunaiGas to buy Kazakh oil and
gas producer MangistauMunaiGas from Indonesia's Central Asia Petroleum Ltd. The ExportImport Bank of China agreed to provide an additional $5 billion to Kazakhstan as part of the
package.457
2010 - (1) Ecuador’s Petroecuador signed a loan for oil agreement with China Development
Bank (20% for oil related investments and 80% for infrastructure investments and other
discretionary investments).458
(2) China and Nigeria signed a $23 billion agreement for China to build three oil refineries and a
fuel complex in Nigeria.459
09/2010 - (1) Ghana and China signed project loans and another deal, totaling $15 billion. The
China Export Import Bank and the government of Ghana signed a $10.4 billion concessionary
loan agreement for various infrastructure projects, payable over 20 years. A separate loan of $3
billion, from the China Development Bank, was intended for Ghana’s expanding oil-and-gas
sector. The China Development Bank also guaranteed more than $400 million for water projects
and what it called e-governance projects in Ghana.
(2) Separately, Ghana signed an agreement valued at $1.2 billion with the Chinese company
Bosai Minerals Group to build a bauxite and aluminum refinery in Ghana over four years. Bosai
Minerals will purchase 80% of the shares in Ghana Bauxite Co.460

456

John Helmer, “China loan turns Russian Oil East,” Asia Times On Line,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/KB24Ag01.html
457
Jing Yang and Victoria Ruan, “China, Kazakhstan Sign Loan-for-Oil Deal
The Wall Street Journal (Updated April 18, 2009)
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123996097676128865
458
Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America
Inter-American Dialogue,” (February 2012)
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf
459
Michail Vafeiadis, “China 'buying out' Africa: Top 5 destinations of Chinese money”
The Christian Science Monitor (March 1, 2012)
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2012/0301/China-buying-out-Africa-Top-5-destinations-of-Chinesemoney/Nigeria
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2011 - (1) Venezuela’s PDVSA signed another $4 billion loan for oil deal with China
Development Bank for infrastructure construction.461
(2) Ecuador’s government signed a $2 billion loan for oil deal with China Development Bank,
30% for oil development and 70% for discretionary infrastructure spending.462
07/03/2011 - Ecuador was in the final stages of negotiations with a Chinese bank for a $571
million loan; and state oil company, Petroecuador, signed a deal to sell oil to the Chinese energy
company, PetroChina.463
12/16/2011 - Venezuela’s PDVSA signed another $4 billion loan for oil deal with Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for housing development in Venezuela 464 bringing the
total amount owed by Venezuela to $30 billion, which was secured by Venezuela’s future oil
production.465
03/12/2012 - PDVSA announced that Citic Group Corp., China’s largest state-owned investment
company, would acquire a 10 percent stake in the Petropiar heavy-crude project held with
PDVSA and Chevron Corp. It also said that the China Development Bank would spend $4
billion to help boost production in a joint venture with China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC).
The Chinese bank and the Venezuelan government also agreed to renew a $6 billion bilateral
investment fund, of which $2 billion was intended to increase PDVSA’s oil production.466

460

Reuters, “China extends Africa push with loans, deal in Ghana” (September 2010)
http://ghanaoilonline.org/2010/09/china-extends-africa-push-with-loans-deal-in-ghana/
461
Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America
Inter-American Dialogue,” (February 2012),
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf
462
Ibid
463
Reuters, “Ecuador negotiates China bank loan, signs oil deal,”
Taipei Times (July 3, 2011) http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2011/07/03/2003507255
464
Ibid
465
Los Angeles Times, “China's Venezuela presence grows with loan-for-oil deal,” (December 16, 2011)
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2011/12/china-venezuela-loan-oil.html
466
Kelly Hearn, “Venezuelan oil a risky investment for China,” The Washington Times, (March 12, 2012)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/12/venezuelan-oil-a-risky-investment-for-china/#ixzz31tLhnzrI
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04/28/2012 - (1) China agreed to provide South Sudan $8 billion in development loans over the
next two years. The loans were to be used for road construction, agriculture, hydroelectricity,
infrastructure and telecommunications, which would be built by Chinese companies.467
12/24/2012 - OAO Rosneft signed two loan agreements for $16.8 billion with international banks
to buy BP Plc’s half of TNK-BP. OAO Rosneft also agreed on a prepaid oil supply deal with
traders Glencore International Plc (GLEN) and Vitol Group to finance its $55 billion acquisition
of TNK-BP.468
02/08/2013 - The Japanese Bank for International Cooperation and three Japanese lenders agreed
to loan the state-owned oil company of the United Arab Emirates approximately $3 billion to
advance the UAE's upstream development. The Japanese bank made the loan with three other
Japanese banks: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd., Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. and
Mizhuo Corporate Bank Ltd.469
05/22/2013 - Essar Energy, the London listed parent of Essar Oil, signed a three-way debt
financing deal with China Development Bank (CDB), the country's largest overseas lender, and
PetroChina to raise $1 billion of external commercial borrowings (ECBs). The financing
cooperation agreement also included a guaranteed product “offtake” by PetroChina.470
07/10/2013 - Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed an
agreement to facilitate $1.1 billion in low-interest loans for infrastructure in Nigeria. China was
offering Nigeria loans to help fund airport terminals in four cities, roads, light-rail line for its

467

Jared Ferrie, “China to Loan South Sudan $8 Billion for Infrastructure Projects,” Bloomberg News (Apr 28, 2012)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-28/china-to-loan-south-sudan-8-billion-for-infrastructureprojects.html
468
Jake Rudnitsky, “Rosneft Clinches Oil Deal, $16.8 Billion Loans for TNK-BP,” Bloomberg, (December 24, 2012)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-24/rosneft-agrees-to-five-year-oil-supply-deal-with-glencore-vitol.html
469
Jake Simpson, “JBIC Loans $3B to Buoy UAE-Owned Oil Co. Upstream Growth,” Law 360, New York (February 8,
2012) http://www.law360.com/articles/413892/jbic-loans-3b-to-buoy-uae-owned-oil-co-upstream-growth
470
The Economic Times, “Essar signs oil-for-loans deal with CDB, PetroChina to raise $1 billion ECBs,” (May 22,
2013) http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-05-22/news/39445340_1_china-development-bankvadinar-essar-oil
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capitol, a hydro-electric power plant and oil and gas infrastructure. This loan was one part of a
$3 billion loan for oil agreement.471
10/16/2013 - Turkmenistan's state company Turkmengaz and the China Development Bank
signed a cooperation agreement for financing the second phase of development at Galkynysh
field through an undisclosed loan to the Turkmen government. Turkmengaz and China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) also signed a contract for the purchase and sale of 25 billion
cubic meters of natural gas to China and a contract for the design and construction of an
upstream complex with a capacity to produce 30 billion cubic meters of additional natural gas
sales.472
10/22/2013 - Russia and China signed 21 trade agreements, valued at $85 billion, including a
new 100 million ton oil supply deal with China’s Sinopec. Rosneft will supply China with up to
100 million tons of crude oil over 10 years and Rosneft will export through China’s Sinopec.473
02/14/2014 - Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA and Spanish oil firm Repsol completed a
$1.2 billion financing agreement to increase output at the Petroquiriquire joint venture. The deal
would increase output to approximately 65,000 barrels per day (bpd) from 50,000 bpd.474
04/30/2014 - According to figures from the China-Latin America Finance Database (a joint effort
between the Inter-American Dialogue, a think-tank, and Boston University), China committed
almost $100 billion to Latin America between 2005 and 2013. The largest amounts have come
from the China Development Bank (CDB). More than half of China’s lending to Latin America
has been made to Venezuela. Chinese lenders committed approximately $15 billion in 2013
alone.475
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05/16/2014 - Brazilian state-controlled company, Petrobras, signed a contract finalizing a 10
year, $10 billion loan from China Development Bank Corp.476
05/21/2014 - Russia agreed to supply China with natural gas for 30 years beginning in 2018
under an agreement that has taken 10 years to negotiate. Russia's state-owned gas company,
Gazprom, signed the deal with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) during a visit
by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Shanghai. Under the deal, Gazprom will supply 38
billion cubic meters of gas to China each year, with the possibility of increasing shipments to 60
billion cubic meters per year. The Russian Ministry of Energy declined to comment on the price
China will pay for the natural gas, but the value of the 30 year deal was estimated to be $456
billion.477
Whether the size and pace of loans for oil and gas will continue is uncertain, but it has been an
important source of financing for developing countries.

Appendix VIII - Major Transactions in 2013
This appendix presents the largest transactions made in the upstream sector of the oil and gas
industry in 2013. Since the number of major transactions that occur each year averages between
1,500 and 1,800, it is clear that the list in Table A.10 is not complete but it demonstrates the
liquidity of the market for oil and natural gas properties and the diversity of transactions and
partners.
Table A.10 - Major Upstream Transaction in 2013
Africa
•

ONGC and Oil India’s acquired Videocon’s 10% equity stake in Area 1 in Mozambique.

•

Pavilion Energy was expected to complete a 20% interest in deep-water Tanzanian Blocks 1, 3
and 4 for $1.3 billion from Ophir Energy.

•

Petrobras “farmed out” some of its equity interest in two exploration stage assets offshore
Tanzania to Shell and Statoil.

http://www.alphabetics.info/international/2014/04/30/loans-for-oil-china-to-latin-america/
476
Latin American Herald Tribune, “Petrobras Signs $10 Billion Loan Deal with China,” (May 16, 2014)
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=346784&CategoryId=13280
477
Alanna Petroff, “Russia to supply China with gas for 30 years, CNNMoney (May 21, 2014)
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/21/news/russia-china-gas/index.html?iid=HP_Highlight
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•

Oil discoveries in Kenya by Tullow and Africa Oil attracted other dealmakers into Kenya and
the promising geology and proximity to current discoveries resulted in a small number of deals
in Madagascar.

•

In a pan-African deal, Petrobras “farmed out” 50% of its interests in Angola, Benin, Gabon,
Namibia, Tanzania and Nigeria to Brazilian investment bank BTG Pactual for $1.5 billion.

•

Other large deals in the region included Marathon Oil’s exit from two Blocks in Angola, selling
its 10% interest in each to Sonangol Sinopec International and Sonangol for $1.5 billion and
$600 million, respectively.

•

In Algeria, state-owned Sonatrach exercised its pre-emption right to acquire 18.375% in
Petoceltic’s Isarene development.

Asia
•

China acquired Petrobras’ assets in Peru for $2.6 billion.

•

China acquired of a 25% stake in the West Qurna field in Iraq from ExxonMobil.

•

Sinopec acquired a 33.33% interest in Apache’s Egypt’s oil and gas assets for U.S. $3.1 billion.

•

Sinopec’s acquired Marathon’s 10% stake in Angola.

•

CNPC’s acquired a 20% interest in the Yamal LNG project.

•

Sinochem’s acquired a 40% interest in Pioneer Natural Resources shale properties.

•

China Development Bank/Petro China signed a loan for oil deal with Petroecuador.

•

Japan Bank for International Cooperation signed a loan agreement for $3 billion with Abu
Dhabi National Oil Company.

•

Temasek (based in Singapore) invested $2.3 billion in Repsol, acquiring 5.4% of its treasury
shares.

•

Japex (34% Japan state owned) acquired 10% interest in Progress Energy’s
North Montney gas assets and the LNG plant that it is developing in Prince Rupert.

•

Pertamina (Indonesian NOC) and PTT (Thailand NOC) jointly acquired Hess’s Indonesian
assets for $1.3 billion.

•

Petronas (Malaysian NOC) acquired natural gas assets from Talisman for $1.4 billion.
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Australia
Chevron agreed to invest up to $349 million in two stages in two of Beach Energy’s

•

prospective permits (PEL 218 and ATP 855).
In Papua New Guinea, Total SA, Santos and Osaka Gas began acquiring stakes in emerging

•

onshore gas fields to position themselves for the next round of gas projects as ExxonMobil’s
PNG LNG project moved toward completion and the production of first gas in 2014.
Canada
Centrica plc and Qatar Petroleum’s acquird Suncor Energy’s producing conventional gas assets

•

for $986 million.
ConocoPhillips sold its 100% interest in the undeveloped Clyden oil sands leasehold located in

•

Alberta’s Athabasca oil sands region to Imperial Oil and ExxonMobil for $720 million.
A group of institutional investors acquired a 6.5% stake in Canadian Oil Sands Ltd., including

•

its Alberta oil sands Syncrude Project, from Newmont Mining Corporation for $710 million.
PKN Orlen SA’s acquired the publicly traded E&P Company, TriOil Resources Ltd, for a total

•

transaction value of $244 million. This was Poland’s first venture into the Canadian energy
market.
CNOOC acquired Canadian oil-sands operator Nexen Inc. for $5.2 billion.478

•

Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
•

Activity in this region was dominated by the crude oil supply deal between Rosneft and the
Chinese NOC, CNPC valued at $60 billion.

•

Rosneft acquired the remaining 49% share in ITERA Oil and Gas Company LLC for $2.9
billion.

•

Rosneft (through its new subsidiary ITERA Oil and Gas Company LLC) completed the
acquisition of a 40% stake in Arctic Russia BV from Enel for cash consideration of $1.8
billion. Arctic Russia BV owns 49% of the share capital in SeverEnergia which owns licenses
in four large oil and gas fields (Samburgskoye, Yaro-Yakhinskoye, Yevo-Yakhinskoye and

478

Carolyn King, “CNOOC Purchase of Nexen Is Approved by U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal. www.online.wsj.com,
(February 12, 2013)
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Severo-Chaselskoye) in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region of Russia. The aggregated
interest of Rosneft in SeverEnergia is 19.6% (.49 x .40).
•

Rosneft signed the Completion Deed for Russian offshore blocks in the Barents Sea and the
Sea of Okhotsk, confirming agreements on the Arctic shelf exploration with Statoil and Eni.

•

Rosneft acquired the remaining 65% stake of Taas-Yuriakh Neftegazodobycha LLC for more
than $2 billion.

•

NOVATEK sold a 20% stake in the Yamal LNG project to CNPC.

•

LUKOIL purchased a 100% stake in Samaranafta, an exploration and production unit
operating in the Volga region, from Hess Corporation for $2.1 billion.

•

LUKOIL also acquired the remaining 50% of the shares of Kama-oil, operating in the Volga
region containing oil reserves of 12.8 million tons, for $400 million, increasing its ownership
to 100%.

•

Rosneft signed an agreement with Corporacion Venezolana de Petroleo, a subsidiary of
PDVSA, to create a joint venture to develop heavy oil reserves in Venezuela as part of the
Carabobo-2 project.

•

Rosneft also acquired a 30% interest in 20 deep-water exploration blocks in the Gulf of Mexico
held by ExxonMobil.

•

LUKOIL and Rosneft were awarded licenses on the Norwegian continental shelf in the Barents
Sea (30% and 20%, respectively).

•

Transaction volumes and the number of deals increased significantly in Kazakhstan. The deals
that were disclosed were valued at more than $11 billion. The cornerstone of this initiative was
CNPC’s entry into the Kashagan offshore project. CNPC acquired an 8.33% stake for $5.4
billion from KazMunaiGas, which had earlier acquired ConocoPhillip’s stake in the project.

Europe
•

The largest North Sea transaction was OMV’s $2.65 billion purchase of a portfolio of UK and
Norwegian assets from Statoil.

•

Canadian company, Ithaca Energy, acquired Valiant Petroleum in a deal valued at close to $500
million, and Spike Exploration (backed by Norwegian PE) acquired Bridge Energy for
approximately $200 million.
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India
•

There were three large outbound transactions by OVL and OIL totaling $5.6 billion. Of these,
two transactions involved acquiring a 20% interest (10% each from Anadarko and Videocon) in
the Rovuma Area 1 Offshore Block in Mozambique. The other large transaction involved
OVL’s exercise of its pre-emption rights to increase its interest in the BC-10 heavy oil offshore
concession in Brazil.

Latin America and the Caribbean
•

The largest deals of the year included: PetroChina and CNPC’s acquisition of assets in Peru
and Ecuador; Pacific Rubiales purchase of regional independent Petrominerales; ONGC
Videsh’s purchase of assets in Brazil from Petrobras; and Chevron’s purchase of a stake in YPF
SA in the Argentina.

United States
•

Two of the largest deals in the upstream sector included: Devon Energy’s acquisition of
GeoSouthern Energy for $6 billion; and Fieldwood Energy’s acquisition of producing assets of
in the Gulf of Mexico from Apache Corporation for $3.75 billion.

•

Chesapeake and Chinese state-owned oil company China Petrochemical Corp. (Sinopec)
announced an agreement in which Sinopec would purchase a 50% undivided interest in
850,000 leasehold acres controlled by Chesapeake Energy in northern Oklahoma.479

•

Pioneer Natural Resources agreed to sell a 40% interest in some of its West Texas Wolfcamp
Shale reserves in the Permian Basin to a U.S. subsidiary of Chinese company Sinochem Group,
for $1.7 billion. Sinochem paid Pioneer $500 million in cash when the joint venture closed and
the remaining $1.2 billion by carrying 75% of Pioneer’s share of future drilling costs, until the
$1.2 billion drilling carry is utilized. Pioneer would continue as the operator of the properties.

Source: E&Y, Global Oil and Gas Transaction Review 2013,
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013/$FILE/EYGlobal_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013.pdf
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Chesapeake Energy Corporation Press Release, “Chesapeake Energy Corporation Announces $1.02 Billion
Mississippi Lime Joint Venture,” (Feb. 25, 2013) http://www.chk.com/news/articles/Pages/1788571.aspx
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